The recent talks between Lebanon's leaders in Doha has merely ushered in a lull, and whether a civil war or long uneasy ceasefire follows is an unanswerable and complex question. The urgent gathering that followed Hezbollah's mock coup last month has presented an uneasy calm - requiring conflict management not conflict resolution. This was the consensus at the Frontline club's panel discussion on Lebanon's future last week. Not only is Lebanon's complex internal fabric highly flammable, but an explosion of violence could equally be provoked by its neighbours Syria and Israel and the more distant meddlers Iran and the United States. A country that is only slightly smaller than Jamaica and Kosovo, is a battleground for all the major players in the region. Like Kosovo Lebanon is on the fault line. Christian post colonial remnants battles the emerging so-called Shia crescent. Cutting across this split are Lebanon's Sunni population still influenced by Syria and an anxious Israel seeking to protect its northern border at all costs. The root of this current imbroglio could be the inconclusive Taif agreement in 1989, Israel's invasion in 1982, the initial eruption of violence in 1975 or the anachronistic overtly confessional constitution drawn up in 1943. But the history - although critical - will come later.
All sides made concessions at Doha, including Hezbollah. But the Shia movement ultimately received what it wanted, negotiating from a position of strength, gaining greater cabinet representation. The fighting that erupted in May and the following deal proved several facts. That the Lebanese army is no match for Hezbollah; the neighbouring powers, especially Syria, do not wish for civil war; that the United States is a peripheral player in this crisis; and the Arab states for once invested political capital in a Middle East peace agreement. So crisis averted and some stability might be on the horizon. But the possibility of violence is there on all fronts.
Hezbollah, designated a terrorist organization by the US, Israel obviously, and many other western states, has real political representation. Unacceptable to the US and funded by Iran, Hezbollah presents Lebanon's gravest problem. That is a fact, regardless of whether you are pro or anti Hezbollah. The movement has rearmed to its levels pre 2006 war, its support has galvanised and returned. The spark for the recent trouble was an incursion against Hezbollah's communications network and the sacking of an airport security chief with alleged links to the group. This network - revealed in its full extent last month - shows the grip Hezbollah has on Lebanon and its position as a state within a state. Dominance in the Bekaa valley and the coastline puts them in a strong strategic position. It also raises the vision among western intelligence agencies of Iranian presence on the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel's fear of Iranian influence on its northern border only grows as Hezbollah strengthens. Historians may debate whether Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon created Hezbollah or whether a Shia political force would inevitably have developed, given the Shias lowly position in Lebanese society. But Iranian influence put resistance to Israel in south Lebanon or in all of historic Palestine at the heart of Hezbollah's ideology. This opposition led to a painful guerrilla war in the 1990s until Israel's withdrawal in 2000. The 2006 war was merely a messy draw and the long awaited replay will most likely be even more inconclusive and bloody. Especially as both Iran and the United States have reiterated their material support on both sides.
The outcome in Lebanon will depend on whether US-Iranian relations improve. With a new presidency next year, things could improve. Then again, Lebanon like Iraq could be the spark for the much feared wider showdown between America, Iran and Israel. But for Lebanon, local issues are always more important than the geopolitical games it seems to be dragged into. The concept of Lebanon needs re-examination, its constitution is long overdue reforming and political flexibility must be paramount for leaders on all sides. Bottom up solutions as always. The Lebanese are tired of the Middle East's political roundabout. Hezbollah's presence is problematic, but despite Israel and America's opposition, they have shown that they are impossible to ignore.
All sides made concessions at Doha, including Hezbollah. But the Shia movement ultimately received what it wanted, negotiating from a position of strength, gaining greater cabinet representation. The fighting that erupted in May and the following deal proved several facts. That the Lebanese army is no match for Hezbollah; the neighbouring powers, especially Syria, do not wish for civil war; that the United States is a peripheral player in this crisis; and the Arab states for once invested political capital in a Middle East peace agreement. So crisis averted and some stability might be on the horizon. But the possibility of violence is there on all fronts.
Hezbollah, designated a terrorist organization by the US, Israel obviously, and many other western states, has real political representation. Unacceptable to the US and funded by Iran, Hezbollah presents Lebanon's gravest problem. That is a fact, regardless of whether you are pro or anti Hezbollah. The movement has rearmed to its levels pre 2006 war, its support has galvanised and returned. The spark for the recent trouble was an incursion against Hezbollah's communications network and the sacking of an airport security chief with alleged links to the group. This network - revealed in its full extent last month - shows the grip Hezbollah has on Lebanon and its position as a state within a state. Dominance in the Bekaa valley and the coastline puts them in a strong strategic position. It also raises the vision among western intelligence agencies of Iranian presence on the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel's fear of Iranian influence on its northern border only grows as Hezbollah strengthens. Historians may debate whether Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon created Hezbollah or whether a Shia political force would inevitably have developed, given the Shias lowly position in Lebanese society. But Iranian influence put resistance to Israel in south Lebanon or in all of historic Palestine at the heart of Hezbollah's ideology. This opposition led to a painful guerrilla war in the 1990s until Israel's withdrawal in 2000. The 2006 war was merely a messy draw and the long awaited replay will most likely be even more inconclusive and bloody. Especially as both Iran and the United States have reiterated their material support on both sides.
The outcome in Lebanon will depend on whether US-Iranian relations improve. With a new presidency next year, things could improve. Then again, Lebanon like Iraq could be the spark for the much feared wider showdown between America, Iran and Israel. But for Lebanon, local issues are always more important than the geopolitical games it seems to be dragged into. The concept of Lebanon needs re-examination, its constitution is long overdue reforming and political flexibility must be paramount for leaders on all sides. Bottom up solutions as always. The Lebanese are tired of the Middle East's political roundabout. Hezbollah's presence is problematic, but despite Israel and America's opposition, they have shown that they are impossible to ignore.
1 comment:
‘But for Lebanon, local issues are always more important than the geopolitical games it seems to be dragged into. The concept of Lebanon needs re-examination, its constitution is long overdue reforming and political flexibility must be paramount for leaders on all sides.’
I think this paragraph touches on a fundamental truth that underpins all current unresolved geopolitical conflicts- from the Lebanon to Papua New Guinea, from Northern Ireland to Iraq.
There may be a route-map toward conflict resolution in examining this cultural effect in conflict zones- what is the psychology of the bunker mentality?
The Northern Ireland peace process for example was a classic case of entrenched psychological conflict, commonly referred to in that zone as ‘both sides of the religious divide’. Years of tit-for-tat attacks justified by tit-for-tat amateur historians on both sides of the Northern Ireland community.
It would be interesting to see the development of a form of Conflict Risk Assessment where a community appears to be headed for armed confrontation.
To a certain extent we see clumsy and sometimes fairly sophisticated types of intervention from the UN and other international actors- we also see blunt military intervention for geopolitical reasons (US in Iraq) which has on the surface little to do with the psychology of local political actors.
If it were possible to temperature-gauge local conflict, and possible to identify the correct point at which to introduce an acceptable international actor to prevent the development of localised bunker mentality then we might just see some serious front-end resolution.
All bets are off where the international actor has a hidden agenda, of course.
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