Green Dragons' Den....

There was no Theo Pathitis wit, Duncan Bannatyne canniness or a Peter Jones put-down and only one wacky entrepreneur, rather serious products for a real global problem with an appropriately informed panel. The Green Dragons' Den - Dragons' Lair to avoid infringing IPR - was no less entertaining and certainly more inspiring, with sustainable products being pitched to a panel mixed with venture capitalists, academics and journos. With only seven minutes to convince, there was little opportunity to expand on the better products, but was a saviour for some badly thought out rambles that made up the numbers. The prize on offer - not a multimillionaire's cash or nause - but simply one month's PR. A couple of websites encouraging localism, democratic empowerment and sustainable green economics were credible but not going to change embedded bad habits. More radical ideas such as an extensive network of food tunnels around the UK and bio-reactors based on Australian lake deposits became bogged down and over elaborate, although the intention was benign. A bizarre plan to convert email - telephone booths into recycling photo booths was wackiest of the night. But it was the technological products that had the longest shelf life. A rechargeable battery that fitted into a USB port and PC energy saving software were up and running products that probably didn't need PR. Carbon 8 systems - a process that uses accelerated carbon technology to treat contaminated soils and waste - was the most innovative product of the night and got my vote. These entrepreneurs are at the forefront of the environmental battle against climate change and are shaping sustainable futures. Hopefully the next event will have a cash incentive above some simple PR.

http://environment.meetup.com/302/calendar/6770530/

South Asia’s militarists

South Asia is in the grip of a dual crisis - neighbours Iran and Pakistan face invasion and implosion respectively. The latest can be summarized as this: Iran is accused of developing a nuclear weapons programme, exporting terror and generating regional instability; Pakistan has a nuclear weapons programme, has exported and currently is an epicentre of terror, regarded by the West as a vital ally, but now faces an unpredictable internal political crisis. Both countries have arrived at these current states through dramatic upheaval over the last thirty years, but specifically, two individuals Reza Shah Pahlavi and General Zia ul-haq were critical players in this process. It would be easy to criticise the American foreign policy that supported these two regional strongmen, as part of its anti Soviet geopolitical strategy. The lack of foresight and application of realpolitik is a widely distributed critique and not without merit. But more importantly both dictators thrived in post colonial environments, where nationalism, industrialisation and militarism catapulted their respective states into revolution and division. South Asia’s desire to re-assert itself against the West was a stronger dynamic in shaping today’s predicament than misguided American foreign policy.

American support undoubtedly contributed to both leaders dominance. The Shah was considered by his opponents as America’s puppet, although he would gain the upper hand in the relationship after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. General Zia seizure of power – including the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – drew American criticism, but the Pakistani leader re-positioned his country as a vital weapon against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. American aid provided the basis for industrialisation for both countries, Iran in the 1960s from the Johnson administration, Pakistan in the 1980s from Carter then Reagan. Arms were the pivot of the dependency. Unprecedented volumes of military equipment were sold to Iran following Nixon’s 1972 carte blanche in exchange for oil revenues; Pakistan acted as the CIA’s conduit, supplying and training the Afghan mujahedin whilst building its own military capacity at the same time. In the post Vietnam era both nations benefited from a relocation of American arms supplies, but it was the ambition of these two leaders that drove their military dictatorships. It was their ambitions that led in different ways to two highly volatile states, now regarded as preeminent international security threats.

The obvious similarity between these two is the critical role designated to them by American Cold War strategy to contain communism. The Shah feared Soviet influence from the early days of his rule, was restored to power by the CIA’s 1953 coup against perceived communist influence, established the brutal security service SAVAK to repress domestic communism, and built up a fearsome military arsenal to counter Soviet influence in Iraq and the Gulf. Zia considered communism the preeminent ideological threat to Islam, cultivated relations with anti-communist hardliners in Washington, and directed Pakistan’s entire military resources in the Afghan-Soviet war.

Domestically both leaders consolidated their power through expansive economic development. The Shah pushed for stratospheric industrialisation fuelled by oil revenues, his ego, and Persian nationalism. Zia presided over modest growth in comparison - seven percent annually - but this development favoured the elites, the military class and Zia political allies. Whilst the Shah used Iran’s natural resource for development, Zia relied on Gulf and American aid. Corruption and economic mismanagement characterised both regimes, eventually creating widespread popular opposition.

The critical constant is Islam, but in totally opposing ways. The Shah acknowledged Shia Islam as part of Persian culture, but presented Pahlavi nationalism as preceding Islam and by implication superior. His extravagances, absolutism and, critically, alliance with the United States alienated the Shia clergy. By focusing on Marxist opposition, the Shia infrastructure – led by Khomeini – was free to develop, laying the path for Islamic revolution. Zia had seen how the power of Islam in Iran shaped politics, so sought to avoid the Shah’s mistakes. Once Zia had seized power, he embarked on an extensive Islamization programme, turning against the grain of Pakistani secular culture, imposing strict Sharia law, restructuring the economy to Islamic precepts, and elevating political party Jamaat e Islami to a central role. Pakistan received vast donations from Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East to establish madrasas and build mosques. Zia encouraged foreign support for both the Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s own Islamic renaissance. But ultimately the consequence of the Shah’s ambivalence and Zia’s proselytizing was the same – the growth of militant Islamism.

The second devastating legacy left by these two autocrats was the proliferation of nuclear technology. The Shah’s nuclear programme – assisted by Kissinger from 1975 - was short-lived and dismantled by Khomeini after 1979, but the infrastructure and expertise plus the very concept of an Iranian bomb remained. Zia’s contribution to South Asia’s nuclear arms race was clearer. Building on the programme established by Bhutto in the early 1970s, Zia pursued an active nuclear agenda – led by AQ Khan – that was ignored by the American leadership, for the sake of preserving Pakistan’s role against the greater Soviet threat. The balance between containment and proliferation always swung to the former in America’s Cold War policy.

Similarities continue in how they managed relations with the West. Both were opportunists, adept at exploiting American geopolitical interests against the backdrop of Cold war policy. The Shah played up the Soviet threat across Iran’s north border, exploited Nixon’s weak foreign policy position through 1972 and 1973, and ultimately received the freedom to purchase any military hardware needed and pursue a hawkish oil policy. Zia likewise seized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to re-establish relations in Washington and improve his poor international reputation, then exploited Reagan’s hardline against communism to up the military aid.

American arms policy and pursuit a wider geopolitical interests are commonly cited as factors in the region’s transformation in the last two decades of the Cold war, but it was the extremism that developed during both reigns that dominated. Khomeini’s militant rhetoric was inadvertently cultivated by the Shah’s excesses and American alliance, whilst Zia directly cultivated Islamic extremism, creating prototypes for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Just as the Shah pursued his pro Western secular rule to the end – despite fierce clerical opposition; Zia continued his support for the most radical elements in the Afghan jihad - especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – until his death.

The consequence of such autocratic behaviour differed in gestation. The Shah’s excesses exploded in Iran at the end of his reign; Zia’s legacy emerged again with a vengeance in the second year of this century in New York. Both leaders left a legacy of resentment, division and brutality. Critically both leaders used American foreign policy and military aid to reinforce their own positions, and while doing so, creating the impression that America only saw South Asian states as pawns against the Soviets. The anti-West sentiment that now exists in South Asia is as much down to the Shah and Zia’s thirst for militarism and its consequences, as it was from American foreign policy.