Afghanistan 2012

The debate surrounding the best strategy for Afghanistan has reached a new fever pitch this week on both sides of the Atlantic. The domestic concerns of NATO's leading members – American and Britain – have been contrasting. America's political and military leadership is divided over troop numbers and how to deal with President Karzai's corrupt government. British debate lies on a more human level: letters of condolence and basic welfare of soldiers has dominated the public's view of the war. The other NATO allies have a fair presence: France just over 3,000; Germany 4,365, but Britain's combat role has caused a disproportionate number of casualties. The public opposition to the war in NATO's allies has been mild in comparison. France has taken a more cautious line for future Afghan strategy, knowing that all bets are off until President Obama decides on the next step. These questions about troop numbers and strategy are important, but Western leaders need to be asking themselves one dominant question: what kind of Afghanistan do we want in the years ahead. What will Afghanistan in 2012, 2022 or beyond look like.

Whereas Iraq was a war of choice, initiated by America and with modest international support. Afghanistan was widely accepted as needing intervention after September 11th and NATO's invoking of Article 5 sealed a wider international effort. If the September 11th plots had emanated from say Somalia, punitive strikes and withdrawal might have sufficed, but Afghanistan's strategic location – its proximity to Pakistan, Iran and China – means that it cannot escape attention. If we base our future hopes for country within this geographical context – failure seems unthinkable. But given the vital importance that Afghanistan has to its neighbours, success should be certainly possible. China, Iran and Russia all have an interest in a stable Afghan state. Clearly the actual material contribution – troops especially – could be limited. China has been approached for humanitarian and training assistance. A significant international role is certainly many Chinese see as long overdue. Afghanistan's natural wealth is appealing and investment by Chinese companies – in a similar way to Africa – could be feature of the country's future redevelopment. China needs to contribute in other ways though, if it is to reap the rewards.

Russia's history with Afghanistan makes any involvement difficult. President Obama has sought Russian assistance in more tangential ways – the use of Russian airspace for American supply lines was discussed in April, but has failed to become a reality. The opening up of Russian airspace would solve many logistical problems, especially if American troop numbers increase. But the historical enmity between the Cold war foes and administration complications like transit fees are hindering the deal. An Afghan future would be internationalised – having two world powers close to its borders means it can be easily exploited for the better.

Most Western diplomats will hope that an Afghan future is free of corruption for which President Karzai's election result has come to epitomise. Replacing Karzai or somehow marginalizing him might be the best way forward given the cancellation of the run off with Abdullah Abdullah. The creation of a loya jirga of tribal chiefs would be more balanced than the dominant elite that Karzai represents. The expansion of the national decision making process to the many under represented Afghan ethnic groups would help solve some of the intense division that exists in the country.

Wishing for a democratic redeveloped Afghanistan is great, but this is almost solely based on progress against the raging insurgency. Taliban attacks occur daily across the country with no real safe havens. Discussions of withdrawal fill Afghani politicians with dread. The stark warning that the Taliban would overrun Kabul in days if NATO withdrew has emphasised how serious the conflict has become. These pessimistic statements disguise the mixed reality on the ground, where reconstruction and development are being undertaken by NATO troops. The McCrystal counterinsurgency plan has started – protecting the local population and building confidence between Afghans and foreign troops. An Afghanistan of the future would somehow have overcome these barriers between the foreign and domestic. Cultural differences are vast, but shared goals of peace and economic development exist. Democracy and political freedoms might have to wait.

2012 is a few years away but it is only three years. Not much time for things to happen. The NATO coalition are realising that patience is one of the traits that will win this war. Training troops, curbing corruption and reconstruction will take a long time. The ingrained ineffectiveness of domestic police and army; the unreliability of Karzai's administration; 30 years of war, all require a long term commitment to overturn. The Obama administration has to balance between showing commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but not giving an indefinite length to their involvement, a consideration needed to ensure domestic support. No progress in eight years has made the American public weary, but it may well take at least another eight or more.

Afghanistan's future has been linked to Pakistan for far longer than the current conflict, so it is a truism that both futures are interlinked. But 2012 Afghanistan will be equally defined by what is occurring in other neighbouring countries. The situation in Iran could turn worse than it currently is and totally dwarf the Afghan conflict. A regional war following an Israeli or American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would most likely shift the focus westwards. Iran's allies lie to its west, so Lebanon, Syria and Palestine would focus American attention away from Afghanistan. This is not to dismiss some sort of Iranian attack on American forces in Afghanistan. 2012 will be an American election year and Obama will be focused on protecting Israel and Saudi Arabia, over anything else.

Iraq – opinion still divided

Six and a half years on from the invasion and there is no let up in the controversy over the decision to invade Iraq. The situation might be considered better than the nadir of 2006 and 2007; elections are due to take place in January; and the media have generally moved on to Afghanistan, but it has been and will remain a fragile state. The run up to the war and decisions made are set to be pored over once again, as memoirs from key Bush administration officials are published and the Chilcot inquiry investigates the British perspective.

The Iraq war was a unique conflict for British domestic politics in that it divided both the left and right. The British left was split between a policy of humanitarian intervention and an anti imperialist opposition to the conflict. The right saw Saddam as a threat but the realist right preferred to keep the status quo. The media also adopted conflicting positions. Papers like the Mail put their pathological opposition to Labour over opposition to British involvement. Despite having clear concerns over terrorism. The Sunday Telegraph was pro war in the run up with questionable reporting from Con Coughlin, but has always been happy to attack Labour since. Leaked documents on the eve of the Chilcot inquiry are designed to set the narrative for the forthcoming inquest. The Iraq war is still a very large stick to attack political opponents with.

The legacy of the Iraq war still also has reverberations for the individuals involved. The EU's quest for a President had Tony Blair in the running, advocated by Gordon Brown. But the opposition from European politicians and the British media over his involvement in the war presented a brick wall of dissatisfaction. Other British political figures, like Hoon, Campbell and Straw have varying degrees of influence these days, but it would be hard to argue that the war and its aftermath didn't deal a severe blow to the longevity of their political careers. The great survivor is probably Brown, who acquiesced with the decisions, but made next to no statements at the time. The American players have mostly moved on either to retirement, think tanks or the private sector. America's executive system that enables political appointees rather than democratically elected representatives to take foreign policy decisions has meant those involved are no longer in any position of power. The shift towards Democrat power that began with the midterm elections of November 2006 has for better or worse closed a chapter in American politics. The war was less controversial in America, at least amongst the political class, so the quest for answers and even retribution that exists in Britain, does not follow across the Atlantic.

The academic debate keeps the invasion of the Iraq war relevant. Some academics argue that Bush foreign policy is no different from the American tradition and that future scenarios like pre 2003 Iraq will be treated simile. The decisions made in late 2002 are still under archive and until the day they are opened to scrutiny, academics say we should reserve judgement. Academic input has been brought into the Chilcot inquiry at an early stage. But this feels so late, the absence of academic consultation on Iraqi culture, society and history was a fatal error in planning for post invasion Iraq. There have been numerous explosive accounts by journalists and military men who were on the ground after the invasion. This has forged the public's view of how the conflict unfolded. But the academic's job is to collate this first hand primary research and present it within a cogent framework, explaining what exactly happened. Academics like Toby Dodge, Charles Tripp and Richard Haass and Kenneth Pollack have presented ongoing academic analysis but now as the Iraq conflict moves on and America contemplates withdrawal, a broader narrative might develop.

When the debate rages over the decision to go to war, a sort of collective amnesia descends. What was the context behind the events leading up to 2003. From the American perspective a decade of failed Iraq policy culminated with the invasion. For Britain, the problem was depicted in the media as a recent issue, but it had burned in foreign affairs committee rooms in Washington for twelve years.

The critical view of American foreign policy catalogues a series of policy blunders. Firstly the failure to understand Iraqi politics in 1991 and expectation of a coup. Second a failed and ambiguous containment policy that left America impotent and allowed Saddam to disregard all UN resolutions. Then finally, a total misconception of how America would be received in 2003 and no plan to reconstruct the country. The context was one of failure on both sides and this should be remembered when assessing the decisions of late 2002.

The errors in American strategy were mirrored by Saddam's reckless behaviour and the nature of regional Middle Eastern politics where saving face ruled decision making. Saddam invaded Kuwait to secure his position amongst the military elite, whilst also being totally ignorant of western politics and the potential outcome of such an act. His brinkmanship with the United States and pretence of possessing WMD to deter Iran brought war on his country, but both in 1991 and 2003 Saddam did not believe that America would invade.

9/11 changed everything etc. True to an extent. It lowered the threshold, it reiterated the fear of a terrorist-WMD nexus, it installed a climate of fear in the American public. But the reasons for invading Iraq were the same before 9/11 as they were after. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 had set in law the desire for regime change. Saddam's supposed breaches of UN resolutions and international law were regularly used as the legal basis for regime change in 2003. The WMD argument was an extension of the argument, not the meat of it. A re-evaluation of the American argument for war will most likely emphasise this point. That 9/11 didn't create a massively different mindset, the plan to remove Saddam was a key Bush administration goal from the time it came to office.

The fourth 9/11 - another revolution?

Those three digits have laid down some seminal dates in modern history: September 11th 1973, the Pinochet coup in Chile; 9th November 1989, the opening of the Berlin Wall; 11th September 2001, the Al-Qaida attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon. Who would discount another epoch making moment this Monday? The break between East and West Berlin was the iconic moment of 1989, even though Poland had elected the non-Communist Solidarity in June, the political breakthrough against communism. The chain of events that followed led to a redefining of international relations: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the EU and the spread of globalisation leading to India and China's ascendancy. But what now? The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed the world in its most precarious position since 1989, even though regional conflicts in Latin America and Africa have alleviated slightly. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the most significant consequence of 1989, leading to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and the withdrawal of American interest in South Asia. The 1991 Gulf war and the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s both led to 9/11 in 2001 and the wars that followed.

If we had to plot ahead and look for this next seismic moment, where and what would it be? The collapse of American forces in Afghanistan, airstrikes on Iran by Israel, or an implosion in Pakistan? The twentieth anniversary will provide commentators and contemporary historians ample space to consider how the world has progressed since, but history tells us that another defining moment could be just around the corner. We will then - twenty years after - be faced with a whole new set of consequences to deal with.

Critics of Western foreign policy highlight the wasted opportunity that followed 1989: the "peace dividend" dissipated as regional conflicts continued and authoritarian regimes retained their grip. Fukuyama's End of History predicting the dominance of Western liberal democracy was blocked by autocratic rule in the Middle East and Russia's return to traditional authoritarianism, after initial steps towards democracy. Whilst American policy makers espoused this new era in the early 1990s as ripe for the expansion of democracy, the reality never quite matched the rhetoric. True Latin America democratized as did South East Asia, but Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan - key allies in the Middle East - stagnated in expanding popular representation. The rise of militant Islam was driven by a perceived apostasy (and lack of popular accountability) in these repressive allies. The 9/11 attacks were part of Bin Laden's strategy to polarize the Arab street and spark revolution against this authoritarian rule. A 1989 style of revolution in the Middle East would have been Osama's dream outcome. But given the way democracy has been curtailed in the region in the last decade, it may not be for a while

Iran - the moment of truth

For several years Iran has delayed, obstructed and played for time when negotiating with the IAEA, the EU and the United States over its nuclear programme. But this cannot continue and at some point soon, either they will declare themselves nuclear capable, Israel will launch a pre-emptive strike or a deal will be struck with the U.S. You would most likely bet on the latter, given the internal strife that is occurring within the Islamic republic. The fact that the Obama administration has placed a September deadline on engagement from Iran, that is not open-ended, means that Tehran must quickly decide what they wish to do.

Israel has long predicted that Iran will have enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon by sometime in late 2010. Assuming Iran is prepared to negotiate then, Obama and Khameini will have a year or so to thrash out a deal. But with Khameini's position severely weakened by the recent post-election protests and Ahmadinejad in an even weaker position than he was prior to his "victory", any substantive diplomatic moves seem incalculably complicated. The nuclear clock will still be ticking regardless of the internal power struggle in Iran. It is not inconceivable that a full blown political crisis is taking place in Iran, whilst the country crosses the nuclear threshold. How the rest of world - specifically the United States and Israel - respond under those circumstances is impossible to say.

Following Iran's dramatic June, a quieter July - on the streets at least - has followed. But behind the scenes political struggle has rumbled on. Now Ahmadinejad and Khameini have fallen out over the president elect's choice of vice president, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, who had previously describing Iran as a friend of Israelis. Ahmadinejad defied the supreme leaders demand for Mashaie to be sacked. The following day, Ahmadinejad fired the country's Intelligence Minister, Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeie, who was subservient to Khameini. This spat - almost unthinkable a month ago - shows the ruptures that have opened since the election. The United States cannot have failed to notice and internal disagreements like this, will weaken the Iranian leadership in any nuclear negotiation.

What happens next to Ahmadinejad is obviously critical. For Khameini to drop him and call another election would be an astonishing turn around. If he was forced out, it would most likely be done in a drawn out manner to avoid such a loss of face for the Supreme leader. The consequences and possible backlash from Ahmadinejad's allies in the Republican Guard could be even more dramatic. Grasping the outcomes for Iranian politics at the moment is extremely challenging, as knowing what exactly is happening in the corridors of power is very difficult and as this is unchartered territory. Such internal dispute has never occurred within Tehran since 1979.

Ahmadinejad could be out then and a compromise between the Khameini camp and the Mousavi-Rafsanjani-Khatami alliance seems a possibility to ease Iran through this period. Who would emerge as president is very unclear. Mousavi regards himself as a defender of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution, having served as prime minister in the 1980s. His belief is that Khameini has betrayed the ideals set out from 1979. Given this and ff Mousavi emerges in the power, how he deals with the nuclear negotiations is a whole new question.

Fisk on Arab culture

There was an excellent article today by the Independent's Robert Fisk on Arab culture. Whilst large sections of Arab society are progressive, intelligent and engaging with the modern world, the Arab world as a whole has stagnated and been left behind by the rest of the world. Arguably this failure to flourish, has allowed the West to pursue an often exploitative foreign policy and let Israel undertake repressive policies against the Palestinians with impunity.

Why is the Arab world – let us speak with terrible sharpness – so backward?
Why so many dictators, so few human rights, so much state security and torture,
so terrible a literacy rate?
Why does this wretched place, so rich in oil, have to produce, even in the age of the computer, a population so poorly
educated, so undernourished, so corrupt? Yes, I know the history of Western
colonialism, the dark conspiracies of the West, the Arab argument that you
cannot upset the sheikhs and the kings and the autocrats, the imams and the
emirs when the "enemy is at the gates". There is some truth to that. But not
enough truth.

Once more the United Nations Development Programme has popped up with yet one more, its
fifth, report that catalogues – via Arab analysts and academics, mark you – the
retarded state of much of the Middle East. It talks of "the fragility of the
region's political, social, economic and environmental structures... its
vulnerability to outside intervention". But does this account for
desertification, for illiteracy – especially among women – and the Arab state
which, as the report admits, is often turned "into a threat to human security,
instead of its chief support"?

As Arab journalist Rami Khouri stated bleakly last week: "How we tackle the underlying causes of our mediocrity and bring about real change anchored in solid citizenship, productive economies and stable
statehood, remains the riddle that has defied three generations of Arabs." Real
GDP per capita in the region – one of the statistics which truly shocked Khouri
– grew by only 6.4 per cent between 1980 and 2004. That's just 0.5 per cent
annually, a rate which 198 of 217 countries analysed by the CIA World Factbook
bettered in 2008. Yet the Arab population – which stood at 150 million in 1980 –
will reach 400 million in 2015.

I notice much of this myself. When I first came to the Middle East in 1976, it was crowded enough. Cairo's steaming, fetid
streets were already jam-packed, night and day, with up to a million homeless
living in the great Ottoman cemeteries. Arab homes are spotlessly clean but
their streets are often repulsive, dirt and ordure spilling on to the pavements.
Even in beautiful Lebanon, where a kind of democracy does exist and whose people
are among the most educated and cultured in the Middle East, you find a similar
phenomenon. In the rough hill villages of the south, the same cleanliness exists
in every home. But why are the streets and the hills so dirty?
I suspect that a real problem exists in the mind of Arabs; they do not feel that they own
their countries. Constantly coaxed into effusions of enthusiasm for Arab or
national "unity", I think they do not feel that sense of belonging which
Westerners feel. Unable, for the most part, to elect real representatives – even
in Lebanon, outside the tribal or sectarian context – they feel "ruled over".
The street, the country as a physical entity, belongs to someone else. And of
course, the moment a movement comes along and – even worse – becomes popular,
emergency laws are introduced to make these movements illegal or "terrorist".
Thus it is always someone else's responsibility to look after the gardens and
the hills and the streets.

And those who work within the state system – who work directly for the state and its corrupt autarchies – also feel that their existence depends on the same corruption upon which the state itself thrives.
The people become part of the corruption. I shall always remember an Arab
landlord, many years ago, bemoaning an anti-corruption drive by his government.
"In the old days, I paid bribes and we got the phone mended and the water pipes
mended and the electricity restored," he complained. "But what can I do now, Mr,
Robert? I can't bribe anyone – so nothing gets done!"

Even the first UNDP report, back in 2002, was deeply depressing. It identified three cardinal
obstacles to human development in the Arab world: the widening "deficit" in
freedom, women's rights and knowledge. George W Bush – he of enduring freedom,
democracy, etc etc amid the slaughter of Iraq – drew attention to this.
Understandably miffed at being lectured to by the man who gave "terror" a new
name, even Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (he of the constantly more than 90 per cent
electoral success rate), told Tony Blair in 2004 that modernisation had to stem
from "the traditions and culture of the region".

Will a solution to the Arab-Israeli war resolve all this? Some of it, perhaps. Without the constant
challenge of crisis, it would be much more difficult to constantly renew
emergency laws, to avoid constitutionality, to distract populations who might
otherwise demand overwhelming political change. Yet I sometimes fear that the
problems have sunk too deep, that like a persistently leaking sewer, the ground
beneath Arab feet has become too saturated to build on.
I was delighted some months ago, while speaking at Cairo University – yes, the same academy which
Barack Obama used to play softball with the Muslim world – to find how bright
its students were, how many female students crowded the classes and how,
compared to previous visits, well-educated they were. Yet far too many wanted to
move to the West. The Koran may be an invaluable document – but so is a Green
Card. And who can blame them when Cairo is awash with PhD engineering graduates
who have to drive taxis?

And on balance, yes, a serious peace between Palestinians and Israelis would help redress the appalling imbalances that
plague Arab society. If you can no longer bellyache about the outrageous
injustice that this war represents, then perhaps there are other injustices to
be addressed. One of them is domestic violence, which – despite the evident love
of family which all Arabs demonstrate – is far more prevalent in the Arab world
than Westerners might realise (or Arabs want to admit).
But I also think that, militarily, we have got to abandon the Middle East. By all means, send the
Arabs our teachers, our economists, our agronomists. But bring our soldiers
home. They do not defend us. They spread the same chaos that breeds the
injustice upon which the al-Qa'idas of this world feed. No, the Arabs – or,
outside the Arab world, the Iranians or the Afghans – will not produce the
eco-loving, gender-equal, happy-clappy democracies that we would like to see.
But freed from "our" tutelage, they might develop their societies to the
advantage of the people who live in them. Maybe the Arabs would even come to
believe that they owned their own countries.
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-why-does-life-in-the-middle-east-remain-rooted-in-the-middle-ages-1763252.html

Lebanon's perfect fragility

Beirut's road network is a web of side-streets, dark underpasses, chaotic junctions and gridlocked one way routes. This organized chaos in many ways reflects the complex nature of Lebanese society. I have recently returned from Lebanon and I can't recall a country of such contrasts. Arriving at night time you miss this daytime chaos. The only indications that you are in Beirut are the lone soldier manning a checkpoint and the large poster of Rafiq Hariri. First impressions count and the no-nonsense and deceptively friendly border official, looking back, set the tone.

West Beirut's Hamra district is now an moderately affluent, often quiet, neighbourhood. Hamra Street is a busy day time shopping zone; the streets leading off have many cafes, boutiques and local stores. Hamra is a perfect mix of residential and busy Beiruti everyday life. But in Lebanon's civil war, West Beirut and Hamra in particular was the centre of fierce fighting. A Sunni district, Hamra was home to numerous militias including the socialist al-Murabitoun, Syrian backed groups and, most significantly, the PLO. Only last year, Hamra was deserted again as Hezbollah and Future Movement militia clashed over several violent days.

To the north of Hamra, lies the Corniche – a long seafront promenade. With perfect viewing for watching the Mediterranean sunset, this walk is a relaxing spot for all Beirutis to unwind. Overlooking the Corniche is the famous American University of Beirut (AUB). The lessons are taught in English, so the cafes of Bliss Street besides the campus, are filled with Lebanese chatting in American accents (not Americans). The campus is a peaceful distance from the Beirut noise, but during the Civil war it was not able to keep out of the violence. Guerillas used the grounds to display their rockets to the international press in 1976 and the former president Malcolm Kerr was assassinated in 1984. The University insisted that it remain open during the war.

From the roof terrace of the Mayflower hotel, you can see uncountable buildings. It is impossible to distinguish between the old and new blocks. The buildings have seen it all. Many have witnessed the terrible days when Hamra was a battlefield. But the new ones are testimony to the Lebanese's desire to rebuild and construct a positive future. The fact that you can't differentiate between the two sums up this internal conflict between forgetting the past and taking steps towards a better future. The Mayflower Hotel is a wonderfully anachronistic place, filled with pictures of 19th century Britain, with previous guests including Graham Green, Kim Philby and countless journos during the war.

North of the National Museum – which displays artifacts of the Phoenecian, Roman and Hellenistic periods – lies Beirut's infamous Green Line. Now simply a busy street, it marked the frontline in the civil war, dividing the predominantly Muslim West and Christian East. The only real leftover from this partition is a thick plain wall with large bullet holes. Continuing north you arrive at Place de Martyrs where numerous political rallies have taken place, which is besides the Mohammed al-Amin mosque, built by Rafiq Hariri before he was killed.

Beirut's Downtown district was decimated during the war and has now been redeveloped into an impeccable area of the city. There are several streets leading off the Place d'Etoile with restaurants and shops. It feels more like Europe and there is definitely no riff-raff. It may lack authenticity but it is probably the most modern part of the city. All entrances to the area are manned by checkpoints so it is also the city's safest spot.

A short distance north near the seafront is the St George Yacht Club. Two buildings stand without their fronts, having been blown off by the truck bomb that killed former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. When you visit this location, you can understand the motives of his killers. Firstly it is in a central location in Beirut, almost between East and West. Secondly it is overlooked by large hotels and apartment blocks built by Gulf money under Hariri's guidance. The assassination strikes at the heart of this wealth and power.

Central Lebanon remained largely undamaged in the July 2006 war. The Shia southern suburbs, home to Hezbollah, were subjected to heavy Israeli bombing. The Shia may often be the poorest section of Lebanese society, but they arguably hold the power. This power lies in two critical areas: demographics and weapons. The absence of any census in Lebanon or serious survey of the respective sectarian populations means that an estimation of total Shia is very difficult. The traditional figure of 35% is passed around, but our Shia taxi driver had four brothers and five sisters alone. The Shias also have Hezbollah of course. Being able to resist Israel's onslaught in 2006 proved that it is no mere mediocre militia and it managed to take control of central Beirut last year with relative ease.

Iran - the latest

It is really hard to get exact information about the situation in Iran. The Guardian has a running newsblog that picks up a lot http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2009/jun/17/iran-uprising

The Huffington Post is also providing a running blog. They have some excellent footage of today's protests: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/13/iran-demonstrations-viole_n_215189.html

Despite the ban on reporting by foreign journalists, the unstoppable Robert Fisk is defying the regime and reporting on the situation: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/06/17/2600571.htm

The Green Tide

Iran's most anticipated election in recent years has ended in acrimony, the opposition have claimed fraud, and now protests have escalated on the streets. How this will progress is unclear though. Ayatollah Khamenei has given ground and said that there will be an inquiry into alleged vote rigging. This might not make much difference to the overall outcome. Firstly as it will probably not turn over the result, Khamenei has already congratulated Ahmadinejad on a victory. Secondly Ahmadinejad has a large following and they wouldn't accept a different result either. It is fairly clear from reports that fraud has occurred to some extent and it has been reported that Mousavi was told of victory, but then that this victory was denied.

The reaction of the current government to this "victory" has been to block websites, telecommunications and email. But with such a media savvy youth leading the protests, the possibility of comprehensive censorship seems unlikely. There won't be a repeat of Burma, where the junta shut the country off. But with a population of 40 million, people power is proving overwhelming. Iranians are extremely politically aware with the advent of the internet. The Islamic regime's efforts to offer freedoms to the people but then deny them their desired result, has proved a disastrous strategy. The genie is out of the bottle.

The depth of protests and opposition to the election's outcome means that there either might be a recount or the election is run again. But Ahmadinejad and the hardliners will fight this. After all the election was predicted to be close and the current president has strong rural support. The ominous warning before the election, that a green revolution would not be tolerated, shows the regime's culpability. Fearing this, they promptly rushed out results giving Ahmadinejad victory.

The ongoing nuclear negotiations and the other regional issues mean the outcome of these protests couldn't come at a more critical point. America has to keep quiet on these events, Iran has long seen the United States as the meddler in their domestic affairs. Which ever way the election goes, America will still have negotiate with Khamenei, unless there is a full blown revolution.
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?ref=logo#/pages/Mir-Hossein-Mousavi-/45061919453?ref=nf

It has been reported that Khameini reneged on a deal to allow Mousavi the presidency, with the hardliners re-seizing the initiative. But it seems that these aloof clerics were totally ignorant of Iranian popular sentiment and their desires for freedom and democratic ideals. Most regimes or ideologies have a limited lifespan. Are we seeing after just over 30 years the end of this one? The revolutionary theocracy has become isolated from the real world and has now alienated its own longstanding supporters. This can't be blamed on foreign interference. This is now domestic pure and simple.

Lebanese elections

The March 14 alliance have been victorious in Lebanon's elections today, defeating the Hezbollah-FPM alliance 71 seats to 57. Western and Israeli diplomats are expressing their relief without sound triumphalist, but it would be extremely premature to see this result leading to a stable situation in Lebanon. There are two important questions to be pondered. What does this mean for Michel Aoun's Christian movement, who unexpectedly allied with the Shia Islamists. Will they return to an alliance with other Christian groups in the March 14 alliance. Secondly, how does Hezbollah respond. It has gracefully accepted defeat, but what happens to their military capability, built up since the 2006 war.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19580/gauging_hezbollah_after_the_vote.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Ddaily_analysis

A Historic Speech?

Today in Cairo, President Obama made his long anticipated speech to the Islamic world. The speech has been hailed as a new start for Muslim-West relations. Delivered in a typically lucid and intelligent manner, this represents an astonishing contrast to his predecessor and indeed those presidents before, who have simply seen the Islamic world in one dimensional terms. Obviously Obama's personal background made this speech all the more genuine and increases its chances of forming new relations. Passages relating to Palestinian suffering and firm rhetoric towards Israel, in particular settlements, will be well received. But unless definitive action occurs, this wave of goodwill is likely to peter out. The Middle East has witnessed many previous false dawns. However the speech can certainly be regarded as historic, for its intent, tone and content, but other events in the next few years may well overshadow its effectiveness.

Iranian Culture Wars

Beneath the hard edged geopolitical battle between Iran and the United States, a subtler and older war is still burning hard. All the media attention is focused on nuclear weapons and Islamist militancy, with matching solutions - sanctions or military action. But an equally important battle exists between censorship and imprisonment versus Internet freedom and human rights. And whilst America’s new commitment to soft power aims to turn this cultural battle in its favour, ultimately it will be a young generation of Iranians who may hold the key.

An ongoing exhibition at the British Museum depicts the life of Shah Abbas, the ruler of Persia from 1587 to 1629. He established contacts with Europe during his reign, to gain an advantage against the greater enemy – the Ottoman Empire. The ruler would even be mentioned in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night, under the name “the Sophy”. This was the last time in Iran-West relations where a mutual respect and parity was felt by both sides. As European colonial expansion settled in Asia, Iran's purpose was limited to its location as a valuable trade route. This economic relationship would become progressively less favorable to Iran as the decades passed.

Thirty years on from the Iranian revolution, a generation of Iranians exists with little memory of the 20th century Shah - Mohammed Pahlavi, the upheaval during the period of Khomeini’s return or the violence that followed - domestic repression and war with Iraq. The current leadership was born in the fires of those early days of the revolution - where repression mixed with anti-Americanism and Islamism. That revolution was born in economics and social unfairness, then morphed into a religious and totalitarian struggle, but it now might be shifting back to the same old grievances. Ahmadinejad’s one positive selling point is his perceived distance from the stain of political corruption, but he is part of a system that limits power to the few. Iran may be a democracy but the power lies close to Ayatollah Khameini and his inner circle.

The forthcoming elections place the incumbent against two reformers candidates, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi. In this election, victory will lie not in what is said, but who controls how it is said.
Maybe another revolution is required in Iran - the Green or maybe Carpet Revolution. I think I need to work on these. But given Iran’s repressive internal security, a softer and more subtle revolution would be the only change possible. Internal change by stealth has greater chance of success - there is evidence that this is taking place.

Secular liberals united behind Khomeini in late 1978. The Shah’s authoritarian rule was opposed for its failure to respect the 1906 Iranian constitution. The middle class secular group the Liberation Movement of Iran, led by Mehdi Bazargan, represented the non-religious and moderate force in the revolution. Bazargan was appointed prime minister in February 1979, resigning after the students’ seizure of the American embassy. He represented the moderates: willing to compromise with the Shah’s supporters; opposing Khomeini’s cultural revolution after he resigned.

The brutal consolidation of power by Khomeini’s supporters eliminated these liberal moderate voices and all others for that matter, especially those communist. With the Iranian die cast - the students seizure of the American embassy in Tehran being the starting point - a period of extreme animosity with the West followed. Efforts towards improving relations were thin, but the first attempts were cultural. Now a restoration of these cultural relations have ever chance to empower the present day secular liberals.

In 1998 Iran invited an American wrestling team to Tehran for a tournament. In the same year the two countries played in the World Cup - Iran winning two-one. The Iranian president Mohamed Khatami had proposed a “dialogue of civilizations” in a CNN interview in 1998. Comparing Iran’s revolution to the American one 200 years previous, he suggested some profound similarities: “With our revolution, we are experiencing a new phase of reconstruction of civilization. We feel that what we seek is what the founders of the American civilization were also pursuing four centuries ago. This is why we sense an intellectual affinity with the essence of the American civilization.” Khatami’s reformist tendencies hit plenty of obstacles within Iran’s political system.

Another football march was played in 2000 in the United States. The first visit for many of the Iranians was made as hospitable as possible, with special treatment like exclusion from border fingerprinting regulation.
America's efforts to improve diplomatic relations have not run totally smoothly. The American women's badminton team was refused visas prior to a tournament in February – on a technicality not through an Iranian government block. Iran's team has been invited to the US in July. It might be a mere game of badminton, but given the antipathy that have poisoned US-Iran relations, this does matter.

Since January 2007, more than 75 Iranian athletes have taken part in wrestling, weightlifting, water polo and table tennis competitions in the United States, while 32 American athletes, including 20 wrestlers, have visited Iran, according to the Ettemaad newspaper. A total of 250 Iranian artists, athletes and doctors have made the return visit to the United States, according to the State Department.

Iran’s political isolation has not always been matched with cultural isolation. Iranians - especially the younger generations - are well tuned to global opinion via the internet. Prior to this year’s elections, the authorities banned access to Facebook, only for this to be lifted. Social networking sites are seen as important in mobilizing the youth vote in these elections, with reformist Mousavi most to gain. The on/off status of Facebook is seen as a dual policy by the Iranian authorities to appeal to the country's youth, but retain control.

Another cultural thrust could be from the good old Beeb. The launch of BBC Persia in January will reach 100 million Farsi speakers. The channel is sent to Iran by two satellite dishes but has been declared illegal by the culture minister.

The final wave of soft power came this week in advance of America's 4th July celebrations. American embassies around the world are to invite Iranian representatives for fireworks, hot dogs and hamburgers, to mark America's independence.

So this month's election is finely balanced, reformist Moussavi is leading in the polls, but expect the unexpected. Ahmadinejad will say anything and do anything to stay in power; hardline candidate Mohsen Rezaei has claimed he could stop Israel in “one strike”. Whatever the result, an undercurrent of cultural connections has in many ways made a rapprochement between Iran and the West inevitable.

Lebanon's decisive election

Elections in the Middle East are always on a knife edge and the outcomes are often uncertain. So Lebanon and the Middle East await with mild anxiety and optimism the forthcoming elections on June 7. Despite a mild period of reconciliation, Lebanon remains divided and the two sides battling out the election present real contrasts for the Lebanese people and its regional neighbours. The anti-Syrian March 14 movement - a coalition led by secular Sunni Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Christian Maronite Samir Geagea - is pitted against the March 8 Alliance that includes Shia groups Amal and Hezbollah, popular Christian group the Free Patriotic Movement, and smaller Armenian political parties. Secretary of State Clinton's recent visit to Lebanon showed the international community's desire for a peaceful outcome and one that does not include significant gains for the distrusted Hezbollah group. While America negotiates with Syria on regional co-operation, it would be hoping that the Damascus regime's influence does not expand in Lebanon again - Clinton expressed her "support [for] the voices of moderation in Lebanon".

Since the start of the civil war, Lebanon has been a fulcrum in the region - where the forces of fundamental struggle against the secular and the international players battle regional. The consequences of a shift in the balance from one side to the other, in the forthcoming election, is being depicted by regional media and diplomats. Israel anticipates the worst - Syria is typically quiet. Clinton's visit concluded with a reserved judgement, waiting for the composition of the new Lebanese parliament before deciding how to continue their relationship. Significant advances by Syrian backed parties would not cause the same friction, that might have happened during the Bush administration. Diplomatic contacts with Syria and improved Saudi-Syrian relations have reduced the threat of post election confrontation. With the prediction that the election might end in a tie, the United States are taking a pragmatic line.

The role of Syria in Lebanon is still highly contentious. Strong relations with Syria are regarded as vital to Lebanon's national interest, not least by President Fouad Siniora, who has had a strained relationship with Hezbollah since his election as prime minister in 2005. A promotion that came about through anti-Syrian protests. In March, Syria and Lebanon established diplomatic relations, when Damascus appointed its first ambassador to Beirut. But Syria is widely distrusted still and has also been accused of interfering in the forthcoming elections.

The prospect of Hezbollah achieving power in Lebanon is a fearful one for Israel. The militant wing has reportedly replenished and vastly expanded its missile capacity since the 2006 war. Meanwhile it has publicly reiterated its support for Palestinian Islamist group Hamas. Israel has long sought a peace with its northern neighbour, it might have a government that directly opposes any peace, after the elections. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has made confident claims about the group's competence for governing: "I tell those who are betting on the [Hezbollah-led] opposition's failure during elections: The resistance that defeated Israel can govern a country that is 100 times larger than Lebanon". But Nasrallah is also speaking the politics of national unity: "We, Hezbollah, have always rejected the division of Lebanon and we shall always maintain this."

A series of arrests of Lebanese on charges of spying for Israel has shown the closeness of the current government and Hezbollah. The counterintelligence capacities of the Lebanese state and indirectly Hezbollah have ironically been boosted by American financial support since 2006. Hezbollah is upping its anti-Israel rhetoric before the election, part brinkmanship - part rallying cry to their voters. Hezbollah's relations with the west are still rife with suspicions, but contacts between the Islamist group and the British foreign office suggest progress is being made.

Bets are on a powersharing fudge between the two sides, held together by President Michel Sleiman. Trusted by most but still anti-Israel. The former commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that "Israel was the enemy" when assuming office last year. This might not be what the international community wants to hear, but he has maintained national unity so far.

The powerbroker in Lebanon could turn out to be Christian Lebanese opposition Gen. Michel Aoun, but he has played a totally contrasting role to Sleiman. Having entered into an alliance with former enemies in 2005, his intention was to hold the balance of power. Now he resists Syrian influence, defends Nasrallah, but still holds the majority Christian support over the parties of Amin Gemayel and Samir Geagea. Aoun and Geagea have a rivalry dating back to the 1980s and the internecine "war of brothers" in 1990. But the Christian population is undecided. Aoun's position shows the contradictions in Lebanese politics - his election posters have been accused of sexism by women's groups. Who would have the greater say in a government of the March 8 Alliance is highly uncertain.

Backtracking on renewables

This week saw the disappointing decision by Shell to drop its renewable energy schemes. Having marketed itself as a new dynamic force for alternative and clean energy, they have taken a move based purely on money and not much else. Some other companies have taken similar steps: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/21/renewable-energy1

Dealing with the inevitable

Next week some leading figures within the climate change debate will gather to help formulate America’s policy at the US Climate Action: A Global Economic Perspective symposium. US legislators will be informed by leading academics and businessmen on the options for tackling the causes and consequences of climate change. That this discussion is still needed is worrying in contrasting ways. Not only because the cause and effect is obvious, but also as there is still deep division as to how to deal with the problem. The symposium is a precursor to the United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen in December. The debate on climate change cannot remain in an academic bubble forever. At some point soon, i.e. now, economics and energy security policy will need to be changed to deal with the problem.

A parallel economy has existed for a long time now, involving new technologies that will reduce emissions. But a second parallel economy might be needed as well, one that deals with the consequences of climate change rather than the causes. There is a growing belief that we will have to accept climate change as a fact and limit the damage that it might cause. These inevitable changes will mean radical differences in how the world functions, where populations live and what resources we survive on. The New Scientist spells out in stark terms in its latest issue: in “a world warmed by 4 °C … it may be impossible to return to anything resembling today's varied and abundant Earth…once there is a 4 °C rise, the juggernaut of warming will be unstoppable, and humanity's fate more uncertain than ever.”

The long standing Green opposition to nuclear energy has been one of the first environmental sacred cows to be attacked in recent debate. James Lovelock - proponent of the Gaia hypothesis - was one of the first environmentalists to defy the consensus and argue that nuclear was the only realistic alternative to fossil fuels. That was five years ago and in the meantime the debate has raged, with the government pressing ahead with their nuclear energy policy. But this week four leading environmentalists have broken ranks and reiterated the nuclear case. The issue threatens to split the green movement at a critical moment.

Lovelock has more to say. His conviction is that the earth’s population will peak to 9 billion then plummet to only 1 billion by the end of the century. He also predicts that a permanent changed climate will last 100,000 years. This extremely pessimistic scenario might be extreme, but even if a fraction of his prediction comes true, then the world will be in trouble. His prediction is that a future enviro-catastrophe will resemble the apocalyptic sounding event - Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) - of 55 million years ago. He has, kindly, provided some solutions, if you can call them that. Britain, especially, will be a lifeboat of the world, so will be flooded with refugees.

How we adapt our society both in terms of infrastructure and resources is a question that academics, architects and engineers are already looking at. Events like this week’s Ecobuild conference showcase sustainable construction. With such high profile attendees, ideas for restructuring our architectural infrastructure will gain greater momentum. Obviously putting them into practice in a recession is another matter altogether. Likewise rich lists featuring the next generation of eco-entrepreneurs are admirable, but how close these individuals are to central government planning and decision-making is uncertain.

Creating new structures through intelligent engineering was well advocated in an Institution of Mechanical Engineers report - Adapting to the Inevitable. In the energy sector, the report proposes a fundamental move towards the greater decentralisation of energy production, via intelligent local networks, linked with a more internationally interconnected electricity grid to balance supply and demand differences (ie a European ‘supranational’ grid). Sources of water may need to include a higher proportion of underground storage and catchment. Greater levels of desalination may also be required and increased water recycling will become more important. The report believes that buildings adaptation is perhaps the area where most consideration of future climate change has already been made. More specifically effective master planning of urban areas to increase natural and artificial ventilation corridors. Better planned infrastructure is also required to counter possible flooding.

More radical solutions such as geoengineering are also on the cards. With origins in the Cold war and super power research into climate as a weapon, but largely outlawed by the 1970s, geoengineering now acts as a dramatic solution to an out of control problem. Geoengineering could possibly increase the reflectivity of the planet (the albedo) by propelling reflective particles into the upper atmosphere. The idea of aircraft pumping sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere might seem far-fetched to many, but it would reasonably cheap and would be applied by most nations, in contrast to the expensive and heavy investment options for cutting emissions. Scientific groups including NASA and the Royal Society have been evaluating its potential, whilst environmental groups have been cautious in their endorsement, believing that geoengineering could provide disincentives for cutting emissions. The overall effectiveness, predictability and side effects of geoengineering are questioned by the scientific community. Other risks put forward include weaponisation, geoengineering piracy or the rise of an all powerful megalomaniac with the ability to control the weather for his/her own purposes. Geoengineering could one day by the silver bullet to green issues, but until the science is conclusive, no government is going to invest substantially to take it the next step. Many of these issues are set out in an excellent Foreign Affairs essay this month: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090301faessay88206-p10/david-g-victor-m-granger-morgan-jay-apt-john-steinbruner-katharine-ricke/the-geoengineering-option.html

A change of climate you can believe in

At this moment in time, it probably ranks about third place in his in-tray, behind the economy and two ongoing wars. But the environment, to many, easily surpasses these two dominant problems. To effectively tackle climate change, President Obama will need two things: money and political will. Unfortunately he doesn’t have the former yet but an economic recovery will see to that. The political will is there, but Americans fear terrorism and nuclear conflict over climate change at this moment in time. Dealing with these two threats will force the possibility of environmental disaster up the domestic agenda. To many, climate change represents a superior threat, but reflecting the problems facing the United States, it is languishing in third at the moment.

Obama has hit the ground running on every other issue, and today it was the environment. Reversing years of Bush neglect, Obama has embarked on a sweeping range of policies to cut emissions. These include allowing individual states to set their own limits of emissions and imposing fuel efficiency standard on the nation‘s carmakers. Obama also reiterated his campaign pledge to reduce US dependence on foreign oil.

The Obama administration has set out a comprehensive New Energy for America plan. This will create five million new jobs by strategically investing $150 billion in clean technology; significantly reduce imports from the Middle East and Venezuela; expand plug-in Hybrid cars throughout the US; increase the proportion of electricity from renewable sources; develop an economy-wide cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent by 2050. The first aspect of this plan: job creation and economic development is a masterstroke. It will clearly help America out of the recession, but it also appeals to those American capitalist ideals - enterprise and wealth creation. The Obama plan could create a first generation of enviro-capitalists.

The holy green nexus of clean technology and commerce represents a future for the American economy. It has been noticed by wealthy Arab states, who are embarking on similar projects. Is this the solution to the two critical problems of the day? Climate change and economic uncertainty.

The response to this challenge is due to be included in his $825bn stimulus package. The dire state of the US economy will mean tight restrictions on emissions may not be feasible, at this moment in time at least. Carmakers are also in a dire financial position, so imposing fuel efficiency regulations will also be difficult.

The last eight years have been full of frustration and inaction. The tone for the next four (and hopefully eight) years has been set. Shortly after his election victory, Obama was unequivocal: “Now is the time to confront this challenge once and for all, delay is no longer an option. Denial is no longer an acceptable response.” In his inauguration speech he emphasised that the United States would "roll back the spectre of a warming planet" and "restore science to its rightful place and wield technology's wonders to raise healthcare's quality and lower its cost[…]harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories.” This direct message contrasts to UK environmental policy which seems at best contradictory and counterproductive, at worse linked to big business interests.

Creating a successor to the Kyoto Protocol will be a priority for Obama. The next global gathering in 2009 is the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December. This might be too long to wait. Domestically any agreement through Congress may be difficult. Republican opposition might be added to by Democrats, wary of the impact on employment and the economy, especially in blue collar states.

One key difference between this administration and the previous - when it comes to the environment - is its indebtedness to corporate interests. Whereas the Bush administration was beholden to oil corporates, as seen in his campaigns where the vast majority of donations came from corporate executives and in some extremely dubious influence on energy policy by oil companies like Exxon Mobil. Obama pursued a grass roots fundraising strategy and his corporate links lie in technology, banking and universities.

The final development of energy policy under Obama is the change of personnel within DoE. The new Secretary Steven Chu is a strong advocate of alternative energy and nuclear, as an alternative to fossil fuels. Placing a Nobel winning scientist at the heart of energy policy shows that ideology and cronyism no longer will determine decisions in this critical department. Scientific fact will be the new mantra. The State department will also have a climate change envoy and, who knows, Al Gore might even be asked to help.

Blessed are the peacemakers

In another highly assertive statement of diplomatic intent, President Obama has appointed two envoys for the two foreign policy priorities of his administration. Richard Holbrooke will be special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, while George Mitchell will seek peace between the Arabs and Israelis. The task facing these two highly experienced diplomats cannot be underestimated. But within the Democrat foreign policy establishment, these two individuals have the strongest CVs.

Holbrooke has a long career of government service, dating back to the early 1960s. His posts included formulating Vietnam policy, State department East Asian and Near Pacific, and Ambassador to Germany and the United Nations. He has also had senior roles in investment banking, academia and international NGOs. But he is probably best known as the chief architect of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. Achieving a lasting peace in the Balkans after the worst conflict in post War Europe was no mean feat. Although Milosevic remained in power and led Serbia into another war in Kosovo in 1999, these accords have held since. Co-ordinating a peace between the Taliban, Afghan army and NATO will be equally difficult, especially when one party - the Taliban - is uncompromising and seeks no form of negotiation. But at some point, the Western forces might have to sit down with some unpleasant figures. Having dealt with those responsible for ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkans, Holbrooke has the necessary experience.

Obama stated in his inauguration speech that a “peace” would be sought in Afghanistan. The model may be the Balkans, where a vast international armed force flooded the region and secured a peace. The failures in Afghanistan have been down to insufficient troops - allowing the Taliban to regroup, Holbrooke and Obama intend to counter these past mistakes without making new ones. A lack of diplomatic focus on the region was also a major fault in Bush policy for South Asia, especially from 2003 to 2006, as Iraq dominated American foreign policy. But Holbrooke sees a regional solution, as set out in a recent Foreign Affairs essay: “Afghanistan's future cannot be secured by a counterinsurgency effort alone; it will also require regional agreements that give Afghanistan's neighbors a stake in the settlement. That includes Iran -- as well as China, India, and Russia,” and of course Pakistan. He identifies four critical areas: “the tribal areas in Pakistan, the drug lords who dominate the Afghan system, the national police, and the incompetence and corruption of the Afghan government.”

An equally intractable war was the crowning achievement of George Mitchell. His work as Special Envoy to Northern Ireland during the Clinton Administration led to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Half Lebanese, Mitchell has a similarly long and distinguished career in public service. A senator for many years and also bizarrely chairman of Disney, he also led international law firm DLA Piper - probably good experience given the number of legal conundrums thrown up by the Middle East conflict. The parallels between Northern Ireland and Palestine have often been raised, as a source of conflict resolution. The comparison is often rejected by Israelis who see Hamas’ statements calling for the destruction of Israel as a totally different order to the IRA. But just as the IRA had a grudging support in Republican communities, Hamas has a similar position with the Palestinians. They may be thugs, but at least they stand up for you. For the West, the parallel is clear. We eventually dealt with the IRA, despite years of denouncements. We may well have to deal with Hamas, as a democratically elected movement. Critically Mitchell has the background to be respected by both sides - he seems the most logical and best choice for this extremely difficult role.

Gaza - amid the rubble

So the dust settles in Gaza, and looking at the footage that is emerging, there are tonnes of it. Both sides are claiming victory, even though deep down neither believes it. And neither does the outside world for that matter. The Israeli military claim that 25% of the 1,300 plus casualties were Hamas militants; Hamas stated today that as few as 48 of its gunmen had been killed. Hamas may not have portrayed themselves as anything other than a uncompromising militant group, but Israel’s image on balance has taken a serious blow. Global protests are one thing, are expected and dismissed, but the possibility of a war crimes investigation by the UN is a different matter. Israel has made unprecedented efforts to put their case to the international media. But the spin doctors have been working overtime to justify Israel’s brutal onslaught. Amidst this confusion on the ground, a regional picture has become equally cloudy. The neighbouring states have lined up against each other in their political battles for regional hegemony. Nobody has gained from this three week crisis.

The Israeli PR machine has consistently sought to portray Hamas as a militant organisation, hell-bent on Israel’s destruction, a proxy of Iran, a threat to its own people. Israel has been simply defending itself against rocket fire, even though most of the rockets prior to the end of the ceasefire on December 20 had been fired by non-Hamas militants like Islamic Jihad. This cassus belli had a cogent argument, but the disproportionality of their response has quickly undermined their reasoning. The obscene numbers of children, women and innocents killed has put Israel on the PR defensive.

Hamas for their part have missed the opportunity to gain positive PR. Lacking the professional expertise and of course being under siege, they have been unable to define themselves as a legitimate resistance movement to the outside world and alter prejudices about what they stand for. Their pronouncements have appeared quite far fetched. Not quite in the Comical Ali mould, but threats have come to nothing, Israeli troops haven’t died in the predicted numbers. Their supposed military prowess seems to have turned out to be a paper tiger. The problem in assessing claims has been partly caused by Israel’s ban on foreign journalists. But it is also not unlikely that Hamas have exaggerated their relative strength to prove their worth to the Palestinian population. It does seem probable that their personnel has not been depleted, a large proportion of their arms have been destroyed, and their political and social infrastructure has been severely hit. However they may have held back in the face of Israeli military superiority.

It has been left to foreign experts to cast some insight. Sir Jeremy Greenstock was clear in his analysis of Hamas, having had contacts through the Forward Thinking thinktank. Hamas did not advocate the total destruction of Israel; their notorious charter, written in 1987, had never been put into practice; they were not controlled by Iran; and their rule did not resemble the Taliban. Israel has been sharp in its linking of Hamas with the war on terror and Iranian designs for regional hegemony. Not convincing arguments, but they’ve stuck to it and it was convincing enough to gain unequivocal American backing.

Most of Israel’s wars have a political dynamic both nationally and internationally, but this conflict has been remarkably and cynically shaped by such forces. The four dominant personalities in Israeli politics have all seen their fortunes shaped by this war in different ways. Ehud Olmert seeks redemption, before he steps down, for his appalling handling of the 2006 Lebanon war. Benjamin Netanyahu has egged the government on and raised Israeli hopes of a comprehensive defeat of Hamas. The ambiguous result will now aid his election prospects. Tzipi Livni has needed a war to prove her hardline credentials. And Ehud Barak, acting as Defence chief, knows that a good war for him, will provide a guaranteed place in any Labour-Kadima coalition. The forthcoming Israeli election has been vital to this war’s destiny, as has the imminent inauguration of President Obama. The ceasefire has happened just in time to not overshadow this momentous day in American history. It is hard to know how this war would have developed without this political context, or whether it would have happened at all.

So we are now at the status quo ante, but with more hatred and fear on both sides. Israeli politics is just as opaque and divided. The war and its failure to eliminate Hamas will strengthen extremist political forces, like Avigdor Lieberman, who equates the war in Gaza to the American war on Japan in 1945, and the enforced surrender rather than occupation. His comments are extreme, but they reflect a pervasive fear among Israelis, surrounded by enemies, with little sentiment for Palestinian suffering. “They brought it upon themselves” is the common Israeli viewpoint. Just as extremists on the Palestinian side reject the idea of an Israeli state, Israeli far right leaders promote equally uncompromising policies. Thankfully the Israeli Supreme Court has overturned a decision to ban two leading Israeli Arab political parties from the Knesset and the forthcoming elections. Israeli democracy is as shaky as Palestinian.

And what now for the Palestinians? Hamas looks likely to remain in power in Gaza and unless there is a settlement with Fatah, negotiations will still be stuck in a “three state solution”. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas’s position is fragile with little popular support and reports from Gaza tell of a brutal renewal of internecine warfare. Has popular support for Hamas dropped? They have brought violence to the strip, but their message of defiance strikes a chord with every Palestinian.

The regional picture is even more confused. Two apparent sides have formed from the crisis, holding two parallel summits to discuss the crisis. Fatah, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are together on the pro-West position; Syria, Iran and Qatar have met Hamas representatives. Both sides offer totally opposing views on who is responsible for the conflict, but both, thankfully, seem united in providing financial support for reconstruction. This is nothing new. Arab states have often used the Palestinian issue to advance their positions in the region. The Obama administration’s quest for Middle East diplomacy will be even harder with such a division. However a clue to how Obama will tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies in this regional political quagmire. An all encompassing regional solution involving not only this conflict, but peace in Iraq and Iran's nuclear plans, is being touted as Obama's intention.