Afghanistan 2012

The debate surrounding the best strategy for Afghanistan has reached a new fever pitch this week on both sides of the Atlantic. The domestic concerns of NATO's leading members – American and Britain – have been contrasting. America's political and military leadership is divided over troop numbers and how to deal with President Karzai's corrupt government. British debate lies on a more human level: letters of condolence and basic welfare of soldiers has dominated the public's view of the war. The other NATO allies have a fair presence: France just over 3,000; Germany 4,365, but Britain's combat role has caused a disproportionate number of casualties. The public opposition to the war in NATO's allies has been mild in comparison. France has taken a more cautious line for future Afghan strategy, knowing that all bets are off until President Obama decides on the next step. These questions about troop numbers and strategy are important, but Western leaders need to be asking themselves one dominant question: what kind of Afghanistan do we want in the years ahead. What will Afghanistan in 2012, 2022 or beyond look like.

Whereas Iraq was a war of choice, initiated by America and with modest international support. Afghanistan was widely accepted as needing intervention after September 11th and NATO's invoking of Article 5 sealed a wider international effort. If the September 11th plots had emanated from say Somalia, punitive strikes and withdrawal might have sufficed, but Afghanistan's strategic location – its proximity to Pakistan, Iran and China – means that it cannot escape attention. If we base our future hopes for country within this geographical context – failure seems unthinkable. But given the vital importance that Afghanistan has to its neighbours, success should be certainly possible. China, Iran and Russia all have an interest in a stable Afghan state. Clearly the actual material contribution – troops especially – could be limited. China has been approached for humanitarian and training assistance. A significant international role is certainly many Chinese see as long overdue. Afghanistan's natural wealth is appealing and investment by Chinese companies – in a similar way to Africa – could be feature of the country's future redevelopment. China needs to contribute in other ways though, if it is to reap the rewards.

Russia's history with Afghanistan makes any involvement difficult. President Obama has sought Russian assistance in more tangential ways – the use of Russian airspace for American supply lines was discussed in April, but has failed to become a reality. The opening up of Russian airspace would solve many logistical problems, especially if American troop numbers increase. But the historical enmity between the Cold war foes and administration complications like transit fees are hindering the deal. An Afghan future would be internationalised – having two world powers close to its borders means it can be easily exploited for the better.

Most Western diplomats will hope that an Afghan future is free of corruption for which President Karzai's election result has come to epitomise. Replacing Karzai or somehow marginalizing him might be the best way forward given the cancellation of the run off with Abdullah Abdullah. The creation of a loya jirga of tribal chiefs would be more balanced than the dominant elite that Karzai represents. The expansion of the national decision making process to the many under represented Afghan ethnic groups would help solve some of the intense division that exists in the country.

Wishing for a democratic redeveloped Afghanistan is great, but this is almost solely based on progress against the raging insurgency. Taliban attacks occur daily across the country with no real safe havens. Discussions of withdrawal fill Afghani politicians with dread. The stark warning that the Taliban would overrun Kabul in days if NATO withdrew has emphasised how serious the conflict has become. These pessimistic statements disguise the mixed reality on the ground, where reconstruction and development are being undertaken by NATO troops. The McCrystal counterinsurgency plan has started – protecting the local population and building confidence between Afghans and foreign troops. An Afghanistan of the future would somehow have overcome these barriers between the foreign and domestic. Cultural differences are vast, but shared goals of peace and economic development exist. Democracy and political freedoms might have to wait.

2012 is a few years away but it is only three years. Not much time for things to happen. The NATO coalition are realising that patience is one of the traits that will win this war. Training troops, curbing corruption and reconstruction will take a long time. The ingrained ineffectiveness of domestic police and army; the unreliability of Karzai's administration; 30 years of war, all require a long term commitment to overturn. The Obama administration has to balance between showing commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but not giving an indefinite length to their involvement, a consideration needed to ensure domestic support. No progress in eight years has made the American public weary, but it may well take at least another eight or more.

Afghanistan's future has been linked to Pakistan for far longer than the current conflict, so it is a truism that both futures are interlinked. But 2012 Afghanistan will be equally defined by what is occurring in other neighbouring countries. The situation in Iran could turn worse than it currently is and totally dwarf the Afghan conflict. A regional war following an Israeli or American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would most likely shift the focus westwards. Iran's allies lie to its west, so Lebanon, Syria and Palestine would focus American attention away from Afghanistan. This is not to dismiss some sort of Iranian attack on American forces in Afghanistan. 2012 will be an American election year and Obama will be focused on protecting Israel and Saudi Arabia, over anything else.