Iraq – opinion still divided

Six and a half years on from the invasion and there is no let up in the controversy over the decision to invade Iraq. The situation might be considered better than the nadir of 2006 and 2007; elections are due to take place in January; and the media have generally moved on to Afghanistan, but it has been and will remain a fragile state. The run up to the war and decisions made are set to be pored over once again, as memoirs from key Bush administration officials are published and the Chilcot inquiry investigates the British perspective.

The Iraq war was a unique conflict for British domestic politics in that it divided both the left and right. The British left was split between a policy of humanitarian intervention and an anti imperialist opposition to the conflict. The right saw Saddam as a threat but the realist right preferred to keep the status quo. The media also adopted conflicting positions. Papers like the Mail put their pathological opposition to Labour over opposition to British involvement. Despite having clear concerns over terrorism. The Sunday Telegraph was pro war in the run up with questionable reporting from Con Coughlin, but has always been happy to attack Labour since. Leaked documents on the eve of the Chilcot inquiry are designed to set the narrative for the forthcoming inquest. The Iraq war is still a very large stick to attack political opponents with.

The legacy of the Iraq war still also has reverberations for the individuals involved. The EU's quest for a President had Tony Blair in the running, advocated by Gordon Brown. But the opposition from European politicians and the British media over his involvement in the war presented a brick wall of dissatisfaction. Other British political figures, like Hoon, Campbell and Straw have varying degrees of influence these days, but it would be hard to argue that the war and its aftermath didn't deal a severe blow to the longevity of their political careers. The great survivor is probably Brown, who acquiesced with the decisions, but made next to no statements at the time. The American players have mostly moved on either to retirement, think tanks or the private sector. America's executive system that enables political appointees rather than democratically elected representatives to take foreign policy decisions has meant those involved are no longer in any position of power. The shift towards Democrat power that began with the midterm elections of November 2006 has for better or worse closed a chapter in American politics. The war was less controversial in America, at least amongst the political class, so the quest for answers and even retribution that exists in Britain, does not follow across the Atlantic.

The academic debate keeps the invasion of the Iraq war relevant. Some academics argue that Bush foreign policy is no different from the American tradition and that future scenarios like pre 2003 Iraq will be treated simile. The decisions made in late 2002 are still under archive and until the day they are opened to scrutiny, academics say we should reserve judgement. Academic input has been brought into the Chilcot inquiry at an early stage. But this feels so late, the absence of academic consultation on Iraqi culture, society and history was a fatal error in planning for post invasion Iraq. There have been numerous explosive accounts by journalists and military men who were on the ground after the invasion. This has forged the public's view of how the conflict unfolded. But the academic's job is to collate this first hand primary research and present it within a cogent framework, explaining what exactly happened. Academics like Toby Dodge, Charles Tripp and Richard Haass and Kenneth Pollack have presented ongoing academic analysis but now as the Iraq conflict moves on and America contemplates withdrawal, a broader narrative might develop.

When the debate rages over the decision to go to war, a sort of collective amnesia descends. What was the context behind the events leading up to 2003. From the American perspective a decade of failed Iraq policy culminated with the invasion. For Britain, the problem was depicted in the media as a recent issue, but it had burned in foreign affairs committee rooms in Washington for twelve years.

The critical view of American foreign policy catalogues a series of policy blunders. Firstly the failure to understand Iraqi politics in 1991 and expectation of a coup. Second a failed and ambiguous containment policy that left America impotent and allowed Saddam to disregard all UN resolutions. Then finally, a total misconception of how America would be received in 2003 and no plan to reconstruct the country. The context was one of failure on both sides and this should be remembered when assessing the decisions of late 2002.

The errors in American strategy were mirrored by Saddam's reckless behaviour and the nature of regional Middle Eastern politics where saving face ruled decision making. Saddam invaded Kuwait to secure his position amongst the military elite, whilst also being totally ignorant of western politics and the potential outcome of such an act. His brinkmanship with the United States and pretence of possessing WMD to deter Iran brought war on his country, but both in 1991 and 2003 Saddam did not believe that America would invade.

9/11 changed everything etc. True to an extent. It lowered the threshold, it reiterated the fear of a terrorist-WMD nexus, it installed a climate of fear in the American public. But the reasons for invading Iraq were the same before 9/11 as they were after. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 had set in law the desire for regime change. Saddam's supposed breaches of UN resolutions and international law were regularly used as the legal basis for regime change in 2003. The WMD argument was an extension of the argument, not the meat of it. A re-evaluation of the American argument for war will most likely emphasise this point. That 9/11 didn't create a massively different mindset, the plan to remove Saddam was a key Bush administration goal from the time it came to office.

The fourth 9/11 - another revolution?

Those three digits have laid down some seminal dates in modern history: September 11th 1973, the Pinochet coup in Chile; 9th November 1989, the opening of the Berlin Wall; 11th September 2001, the Al-Qaida attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon. Who would discount another epoch making moment this Monday? The break between East and West Berlin was the iconic moment of 1989, even though Poland had elected the non-Communist Solidarity in June, the political breakthrough against communism. The chain of events that followed led to a redefining of international relations: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the EU and the spread of globalisation leading to India and China's ascendancy. But what now? The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed the world in its most precarious position since 1989, even though regional conflicts in Latin America and Africa have alleviated slightly. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the most significant consequence of 1989, leading to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and the withdrawal of American interest in South Asia. The 1991 Gulf war and the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s both led to 9/11 in 2001 and the wars that followed.

If we had to plot ahead and look for this next seismic moment, where and what would it be? The collapse of American forces in Afghanistan, airstrikes on Iran by Israel, or an implosion in Pakistan? The twentieth anniversary will provide commentators and contemporary historians ample space to consider how the world has progressed since, but history tells us that another defining moment could be just around the corner. We will then - twenty years after - be faced with a whole new set of consequences to deal with.

Critics of Western foreign policy highlight the wasted opportunity that followed 1989: the "peace dividend" dissipated as regional conflicts continued and authoritarian regimes retained their grip. Fukuyama's End of History predicting the dominance of Western liberal democracy was blocked by autocratic rule in the Middle East and Russia's return to traditional authoritarianism, after initial steps towards democracy. Whilst American policy makers espoused this new era in the early 1990s as ripe for the expansion of democracy, the reality never quite matched the rhetoric. True Latin America democratized as did South East Asia, but Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan - key allies in the Middle East - stagnated in expanding popular representation. The rise of militant Islam was driven by a perceived apostasy (and lack of popular accountability) in these repressive allies. The 9/11 attacks were part of Bin Laden's strategy to polarize the Arab street and spark revolution against this authoritarian rule. A 1989 style of revolution in the Middle East would have been Osama's dream outcome. But given the way democracy has been curtailed in the region in the last decade, it may not be for a while