The Cameron doctrine?

In a few months time a new British government will be formed, most likely by David Cameron's Conservative party. Finding clear policy statements by the Tories is hard enough for domestic policy, so understanding how a Cameron foreign policy will shape up, needs a degree of imagination. The simplest explanation for the lack of hints as to what a Cameron doctrine may be, is in the nature of Britain's foreign policy establishment. Like Obama across the Atlantic, the underlying theme from a change of administration is continuity. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office sets the agenda in many respects and newly appointed ministers are often happy to let foreign policy continue in its traditional mode. The other reason for undramatic shifts is that newly elected governments often arrive with only the vaguest of ideas of what their foreign policy should look like.

Margaret Thatcher arrived during a period of severe domestic turbulence and British foreign policy had been in steady decline since the early 1970s. John Major's popularity had been boosted by the Gulf War but the recession was the overwhelming issue for voters. Tony Blair's vague promise of an ethical foreign policy appealed to the centre left core of his vote, but was a small part of a new fresh approach to politics that he tried to represent. Gordon Brown was the first prime minister to take office while Britain was at war for half a century. But having never mentioned foreign policy during the Blair years, apart from economic led initiatives for Africa, it was unlikely that he would start gushing out ideals on world peace. His book on courage was about the limit.

British leaders also tend to be highly reactive in their approaches to foreign policy. Blair is the exception here. The Falklands war, Gulf war, Bosnia and Kosovan conflicts each presented Britain with two questions. What degree of intervention does Britain take and how does this relate to Britain's role in the world? They all arrived unexpectedly. They all represented challenges to a Britain that has often tried to punch above its weight.

You would expect Cameron to follow this pattern of a reactive strategy. Tackling international crises, most likely with America but often with European powers, will be on an ad hoc basis. Whatever does arise will require international co-operation and so far Cameron's attempts to reach out to future potential allies has been lamentable. It's hard to believe that the Conservative party's troubled relationship with the EU won't make co-operation with European states difficult. The emphasis is on transatlantic co-operation on their website; European co-operation is not mentioned. The Tories re-position Britain's relationship with Europe solely in terms of how continental power has a negative effect, not what any positive future co-operation over foreign policy issues might be.

The one foreign policy issue that Cameron can't step back from or resist international co-operation is in Afghanistan. David Cameron has used his support for the war to draw to gain strong backing from the right wing press. But this is not necessarily part of an overarching foreign policy, it is based more in support for soldiers on the frontline. The Brown government has been accused of selling the army short and Cameron intends to be on the popular side of the argument here. A withdrawal half way through any Cameron first term would be the ideal result. Britain could then return to its traditional realist and isolationist stance, rather than the liberal interventionist outlook of the Blair years.

This return to isolationism would appeal to the Tory old guard of the 1990s who still make up a significant contingency in the party. Major was far more cautious than Thatcher in his foreign policy and after the Gulf war, Britain languished on the world stage. The ambivalence to the Balkan wars was the nadir of British foreign policy in the 1990s. Major wasn't helped by his poor relationship with Bill Clinton either. The old guard of Douglas Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind who ran foreign and defence ministries respectively are respected wise members of the Conservative party's foreign policy cognoscenti despite presiding over a dire Balkans policy. The Tories of the 1990s were so myopic that Europe was as far as their foreign policy went. There is every indication that any future Conservative government will have an equally limited outlook, with Europe being an obsession over anything else.

Assuming Britain's economy recovers and a steady withdrawal from Afghanistan can be achieved then Cameron could shift to a Blairite interventionist model. Conservatives have established links with neo-conservatives in the United States. The party has a strong right wing Jewish backing that would support strong action against Iran or any other threat to Israel. Having decent relations with allies will be crucial in such circumstances. Faced with a serious threat personal differences might be put to one side. Britain is regarded by America and Europe as a main player and is expected to fulfil these obligations.

It is also difficult to assess Cameron's intentions from his time in opposition, as they have acted primarily as an opposition party on many issues, rather than putting forward a consistent stance. They supported the Iraq war as much if not than Labour, but criticised the aftermath. They have been happy to watch the Labour party squirm during the Chilcot inquiry but know that they have been lucky to avoid scrutiny of their role. They criticised disproportionate Israeli action against Hezbollah in 2006, but have portrayed themselves as a dedicated supporter of Israel on most other occasions. Accusations of opportunism and inconsistency can be easily aimed.

A recent presentation at Chatham House by Cameron's foreign policy team failed to clarify their aims. Dame Pauline Neville Jones explained that a Conservative foreign policy would be more pre-emptive and intelligent in its approach, which is to expected. That is what the foreign policy establishment do all day. Foreign policy is also, as previously stated, often reactive to events. A doctrine cannot ever work if it doesn't factor in the unexpected. Cameron will probably learn this quite soon after taking office.