Sunday, September 26, 2010

Ed abroad

So after a long and generally uninspiring contest for the Labour party leadership, Ed Miliband was crowned last night as new leader. We know a lot about his older brother David, who he defeated, and we know a lot about his sibling’s views on foreign policy. David was Foreign Secretary for just under three years – the entire length of Gordon Brown’s premiership. We know David’s role in the torture controversy surrounding the security services. We cringed at his swooning relationship with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. We were impressed by his strong stances on the Conservative’s dubious European alliances and the Israel-Dubai assassination. Interpreting how his foreign policy would continue is easy, but what about Ed.

One of Ed Miliband’s campaign messages was his opposition to the Iraq war. As he wasn’t an MP at the time of the invasion, he was arguably spared the difficulty of rebelling against the government. Taking a stand against Blair and the majority of the cabinet could have hindered his progression. Nevertheless he opposed it and this has been one strand of a so-called left wing approach to his leadership. His criticisms of the war have also been important in presenting himself as an honest politician who is prepared to accept past mistakes and learn from them. The loss of trust in 2003 has never been restored for many voters.

Learning from the mistakes from Iraq is a relatively easy thing, there are so many to choose from. So this stance doesn’t really give him any differentiation from most, although it did create a clear difference with his brother. But creating a new ethic for foreign relations requires more depth. Ed has advocated a values based approach, as opposed to a traditional alliance based one.

David Cameron congratulated Miliband on his victory and promised to share information on issues of national security. Being privy to this information will probably help form Miliband’s foreign policy. He has stuck to the national consensus on Afghanistan during his campaign – that a withdrawal should take place only when a degree of security is achieved. But as issues arise – he will have to react in a pragmatic way, rather than playing solely to the Labour left. The withdrawal from Afghanistan and Trident renewal will test the theory that he owes the Unions for his win.

Another clue to Miliband E foreign policy lies in Miliband D. Ed has stated that he wants to use David’s talents within his shadow cabinet. The position of Chancellor might be some sort of consolation but it would be unpopular with Ed Balls, an important cabinet figure, and David’s new labour tendencies would contradict Ed’s social democracy message. A real likelihood is that David will retain his foreign affairs brief and as shadow foreign secretary he will be aloof from the core of power. Ed might give David free reign over the foreign brief. David will be able to retain a degree of independence that will ease the pain of losing to his younger brother.

Labour’s stance towards foreign policy for the next parliament will mostly be underpinned by two resounding factors. Firstly the Blair era provided a torrid experience to party members and nearly destroyed Labour. The leadership won’t mistake the same mistakes again. Secondly the economic situation will enforce a conservative approach to foreign affairs. Domestic politics will be of the main concern to UK voters when facing cuts – they will expect Labour to show the same focus.


Tuesday, August 3, 2010

Mexico – the forgotten neighbour

Given the perilous state of the Iraq conflict and the worsening situation in Afghanistan, the Obama administration might be excused for taking less notice of the drug wars in Mexico. But the continuing conflict below the southern border has the potential to undermine America’s regional security, compromise its immigration policy and increase domestic crime and drug related violence.

The emergence of a major drug war in America’s neighbour has been largely unnoticed. The wars in the Middle East had dominated the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Besides Mexico falls within a policy gap – is it domestic and regional? And it was only recently that proper statements were made by senior administration officials. Now Hilary Clinton has drawn parallels with the Colombian narco wars during the 1980s.


The similarity between the Colombian drug wars of the 1980s and 1990s and the Mexican cartel wars is strong. Then two cartels – Medillin and Cali – waged a long war against the state, local officials and anyone else who was in the way. The situation was arguably far worse with powerful narco-paramilitaries attacking state institutions, intimidating or killing police and government officials, and often allied with insurgent groups like Farc, controlling large areas of the country. The over used term ‘failed state’ certainly applied to Colombia in the 1980s as no sector of society escaped cocaine related violence. The Colombian cartels also established distribution networks through Central America, the Caribbean and in the United States itself.

Most of these Colombian conditions apply now to Mexico. Local officials and police are largely compromised by corruption or face threats of violence. In a slight comparison to Colombia, the Mexican violence is more focused on inter-cartel battles. But the Mexican state is still under threat, the cartels have attacked government officials and are now facing a full square conflict with the army. But narco-terrorism is not as prominent as it was in Colombia. The cartels have looked to establish regional control though: replacing trade routes once managed by the Colombians and expanding to American cities and even to Europe and West Africa.

The Colombian war was undoubtedly violent: caused by a combination deep rooted political tensions, an unprecedented increase in wealth for the traffickers and social inequality that fed general criminality. The Mexican war has these characteristics. But other factors have brought on the conflict since 2006 and made it especially violent. The fact that all other supply routes for drugs (especially cocaine) have been sealed means that the US-Mexican border is a concentrated point for traffickers to supply the north. The Caribbean-Miami route was restricted by US agencies from the late 1980s. This has increased the profits for north Mexican cartels but also raised the stakes. With such lucrative rewards, the cartels have resorted to greater violence to ensure their share.

Another cause of such extreme violence has been the ease with which guns, especially automatic weapons, cross the border. The figures are disputed by organizations like the National Rifle Association, but supply of weapons is certainly a factor in inflaming the violence. This has included military grade hardware such as RPG launchers, explosives and even tanks. Desertion from the Mexican army has played a role, in particular the former special forces soldiers who formed the notorious Los Zetas, now one of the most feared and violent groups.

Some argue that the war is a war of choice, initiated by Frederick Calderon following his 2006 election. His decision to send troops into the northern towns certainly coincided with the violence, but the problems of Mexico have been in gestation for a long time. A spike in violence would have been inevitable and as most of the violence has been intra-cartel, it would suggest that the military are another player in the conflict not a lead protagonist.

The one constant in the war is the American consumer. The continuous demand for drugs, not just cocaine and marijuana but also metamphetamine and heroin, has fuelled the criminality. The critics of the war on drugs argue that successive governments have failed to grasp this elementary fact. Decriminalisation would starve the traffickers of their lifeblood. How the actual supply end would remain free of criminality is unclear. The traffickers are linked to the process at every level – how would it be possible to bring these individuals onside. A criticism of decriminalisation is that criminals would still act as criminals – operating in other black markets. In areas of Latin America where poverty is deep, the causes of drug related criminality may well exist.

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Iraq and the press

The Iraq war differed from other recent conflicts in that its cassus belli needed to be sold to the public and the world at large. Whereas the need to go to war might be obvious on many occasions: an invasion, an unprovoked attack, a humanitarian crisis or an ethnic civil war. None of these applied. Not directly at least. Saddam Hussein's regime was considered a threat, he was in defiance of international law, and he was an unpleasant dictator who menaced his people and neighbours. So the argument goes. But this was a manufactured argument, rather than an argument based on an unacceptable situation. The relationship between the West and Iraq in March 2003 was essentially the same as it was in March 1991.

The threat justification was the hardest to prove. Firstly as threats like risks are perceived and the threshold for any threat will vary. The threat of WMD has been with us since the end of the second World War. Arguing that such a threat has worsened is not an easy task. Whilst Saddam had used and developed WMD in the past, it was unclear whether he retained this capacity. Secondly to justify war the Western powers would need to rely on intelligence gathered covertly from a mixture of unreliable and sparse sources. The intelligence agencies across Europe and the United States were convinced Iraq still possessed chemical, biological and nuclear capability or at least the ambition to develop. Clearly unable to provide open access to their sources, politicians had to present their evidence via the media in various dossiers, intelligence reports and press briefings. In the run up to war favourable media was used to present this case; sections of the media opposed to war scrutinised it.

Clearly from hindsight the evidence did not match the reality. But the public generally saw no reason to doubt the intelligence agencies who had been the vanguard of foreign policy for centuries. In an age of scepticism there were many who doubted the concrete nature of what was presented. Simile those opposed to war on humanitarian or anti-imperial grounds did not necessarily doubt that Saddam had WMD, but fiercely opposed the solution being set out by the Bush administration.

The good faith displayed by the media to the WMD argument proved to be finite. As it became obvious that the WMD did not exist, the media changed tack and sought to prove that politicians had spun, exaggerated or lied about the exact nature of what Iraq possessed. The war between the BBC and the government in June and July 2003 that led to the Hutton inquiry was the apex of this. Sections of the media who maintained a grudging acknowledgement that Blair was right and Saddam needed to go, reverted back to traditional positions. The Daily Mail, Telegraph and Times were critical of the way intelligence had been presented to the public, despite supporting the war. A hatred of new Labour, its ways and personnel superseded support for war.

The British media's focus on the September dossier and the semantics of Blair's statements on WMD have been an obsession, that has often baffled Iraqis. Pretty much since late May 2003 when the accusation of exaggerating intelligence emerged, large sections of the media have focused on this unremittingly. The questions about WMD and Blair's veracity provide a focal point for all opponents of the war to hone in on. The obsession to prove that Blair, Campbell and anyone else connected lied often seemed more important than what was actually happening in Iraq. Simile the debate over whether Iraq was in a state of civil war in 2006 formed part of a totemic struggle between the government and the media. To the government Iraq wasn't; to the media it was – thus vindicating their previous opposition.

The absence of Iraq experts in the mainstream media is also a criticism of how the war was reported. Prior to the war, Iraq's closed and secretive society meant that prior experience of Iraqi culture was rare. After the invasion and in the dangerous aftermath, those reporters who were new to Iraq would be unable to truly get to know the country. There would be no learning curve for new reporters. Either reporting would be from a distance within the Green zone or embedded with patrols. Actually meeting ordinary Iraqis would be far too dangerous for inexperienced journalists, as the risk of kidnap and death became widespread in the aftermath. A consequence for Western audiences is that reporting trends and patterns in Iraq, that long term experience could understand, was replaced with a focus on events – the spectacular insurgent attacks or American operations that regularly occurred.

Further to this, as the insurgency developed through 2004, its nuances were poorly reported. True the actual fabric of the insurgency was not fully understood by defence intelligence let alone journalists. But the American line that the violence was caused by outsiders whether in terms of personnel, finance or weapons was too easily passed. The Bush administration tried to link the war to its international war on terror, but the majority of the attacks on Coalition troops were from nationalist Sunni insurgents who were alienated by the American installed process and their heavy handed tactics. Likewise violence was often linked to the new political elite that America brought in from exile.

Sunday, February 21, 2010

The Cameron doctrine?

In a few months time a new British government will be formed, most likely by David Cameron's Conservative party. Finding clear policy statements by the Tories is hard enough for domestic policy, so understanding how a Cameron foreign policy will shape up, needs a degree of imagination. The simplest explanation for the lack of hints as to what a Cameron doctrine may be, is in the nature of Britain's foreign policy establishment. Like Obama across the Atlantic, the underlying theme from a change of administration is continuity. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office sets the agenda in many respects and newly appointed ministers are often happy to let foreign policy continue in its traditional mode. The other reason for undramatic shifts is that newly elected governments often arrive with only the vaguest of ideas of what their foreign policy should look like.

Margaret Thatcher arrived during a period of severe domestic turbulence and British foreign policy had been in steady decline since the early 1970s. John Major's popularity had been boosted by the Gulf War but the recession was the overwhelming issue for voters. Tony Blair's vague promise of an ethical foreign policy appealed to the centre left core of his vote, but was a small part of a new fresh approach to politics that he tried to represent. Gordon Brown was the first prime minister to take office while Britain was at war for half a century. But having never mentioned foreign policy during the Blair years, apart from economic led initiatives for Africa, it was unlikely that he would start gushing out ideals on world peace. His book on courage was about the limit.

British leaders also tend to be highly reactive in their approaches to foreign policy. Blair is the exception here. The Falklands war, Gulf war, Bosnia and Kosovan conflicts each presented Britain with two questions. What degree of intervention does Britain take and how does this relate to Britain's role in the world? They all arrived unexpectedly. They all represented challenges to a Britain that has often tried to punch above its weight.

You would expect Cameron to follow this pattern of a reactive strategy. Tackling international crises, most likely with America but often with European powers, will be on an ad hoc basis. Whatever does arise will require international co-operation and so far Cameron's attempts to reach out to future potential allies has been lamentable. It's hard to believe that the Conservative party's troubled relationship with the EU won't make co-operation with European states difficult. The emphasis is on transatlantic co-operation on their website; European co-operation is not mentioned. The Tories re-position Britain's relationship with Europe solely in terms of how continental power has a negative effect, not what any positive future co-operation over foreign policy issues might be.

The one foreign policy issue that Cameron can't step back from or resist international co-operation is in Afghanistan. David Cameron has used his support for the war to draw to gain strong backing from the right wing press. But this is not necessarily part of an overarching foreign policy, it is based more in support for soldiers on the frontline. The Brown government has been accused of selling the army short and Cameron intends to be on the popular side of the argument here. A withdrawal half way through any Cameron first term would be the ideal result. Britain could then return to its traditional realist and isolationist stance, rather than the liberal interventionist outlook of the Blair years.

This return to isolationism would appeal to the Tory old guard of the 1990s who still make up a significant contingency in the party. Major was far more cautious than Thatcher in his foreign policy and after the Gulf war, Britain languished on the world stage. The ambivalence to the Balkan wars was the nadir of British foreign policy in the 1990s. Major wasn't helped by his poor relationship with Bill Clinton either. The old guard of Douglas Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind who ran foreign and defence ministries respectively are respected wise members of the Conservative party's foreign policy cognoscenti despite presiding over a dire Balkans policy. The Tories of the 1990s were so myopic that Europe was as far as their foreign policy went. There is every indication that any future Conservative government will have an equally limited outlook, with Europe being an obsession over anything else.

Assuming Britain's economy recovers and a steady withdrawal from Afghanistan can be achieved then Cameron could shift to a Blairite interventionist model. Conservatives have established links with neo-conservatives in the United States. The party has a strong right wing Jewish backing that would support strong action against Iran or any other threat to Israel. Having decent relations with allies will be crucial in such circumstances. Faced with a serious threat personal differences might be put to one side. Britain is regarded by America and Europe as a main player and is expected to fulfil these obligations.

It is also difficult to assess Cameron's intentions from his time in opposition, as they have acted primarily as an opposition party on many issues, rather than putting forward a consistent stance. They supported the Iraq war as much if not than Labour, but criticised the aftermath. They have been happy to watch the Labour party squirm during the Chilcot inquiry but know that they have been lucky to avoid scrutiny of their role. They criticised disproportionate Israeli action against Hezbollah in 2006, but have portrayed themselves as a dedicated supporter of Israel on most other occasions. Accusations of opportunism and inconsistency can be easily aimed.

A recent presentation at Chatham House by Cameron's foreign policy team failed to clarify their aims. Dame Pauline Neville Jones explained that a Conservative foreign policy would be more pre-emptive and intelligent in its approach, which is to expected. That is what the foreign policy establishment do all day. Foreign policy is also, as previously stated, often reactive to events. A doctrine cannot ever work if it doesn't factor in the unexpected. Cameron will probably learn this quite soon after taking office.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Iraq's fateful election

With the world's attention focused on Iran and Afghanistan, the progress of Iraq's fledgling democracy has dropped off the world agenda. But the March 7 poll could be as decisive as any other political event of the next few months. The decision to partially overturn a ban of over 500 candidates with alleged Ba'ath party links, has removed the possibility of the election being tainted before it actually happened. The committee that issued the banning of these Sunni candidates had links to Tehran, but the current leaders have shown themselves keen to resist this eastern influence. The outcome of the election may end up convoluted through endless coalition building and compromise, but the prize of victory is no less important.

The two alliances that look most likely to gain the most seats, cover the majority of the potential Shia vote, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and the State of Law Alliance (SOLA). The INA won the 2005 election and includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist movement. SOLA takes a more nationalistic approach and includes current prime minister Maliki. Other parties include Sunni alliances the Iraqi National Movement and Unity of Iraq Alliance. The Kurdish parties have formed an alliance to cover the Kurdish representation.

The introduction of democracy to Iraq after years of dictatorship and one party rule has been fraught. Elections have taken place – true, but the desired consequences have not always followed. The elections of 2005 confirmed the Sunni population's fear of marginalisation, after a limited participation. The elections have also appeared as something of a sideshow besides the raging violence that has overwhelmed Iraq. Successful elections have not led to political stability.

The elections of 2005 took place whilst insurgents waged war against the Americans and Iraq's embryonic state. The threats to bomb polling stations weighed on any Iraqi voter. The 2005 election resulted in a Shia-Kurdish victory, but the deterioration that followed wasn't just caused by Sunni rejection. The rejectionist forces opposed the entire new Iraq project, not just the electoral process. And vowed to wage war regardless. The December 15th 2005 elections did see some participation from Sunni insurgent groups keen to gain political power. These splits between nationalist insurgent and Islamist insurgent could be traced back to this difference of attitude.

The failure of elections to provide national unity and an end to sectarian differences also worsened inter communal violence. Unable to come to a political settlement, Iraqi politicians drew on their militia links to press home their influence. The militias integration into ministries of the state – acting as personal fiefdoms for Shia politicians – further alienated the Sunnis from the political set up. Elements within the Shi'te political fabric were more interested in controlling power than power sharing. Whilst clearly partisan Noura Al-Maliki has provided a counterweight to the power hungry Sadrist party. The previous elections created clear divisions in Iraq into sectarian lines. Tensions that did not previously exist were formed. Power and the expansion of power encouraged coercive and often violent practices by Iraqi politicians.

Despite recent improvements, the security threat in this election is still very real. The recent large attacks by Ba'athist-Al Qaida linked militants has been focused on the symbols of government power – ministries of health, justice, etc. But personal security for Iraqis is still poor, it just isn't reported extensively by the Western media. Iraq heads into these elections in a weak position.

The Americans will hope for a predictable outcome where established power bases keep their control. Iraqi domestic politics are now firmly considered Iraqi affairs. Greater participation from Sunnis, especially former insurgents like the Sons of Iraq, is to be hoped for. Kurdish confidence in the political system is also important to avoid a Iraqi-Kurd Arab split. The fault line that divides northern Iraqi Kurdistan and the Sunni heartland could be the new battle front. America will also hope that Iraqi politicians resist further Iranian influence. This is difficult to expect but will be crucial to wider US-Iranian relations that have worsen considerably of late.

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Iran and the US - at breaking point

So what now? The deadline for Iran to respond to American proposals on transfer of enriched nuclear fuel has elapsed. Another stalemate has developed in Iranian domestic politics, as the reformist movement remains intact and the government retains its iron grip. Potential international sanctions are no closer with China and Russia continuing to see the Iranian issue in different terms to the West. Meanwhile Israel only gets twitchier.

Surely this situation cannot continue. The short answer is no. Both sides have indicated that they will not back down. The long game of brinkmanship that Iran has been playing will eventually end. The dangerous brinkmanship that Saddam engaged in prior to the Iraq invasion was supported by his belief that America would never invade. Even days prior to the actual invasion he believed that the Americans would not go through with it. Now Barack Obama is no George W Bush and is not surrounded by a hawkish cabinet, so military action is not inevitable. But the pressure on him in a Congressional election year, with a relative decline in his popularity and with a frenzied Republican right, would be too great for him to, if not actually authorise military action, at least give tacit support to Israeli action. It is hard to stay optimistic given the characters involved and the political context of Iran-US-Israeli relations, but in this article I'll try.

The way things stand Iran, Israel and the United States are on a collision course. It is safe to say that the policy of any one of them will not dramatically change with their respective leaders. But the one constant that might change is Iran's domestic political situation. If there is going to be a solution to the nuclear crisis then it will come from here. On the one hand, the nuclear card has often (and could henceforth be) been used to shore up domestic support amongst a patriotic population. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent nuclear rhetoric has been ratcheted up to try and distract from deep internal opposition to his presidency. But once the consequences of such a nuclear policy become apparent, with sanctions and further economic isolation, internal opposition will only grow. Reformist leader Mir Hussein Mousavi pledged his support for Iran's nuclear programme in the June elections, but his pragmatism is clear. Besides, any candidate who pledged to scrap Iran's nuclear programme would not have been permitted on the ballot paper, with Iran's strictly controlled electoral system.

Looking from hindsight it was probably a mistake to President Obama to be so impartial during the election protest last year. A declaration of American commitment to human rights and democratic integrity is not the same as meddling in another countries affairs. Iran's leaders blamed the West anyway for the post election unrest, despite Western government's going out of their way to keep schtum. Given the fragility of the situation, knowing what kind of covert activity America is undertaking in Iran, would be difficult. The Iranians have made various claims of foreign espionage plots involving American hikers, journalists or just simply foreign infiltrators. None have come across as anything but the result of the regime's paranoia. Either the Americans are acting very carefully or dare not create an incident that could trigger a serious escalation. As with today's assassination of a nuclear physicist – the initial blame was put on America and Israel but was denied immediately.

A game of psychological warfare is being played out. You can guarantee that America has a legion of analysts and Iranologists de-cyphering messages emitting from Tehran, whilst trying to determine who holds the power in Iran's opaque political system. Iranian psychology might often seem simple and naïve but is equally thoughtful. Every incident in Iran's turbulent domestic scene can be passed off as a foreign plot onto an often gullible public. The Iranian leadership might be ignorant of global politics but they know how to play international powers off one another, stall negotiations and maintain ambiguity.

Having an influence on how Iran's domestic battle evolves, is way beyond America's reach. It is doubtful whether sanctions could hurt the factions America wants to weaken. Helping exiles might be an answer. On the downside, after the Iraq experience, exiles can often provide false information and be unrepresentative of the actual population. The ruling elite has a tight control, so what counts is what occurs in protests in Iranian cities. But even though the internet and external communications are censored, knowing that foreign exiles and supporters are strong and organized outside Iran, would embolden the domestic protesters.