The Israeli PR machine has consistently sought to portray Hamas as a militant organisation, hell-bent on Israel’s destruction, a proxy of Iran, a threat to its own people. Israel has been simply defending itself against rocket fire, even though most of the rockets prior to the end of the ceasefire on December 20 had been fired by non-Hamas militants like Islamic Jihad. This cassus belli had a cogent argument, but the disproportionality of their response has quickly undermined their reasoning. The obscene numbers of children, women and innocents killed has put Israel on the PR defensive.
Hamas for their part have missed the opportunity to gain positive PR. Lacking the professional expertise and of course being under siege, they have been unable to define themselves as a legitimate resistance movement to the outside world and alter prejudices about what they stand for. Their pronouncements have appeared quite far fetched. Not quite in the Comical Ali mould, but threats have come to nothing, Israeli troops haven’t died in the predicted numbers. Their supposed military prowess seems to have turned out to be a paper tiger. The problem in assessing claims has been partly caused by Israel’s ban on foreign journalists. But it is also not unlikely that Hamas have exaggerated their relative strength to prove their worth to the Palestinian population. It does seem probable that their personnel has not been depleted, a large proportion of their arms have been destroyed, and their political and social infrastructure has been severely hit. However they may have held back in the face of Israeli military superiority.
It has been left to foreign experts to cast some insight. Sir Jeremy Greenstock was clear in his analysis of Hamas, having had contacts through the Forward Thinking thinktank. Hamas did not advocate the total destruction of Israel; their notorious charter, written in 1987, had never been put into practice; they were not controlled by Iran; and their rule did not resemble the Taliban. Israel has been sharp in its linking of Hamas with the war on terror and Iranian designs for regional hegemony. Not convincing arguments, but they’ve stuck to it and it was convincing enough to gain unequivocal American backing.
Most of Israel’s wars have a political dynamic both nationally and internationally, but this conflict has been remarkably and cynically shaped by such forces. The four dominant personalities in Israeli politics have all seen their fortunes shaped by this war in different ways. Ehud Olmert seeks redemption, before he steps down, for his appalling handling of the 2006 Lebanon war. Benjamin Netanyahu has egged the government on and raised Israeli hopes of a comprehensive defeat of Hamas. The ambiguous result will now aid his election prospects. Tzipi Livni has needed a war to prove her hardline credentials. And Ehud Barak, acting as Defence chief, knows that a good war for him, will provide a guaranteed place in any Labour-Kadima coalition. The forthcoming Israeli election has been vital to this war’s destiny, as has the imminent inauguration of President Obama. The ceasefire has happened just in time to not overshadow this momentous day in American history. It is hard to know how this war would have developed without this political context, or whether it would have happened at all.
So we are now at the status quo ante, but with more hatred and fear on both sides. Israeli politics is just as opaque and divided. The war and its failure to eliminate Hamas will strengthen extremist political forces, like Avigdor Lieberman, who equates the war in Gaza to the American war on Japan in 1945, and the enforced surrender rather than occupation. His comments are extreme, but they reflect a pervasive fear among Israelis, surrounded by enemies, with little sentiment for Palestinian suffering. “They brought it upon themselves” is the common Israeli viewpoint. Just as extremists on the Palestinian side reject the idea of an Israeli state, Israeli far right leaders promote equally uncompromising policies. Thankfully the Israeli Supreme Court has overturned a decision to ban two leading Israeli Arab political parties from the Knesset and the forthcoming elections. Israeli democracy is as shaky as Palestinian.
And what now for the Palestinians? Hamas looks likely to remain in power in Gaza and unless there is a settlement with Fatah, negotiations will still be stuck in a “three state solution”. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas’s position is fragile with little popular support and reports from Gaza tell of a brutal renewal of internecine warfare. Has popular support for Hamas dropped? They have brought violence to the strip, but their message of defiance strikes a chord with every Palestinian.
The regional picture is even more confused. Two apparent sides have formed from the crisis, holding two parallel summits to discuss the crisis. Fatah, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are together on the pro-West position; Syria, Iran and Qatar have met Hamas representatives. Both sides offer totally opposing views on who is responsible for the conflict, but both, thankfully, seem united in providing financial support for reconstruction. This is nothing new. Arab states have often used the Palestinian issue to advance their positions in the region. The Obama administration’s quest for Middle East diplomacy will be even harder with such a division. However a clue to how Obama will tackle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies in this regional political quagmire. An all encompassing regional solution involving not only this conflict, but peace in Iraq and Iran's nuclear plans, is being touted as Obama's intention.
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