Tea with the enemy

In the secretive, delicate and ruthless covert arena, hard-nosed negotiations with adversaries occur regularly. Official admittance is often rare though, as it undermines public political statements, puts moderates (those usually doing the talking) at risk from extremists, and is often far from productive. Just as British intelligence negotiated with Irish republicans prior to an official agreement, Israelis liaised with Fatah, and the CIA have cultivated contacts with Sunni insurgents. Today's reports of MI6 meetings with the Taliban is not news therefore, not in terms of intelligence services historical activities nor in light of the current conflict in Afghanistan. This story has moved to the political level as British domestic opposition accuse Gordon Brown of backtracking on a previous promise not to negotiate with the Taliban; and Afghan authorities, having just expelled two diplomats, are looking but failing to convince the world that progress is being made. American commanders have also expressed dissatisfaction with the very idea of negotiations with an extremist movement that harboured Al-Qaeda militants - vital to the group's rise in the 1990s.


MI6, the British army, the UN and various other players in Afghanistan's latest great but not very gratifying game is without an end in sight. A war that appeared concluded in early 2002 has come back with a vengeance this year. MI6 are merely continuing a long held role and manipulating long held assets. SIS played an auxiliary role during the Afghan war against the Soviets, had a deep and valuable relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud in the following decade, and were at the forefront of the UK-US invasion in October 2001. Neither SIS nor the British government have verified these recent reports and will not do so.

Call it pragmatism or the product of an increasingly intractable conflict, as up to 10,000 Taliban insurgents in a six year plus war are forcing alternative and radical solutions. Splitting the Taliban between an acceptable indigenous faction and the hard line foreign mixed cadre could be the strategy behind MI6's liaison. The increasing foreign influence adds urgency to any possible deal with indigenous militias. The rise of the Pakistani neo-Taliban across the border - allied closely to the Afghan Taliban leadership - has narrowed options further. Suddenly NATO - despite the recent re-capture of Musa Qala - is in a position of weakness as the threat has been trebled by expanding militancy on either side.