Thursday, December 27, 2007

Bhutto suffers the inevitable

Having survived an assassination attempt on her first day and facing physical and political threats from all sides, Benazir Bhutto's return to Pakistan has ended in tragedy and sadly an inevitable assassination. With such a pressing Islamist threat, the Zia old guard still flexing their influence, and great uncertainty over how much control Musharraf actually has, this conclusion to Bhutto's career and undoubtedly the start of a new violent chapter for Pakistan is not surprising. Bhutto was without doubt a corrupt and feudal leader who had been unable to state a clear vision for the future since her return, but she was probably the second lesser of the four evils.

Two conclusions are clear from this assassination in Rawalpindi. Musharraf has no control over internal security and his state of emergency tactic of arresting moderates has clearly backfired. Second the Islamists are clearly in the ascendancy, they have penetrated internal state security apparatus with the capability to attack any politician regardless of their security detail. There is also the more alarming prospect of a return to the Zia-Islamist alliance of the 1980s. Zia ordered the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Rawalpindi, a garrison town, might be considered one of the more secure Pakistani cities but it's military and ISI presence may not be a coincidence. Rawalpindi has also witnessed several bomb attacks over the last few years, including an assassination attempt on Musharraf in December 2003 and recent suicide attacks against the military.

Where does this leave Pakistan? Firstly Musharraf's response will be closely monitored, especially those who accuse him of collusion in this attack. Then the elections are due to occur early next year, can any candidate feel safe when campaigning, will Islamists escalate their campaign emboldened by this success, will elections actually take place? Musharraf has evaporating support in Washington, Sharif has failed to convince, meanwhile America's ultimate concern - Al Qaeda and neo-Taliban forces along the Afghanistan border - can only feel stronger after this assassination. Bhutto was unequivocal in her support for a US onslaught in the tribal areas if elected. The Islamist violence that erupted after the storming of the Red Mosque has continued with relentless ferocity and Pakistan is now close to if not over the edge.

Wednesday, December 26, 2007

Tea with the enemy

In the secretive, delicate and ruthless covert arena, hard-nosed negotiations with adversaries occur regularly. Official admittance is often rare though, as it undermines public political statements, puts moderates (those usually doing the talking) at risk from extremists, and is often far from productive. Just as British intelligence negotiated with Irish republicans prior to an official agreement, Israelis liaised with Fatah, and the CIA have cultivated contacts with Sunni insurgents. Today's reports of MI6 meetings with the Taliban is not news therefore, not in terms of intelligence services historical activities nor in light of the current conflict in Afghanistan. This story has moved to the political level as British domestic opposition accuse Gordon Brown of backtracking on a previous promise not to negotiate with the Taliban; and Afghan authorities, having just expelled two diplomats, are looking but failing to convince the world that progress is being made. American commanders have also expressed dissatisfaction with the very idea of negotiations with an extremist movement that harboured Al-Qaeda militants - vital to the group's rise in the 1990s.


MI6, the British army, the UN and various other players in Afghanistan's latest great but not very gratifying game is without an end in sight. A war that appeared concluded in early 2002 has come back with a vengeance this year. MI6 are merely continuing a long held role and manipulating long held assets. SIS played an auxiliary role during the Afghan war against the Soviets, had a deep and valuable relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud in the following decade, and were at the forefront of the UK-US invasion in October 2001. Neither SIS nor the British government have verified these recent reports and will not do so.

Call it pragmatism or the product of an increasingly intractable conflict, as up to 10,000 Taliban insurgents in a six year plus war are forcing alternative and radical solutions. Splitting the Taliban between an acceptable indigenous faction and the hard line foreign mixed cadre could be the strategy behind MI6's liaison. The increasing foreign influence adds urgency to any possible deal with indigenous militias. The rise of the Pakistani neo-Taliban across the border - allied closely to the Afghan Taliban leadership - has narrowed options further. Suddenly NATO - despite the recent re-capture of Musa Qala - is in a position of weakness as the threat has been trebled by expanding militancy on either side.

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Iranian estimate or guesstimate..

The drum is back in the cupboard for the time being. The drum beat of war that has become louder and faster for the last year has been knocked out of its stride. This week's National Intelligence Assessment (NIE) downplays the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme: "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program"; as of June 2007 the intelligence agencies "assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program". Iran still poses a threat, being "technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015," with "the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." The pressure seems to have abated and this volte-face appears to be an apparent triumph for the diplomatic voices of Britain and Europe. Russia and China will use this revision as a justification for their caution and resist stricter sanctions. The hawks in the Bush administration have had their march to Tehran cancelled, temporarily, but will there be a rapprochement with the long standing foe? On the evidence of today's White House conference, this seems unlikely. Iran continues to antagonise America (and Israel) in a variety of ways. Any grand bargain now still implies acceptance of Iran's behaviour and this seems inconceivable given the rhetoric of recent months. A clearer understanding of the Bush administrations animosity and intransigence towards Iran is
provided by the fact that this estimate was drafted one year previous. Verbal assaults have been used to discourage Iranian meddling in Iraq, maintain Bush's "war president" status, and scare Democrats from any dovish position, in the knowledge that the threat isn't that great. The intelligence agencies have shown their hand early to avoid a repeat of the Iraq war build up - where the inevitability of war shaped intelligence, not the reverse. A collision course between Iran and Bush is still a route, but the CIA, NSA or anyone of the other 14 agencies are not providing the map this time. When neocons like Robert Kagan - an intellectual architect of the Iraq war - advise the administration to talk to Iran, the game seems up, a new era of peace will surely be upon us! Unfortunately we have two radical unpredictable and ignorant leaders on either side, who are more than capable of snatching defeat from the jaws of an acceptable score draw.

Iran's leadership will react with predictable self-satisfaction. A role exists for the Gulf Arab states - having concluded the recent Gulf Co-operation Council meeting in Qatar - facing a diminished Iranian threat, as a possible bridge between the Great Satan and the Mad Mullahs. The Democrats are refocusing the domestic debate with diplomacy as the sole elixir, putting to bed neoconservative militarism. But Bush probably would have gone to war against Iraq with or without credible intel, and Iran - as the estimate does state - still has the capability to go nuclear, so Ayatollahs lounging on Texan ranches or George and Laura admiring the mosques of Qom are far off visions at the moment I'm afraid.