End of days

In 40 days time, the American public will vote for a new President, who then will be sworn in a further two and a half months later - a hell of a lot can happen in this time. Three crises are reaching fever pitch at the moment and at least one will cast a dark shadow over this concluding period. First Iran. Tensions between the United States, Israel and Iran have simmered all year. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's recent speech to the UN in New York has only outraged anti-Iran groups further and now even Obama is expressing outrage at his anti-semitic and confrontational comments. The war of words has continued with the IAEA acting as an ineffectual referee. The longer Iran is perceived to be un-cooperative and obstructionist - the less patient America and Israel will be. An attack on Iran is not considered likely before 4 November, but in the post election vacuum, and if there is an Obama victory, a parting shot by Bush (egged on by Dick Cheney) at Iran's nuclear installations is considered a real possibility.

Will this happen? The Bush administration has had Tehran in its cross hairs for most of its tenure. The "not on my watch" syndrome is a strong influence for Bush and Iran continues to provoke and be defiant. But whether America attacks Iran seems related to the second crisis that dominates US foreign policy. The crisis in Pakistan that is now on all fronts - military, political and economic is making the Iran crisis seem totally innocuous in comparison. The expansion of Taliban-jihadi influence in the tribal areas of north-west Pakistan, the weakness of Islamabad's civilian leadership and the duplicitous role of the military-ISI has created an explosive mix. Pakistan is getting worse every day. It seemed to be on the precipice at the end of last year, after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but its state has only detiorated since. On top of this, American and Pakistani troops have exchanged fire, after US Special forces conducted a cross border raid from Afghanistan.

The Bush administration has finally realised the seriousness of the Afghanistan conflict, having been pre-occupied by Iraq for most of the last five years. It also hopes to capture or kill as many Al-Qaida leaders as possible in its remaining months, including possibly the greatest prize Osama Bin Laden. The re-organized Taliban and its Al-Qaida allies are so submerged in the region though, that air raids, lightning operations and certainly conventional operations are fairly ineffective. A large scale bombing campaign might eliminate a score of enemy fighters, but would create an outcry in the region fierce enough to push Pakistan over the edge. Last weekend's suicide attack on the Marriott hotel underlined what everyone knows - Pakistan is facing a grave threat from jihadist terrorism. Repelling the attacks from the safe haven of the Pakistani tribal areas is an immense challenge to the American military, let alone a disorganised Pakistani army. Dealing with this situation is Bush's priority and thus puts Iran on the back burner.

But the two crises are related - logistically at least - Taliban forces have been armed by Iran according to some reports. Pakistan's upheaval and Iran's nuclear ambitions are driven by domestic factors way beyond the influence of Washington policymakers. Bush's role is forgiven in some respects. But the policies of the Bush administration have also made these countries worse, and the president might feel obliged to tidy up his mess in the crudest way possible.

Finally as the credit crunch is approaching its moment of truth, the US treasury is pushing for Congress to approve a $700bn bail out package for American banks. The deal will go through - simply because its failure would end American economic power as we know it. But whether it is the panacea for the global credit crisis is unclear. The American economy may well suffer further for the rest of the year. Whatever happens Bush's economic legacy seems as bad as his foreign policy one. Not only has America moved nearer recession and its previously unrivalled position as the centre for global capital been severely dented, but it has surrendered economic initiative to China and to a lesser extent India, Russia and the EU. One could also argue that the loss of soft power under Bush has made America an unattractive economic prospect as well. The Bush administration has been plagued with incompetent decision making, but fortunately the global financial crisis is such an out of control behemoth that any Bush action will probably make little difference. A parting shot is in the offing, the world will be holding its breath until January 20th.

End of the silly season?

British politics has the fortune of a peaceful summer month to give followers of current affairs a welcome break from the turbulent world that we live in. In such unforgiving environments elsewhere, a similar break would be a minor miracle. But despite the perpetual gloom, some positive moments have occured in the Middle East. As the season ended, the US significantly handed over the restive province of Anbar in west Iraq. Once the epicentre of the insurgency - a destructive nexus of Al-Qaida in Iraq, Sunni nationalists and Ba'thists - it has experienced a dramatic improvement in the last year. An important moment for the country.

The success here linked, not to a large degree but in part, to a ruthless campaign in Baghdad by the coalition. A good summer story to boost sales and provide some gung-ho sweat to a predictably cold summer was the disclosure by General Petraeus that SAS had played a vital role in securing the capital. Undercover SAS hit teams conducted a secret war had taken out 3,500 terrorists in a year and a half. Pure but probably true propaganda. The story was only picked up by the right wing newspapers, and was probably good sunbed reading.

More machoism this week, as an Israeli cabinet minister suggests that Mossad could kidnap Iranian president Ahmadinejad. Forgetting the logistical difficulties, Israel would be walking into a legal minefield. A country that has by many accounts broken numerous international laws tries to prosecute a leader who has threatened to break another law, in a figurative sense. It would dominate the syllabus of international law students for years.

Some wilder moments have arisen in the summer's required reading that has been published in Washington. First the revelation that American intelligence spied on Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki.

It's the climate stupid!

The Democrats have anointed Barack Obama and now the Republicans will do the same for John McCain in Minnesota this week. The differences between how each candidate will preside are becoming starker as Obama's progressive middle class multicultural agenda clashes with a conservative coalition of evangelicals and the free market financial elite. The backdrop of a serious global economic downturn, war in the Caucasus, and yet more confrontation in the Middle East, will probably dominate for the next few months of the contest, but by far the most important issue is still the lowest priority and this despite recent events in New Orleans.

Voters have been myopic when it comes climate change so far. We have yet to have a climate change election and fortunately on this occasion, it won't be. Both Obama and McCain accept the reality of climate change and will push for renewed international co-operation if elected. McCain's vice president Sarah Palin does not believe climate change is man-made - a problematic position for sure. And if elected the traditional economic interests that bankroll the Republicans may come to the fore. But compared to Bush's obstinacy and ignorance on the issue, the future is more optimistic. The UN Secretary General believes the next president must take the global lead on the issue.

Fanning the Olympic flames...

Sport and politics don't mix they say - try telling that to the Olympians. The history of the modern Olympics has been laced with incidents ranging from good old fashioned boycotts, to exploiting the games for propaganda, to acts of mindless terrorism. Look at the games through the years and the prevailing malaise often comes to the fore. The rise of Nazism marked the 1936 event; the Mexico City games of 68 were remembered for two American athletes' black power salute. 1972 was in the midst of ever more imaginative international terrorism - the death of 11 Israeli weightlifting team members made the event permanently associated with terror not sport. Then in the height of the "second Cold War", both the United States and the Soviet Union used the 1980 and 1984 games not as a platform for detente but - through boycotts - as another way to show disgust towards the other.

Thankfully recent Olympics have been more docile, without violence or part of warped geopolitics. Although the 1996 Atlanta event felt the ugly side of homegrown American terrorism. Perhaps staging the event in the kind of places most people would go on holiday, with no indigenous terrorism or autocratic regimes looking for any fillip possible, helps. Barcelona, Sydney and Athens fit the safety first option.

For Beijing though, the decision to award the Olympia was based on "international recognition of China's social stability, economic progress and the healthy life of the Chinese people." The IOC probably knew they were gambling, considering the safe alternatives that lost out to Beijing - Toronto and Paris. But the Olympics has always seen itself as a force for change and good in the world - the chance to bring one billion Chinese into the 21st century was too good an opportunity to miss.

Unfortunately under the international microscope, Chinese government policies are exposed. It is interesting to consider whether these issues are being examined minutely due to the Olympics, whether the protagonists are raising the protests and odds to capture this moment, or whether in a more globalised world we are just more interested in what happens thousands of miles away. So we have had international protests against China's long running iron fist policies in Tibet. Firstly in Llasa itself and then during the cross nation Olympic flame journey. China's misconception of how the world perceived their brutality in Tibet was exposed in snowy April Sunday in London, although not to the viewers back home. Then China suffered a devastating earthquake in Sichuan province, where nearly 70,000 people have died. Although an apolitical event, the Chinese authorities knew international focus required a decisive and compassionate response, which was delivered. It would be extremely cynical to say that such response was purely due to the Olympics, but international opinion was probably not not considered.

The prickly subject of censorship is an ongoing source of tension between the relative organisers. Having promised open media access, Chinese authorities have been slow in unblocking websites deemed politically sensitive, but progress is being made - apparently. Add to this ongoing concerns with Chinese human rights record that Amnesty are more than happy to raise - a series of broken promises as their timely report reveals. Oh and don't forget chronic smog over Beijing that puts the games (well outdoor events at least) in real doubt. The embarrassment of smog effected delays and cancellations could do far more damage than any protester might inflict, whether in a "protest pen" or not.

The final factor that threatens to turn a merely controversial Olympics into an ugly one, is that old favourite - terrorism. Today's attack by separatists from the Muslim region of Xinjiang on a police border post has brought serious concern for the organizers. Previously unheard of groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) are now centre stage. Predictably linked to Al-Qaeda they are putting the Olympics in a new perspective.

But despite minor teething problems, these Olympics are China's sales pitch to the world. It is their chance to impress us, beyond simple economic competence and it is also, at the same time, China's chance to understand the rest of the planet. China is an easy target for anyone concerned with human rights and there will be many who hope that the Olympics somehow fail as justice for their disregard for Tibet, Tianamen, etc. But there is a benign innocence to the Chinese - vis-à-vis the rest of the world - and any embarrassing cock-up would be a tad cruel given their zeal and desire for recognition.

Justice land

After the controversial, time consuming and ultimately unsuccessful trial of Milosevic, the UN war crimes tribunal at the Hague has its second big catch - Radovan Karadzic. His arrival at the Hague today provides an opportunity of justice for some of worst crimes in Europe since the second World War, but as Milosevic's trial showed, this can be an arduous process. Lower ranking individuals with less responsibility and blood on their hands have been prosecuted successfully, but those further up the Serb food chain have thus far escaped justice. Croat, Bosnian and even Kosovar idictees have faced the Hague, but none of the very unholy trinity of Milosevic, Karadzic or the still at large Ratko Mladic, who were responsible for the vast majority of the carnage, have faced a final reckoning. Although the ICTY is 15 years old, without a full and complete prosecution of these three, the court will be perceived as under-achieving.

Karadzic's crimes are numerous. As leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka) in Bosnia, he assumed the commanding military role, as Bosnian Serb forces sought to preserve their territory at the expense of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Beyond the relentless campaign of ethnic cleansing, Karadzic oversaw the cruel siege of Sarajevo, then is alleged to have ordered the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. Milosevic's take on Serb nationalism was manipulative and opportunistic, and was also from a distance in Belgrade with every effort to avoid culpability. But Karadzic sought no veil of guilt, his pronouncements at the time were unflinching: "In just a couple of days, Sarajevo will be gone and there will be five hundred thousand dead, in one month Muslims will be annihilated in Bosnia and Herzegovina". The ICTY has a compelling case for Karadzic.

Middle East - Chapter 6

The Middle East see-saw is fluctuating with its characteristic unpredictability as moves towards peace and ceasefires are matched by new tensions and violence. There is a sense that a new chapter in the region is opening. Partly due to several political facts that will occur in the next six months, but partly due to a long overdue re-evaluation of the problems in the region and the best way to resolve them. This new chapter could possibly see South West Asia move onto a more equal standing to the rest of the industrialised world, but it also has the potential to become far worse - even to the point of total destruction. So finish reading chapter five, make yourself a cup of tea, then turn the page to start this gripping new chapter....

What we do know and can predict with some certainty are the following. That a new American president will be elected by the end of the year and with this will follow a re-consideration of US policy in the region. The new President will either stay in Iraq until an unspecified date or will initiate a troop withdrawal to be completed within a 16 month time frame. Those are pretty stark differences in policy. The second way in which the new President will impact on the region is diplomatic. One will maintain the current diplomatic freeze on Iran, tighten sanctions and take military action if it comes to it. The other will meet the Tehran leadership without preconditions. Again with such differences in policy the future of the region could go either way. Tehran will also hold elections in 2009 and the end of Ahmadinejad's radical rule could change the course of this crisis. Regarding Israel and the Palestinians, both candidates have expressed strong support for Israel recently and have not put forward any radical alternatives to the status quo, so that conflict will continue as it is.

Linked to America's destiny in the region is the strong possibility of some sort of enhanced sovereignty for Iraq. As Iraqi forces gain the upper hand against the insurgency, greater political control will follow. Ten out of Iraq's 18 provinces have been handed back to Iraqi government control - Diwaniyah is the latest. The tide may well have turned since the start of the surge in 2007, but Sunni provinces are still beyond the Baghdad government's control. Iraq also remains heavily influenced by Iran, the provinces under Iraqi government control are Shiite and Prime Minister Maliki shows no sign of cooling Iranian ties under American pressure. But the battle against the militias appears to being won and maybe, just maybe, 2009 could be a year of serious reconciliation for Iraq. Iraq is pushing for further sovereignty with the setting of a US timetable for withdrawal and possible prosecution of American troops but these are flimsy aspirations.

Finally for the United States, as Iraq achieves some vague concept of stability, a new front is re-opened in Afghanistan. The recent revival of the Taliban shows that western concepts of victory are very flimsy. A "victory" in late 2001 seems a long way off now. The Taliban may have been in power from 1996 for five years, but once ousted, they simply reverted back to their previous guise as the insurgency that defeated the Soviets in the 1980s. Having regrouped in Pakistan, they pose an even greater threat to regional stability. Bin Laden is not heard of, but he seems irrelevant, as the international jihadist movement has established its own momentum. Expect America's involvement in the Afghan war to take a dangerous twist in the next chapter.

Another near certainty for the region is a change in political leadership in Israel. A Likud win in Israel's elections raises the possibility of renewed war with Hezbollah and military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran will achieve nuclear capability in the next two years, according to Israeli intelligence, so war may be inevitable regardless of who leads Israel. The long delayed full scale invasion of Gaza will probably happen as well, regardless of who leads Israel. Linked to America's destiny closely, the relationship between new leaders in both countries, will be critical. Presidents have regularly been well received in Israel, mostly because the said President has gone out of his way to appear pro Israeli. But Israeli public opinion is unsure about Obama and what approach he will adopt. A new US-Israel relationship could emerge, but many have argued it will slip back into the traditional mould.

Some slightly less certain but equally important possibilities for the region revolve around economic factors. The region's wealth has clearly developed at a rapid rate, but now with this growth, influence might follow. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are the powerhouses using oil wealth to not only expand international economic influence - the rise of sovereign wealth funds being the main vehicle - but through significant investment in education and technology - the region is developing its own soft power. Dubai is a centre for experimental architecture, science and medicine research - providing an intellectual export to go with the energy one. Talent may also be drawn into the region, lured by advanced educational institutions flushed with investment and superior facilities.

So that's what could be reasonably expected for the next few years, there are certainly more probabilities and there will also be the odd surprise. Could Syria finally come in from the cold? Could a democratic forces gain momentum in say Lebanon or Pakistan? Another rollercoaster chapter for the region. But in this next stage, events will also lead to new thinking.

The mistakes and misadventures of the last seven years have now spurred a new wave of intellectual output. How the West should interact with the Middle East (and the rest of the world for that matter) is analysed in some new groundbreaking works. Robert Kagan, neoconservative writer and adviser to John McCain, in his new book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, sees the Middle East being absorbed into a larger geopolitical game with the democratic West facing the autocratic East - Russia and China. The extremist forces in the region dedicated to tradition that reject modernity, argues Kagan, such as Al-Qaeda and Iranian Mullahs, simply cannot win. Neither the outside world with such a vested interest in the region, nor the peoples themselves, will allow this backward path to happen.

On an even broader scale, Philip Bobbitt's Terror and Consent sets out the landscape for the 21st century, as states divide between those of terror or consent. With this new paradigm must also follow a re-evaluation of the war on terror to date, which has been misconceived and mismanaged. Islam is not the issue but rather shifts in how states and warfare are linked. Like Kagan, the Middle East is a focus for the 21st century conflict, but certainly will not be the sole arena. But critically America's role in the region and the world may be diminishing - the view of Fareed Zakaria in his book The Post American World. The threats that have emerged from the Middle East, argues Zakaria, are essentially exaggerated. Once American policymakers realise this, they will see the folly of involvement in the region.

Lebanon - the enemy within

The recent talks between Lebanon's leaders in Doha has merely ushered in a lull, and whether a civil war or long uneasy ceasefire follows is an unanswerable and complex question. The urgent gathering that followed Hezbollah's mock coup last month has presented an uneasy calm - requiring conflict management not conflict resolution. This was the consensus at the Frontline club's panel discussion on Lebanon's future last week. Not only is Lebanon's complex internal fabric highly flammable, but an explosion of violence could equally be provoked by its neighbours Syria and Israel and the more distant meddlers Iran and the United States. A country that is only slightly smaller than Jamaica and Kosovo, is a battleground for all the major players in the region. Like Kosovo Lebanon is on the fault line. Christian post colonial remnants battles the emerging so-called Shia crescent. Cutting across this split are Lebanon's Sunni population still influenced by Syria and an anxious Israel seeking to protect its northern border at all costs. The root of this current imbroglio could be the inconclusive Taif agreement in 1989, Israel's invasion in 1982, the initial eruption of violence in 1975 or the anachronistic overtly confessional constitution drawn up in 1943. But the history - although critical - will come later.

All sides made concessions at Doha, including Hezbollah. But the Shia movement ultimately received what it wanted, negotiating from a position of strength, gaining greater cabinet representation. The fighting that erupted in May and the following deal proved several facts. That the Lebanese army is no match for Hezbollah; the neighbouring powers, especially Syria, do not wish for civil war; that the United States is a peripheral player in this crisis; and the Arab states for once invested political capital in a Middle East peace agreement. So crisis averted and some stability might be on the horizon. But the possibility of violence is there on all fronts.

Hezbollah, designated a terrorist organization by the US, Israel obviously, and many other western states, has real political representation. Unacceptable to the US and funded by Iran, Hezbollah presents Lebanon's gravest problem. That is a fact, regardless of whether you are pro or anti Hezbollah. The movement has rearmed to its levels pre 2006 war, its support has galvanised and returned. The spark for the recent trouble was an incursion against Hezbollah's communications network and the sacking of an airport security chief with alleged links to the group. This network - revealed in its full extent last month - shows the grip Hezbollah has on Lebanon and its position as a state within a state. Dominance in the Bekaa valley and the coastline puts them in a strong strategic position. It also raises the vision among western intelligence agencies of Iranian presence on the eastern Mediterranean.

Israel's fear of Iranian influence on its northern border only grows as Hezbollah strengthens. Historians may debate whether Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon created Hezbollah or whether a Shia political force would inevitably have developed, given the Shias lowly position in Lebanese society. But Iranian influence put resistance to Israel in south Lebanon or in all of historic Palestine at the heart of Hezbollah's ideology. This opposition led to a painful guerrilla war in the 1990s until Israel's withdrawal in 2000. The 2006 war was merely a messy draw and the long awaited replay will most likely be even more inconclusive and bloody. Especially as both Iran and the United States have reiterated their material support on both sides.

The outcome in Lebanon will depend on whether US-Iranian relations improve. With a new presidency next year, things could improve. Then again, Lebanon like Iraq could be the spark for the much feared wider showdown between America, Iran and Israel. But for Lebanon, local issues are always more important than the geopolitical games it seems to be dragged into. The concept of Lebanon needs re-examination, its constitution is long overdue reforming and political flexibility must be paramount for leaders on all sides. Bottom up solutions as always. The Lebanese are tired of the Middle East's political roundabout. Hezbollah's presence is problematic, but despite Israel and America's opposition, they have shown that they are impossible to ignore.

One man's oil price, is another man's....

The discovery of oil could be regarded in the same breath as the discovery of fire, electricity or nuclear technology, but none of these human revelations has created the division and conflict that the black gold has inflicted on the world. Oil has fed greed the world over, led to countless wars and set in motion a potentially unstoppable environmental catastrophe. Without oil our standards of living might not be as high and access to essentials may not be as instantaneous, but we could have adapted. Oil has enabled transportation to move at what would have seemed galactic pace only a few hundred years ago, but do we need to get across the globe in such a short space of time. Electrical communications may make physical communication - that is actual travel - irrelevant one day. Oil has been responsible for creating the world as it is, but would an alternative world been worse? It's debatable. So oil has achieved short term gratification but long term damage.

In 1973 the West's reliance of oil for the first time was laid bare. Finally the Achilles heal had been exposed. And this was only after a limited one month embargo and a price increase to a mere $11.65 per barrel. But the West managed to tame the Saudis and consequently OPEC through weapons and various other backhanders and oil prices stabilised (although they increased to $30-40 per barrel for much of the 1980s and 1990s), allowing sustained growth. But this Achilles heal is laid bare once more. The Middle East is floating on immense oil revenues, it is an architects paradise and is now providing finance back to its customers just to reiterate its economic clout. So for this part of the world, higher oil prices mean even greater wealth. And to rub it, petrol prices in the Middle East are decreasing.

Oil is a finite resource, so unless the Middle East diversifies (which it is doing through education, finance and science), it will be washed up in a century. Likewise, but more immediately, the West needs to wake up to the reality of a limited resource and shift its economy to non-petroleum reliance. Predictably this has been left too late, so now it will only be achieved the hard way and may well lead to violence, social unrest, etc. Now the West are not the only consumers, India and China, with a combined population closing on the 3 billion mark, are radically altering the market.

Organized Chaos

The tide of globalisation was unstoppable in the 1990s and whilst free trade benefited the Western world with an enhanced communication networks and higher standards of living, the downside - exploitation of the Third world, vast disparities in the distribution of wealth, unchecked and corrupt power to corporates - has been clearly evident. But even worse consequences have emergedv - terrorism and crime. Transnational terrorism has benefited from globalisation rather than being caused by it, but organized crime has evolved and mixed with this new globalised world into a hybrid operating at new unprecedented and dangerous levels. Journalist and historian Misha Glenny investigates this post globalisation criminal underworld in his new book McMafia. Having reported first on the collapse of communism in 1989 and then the Balkan wars 1991-1995, Glenny has witnessed, first hand, the rise of Eastern European thugs, gangsters and wrestlers to the form a new elite mafia.
The mix of rampant capitalism, corruption, unscrupulous morality and plain old brutality underpinned the rise of gangs in Serbia, Russia and Bulgaria in the early 1990s. Glenny identifies the imposing of an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1991 as a significant moment. The republic was not short of weaponry, but this gave every incentive for smugglers and gangs to create sophisticated plans to circumvent the embargo and get rich in the process. Another factor - following the collapse of communism - was the mass dismissal of intelligence services personnel who had enforced the Iron curtain's will. Individuals trained in surveillance, assassination and deception were perfect recruits for criminal gangs. Another key factor that Glenny explains - is the unbreakable link between politics and organized crime in the region. This was brutally demonstrated by the 2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjic, who had mixed with organized criminals and relied on their support on his rise to office. His death followed a pledge to crack down on these groups.

States of decline

The world has witnessed several seismic shifts in the last eight years, but these transformations to the international order have fallen beyond the traditional realm of the state system and in particular the leading Western powers plus China, India and Russia. Control is moving beyond the capacity of governments, statesman, alliances or treaties. The state system is becoming a redundant order – power has spread to every corner of the globe. We live now in a world where economic fluctuations are so complex that unitary political control is impossible. Climate change has reached unstoppable levels and measures taken now will only turn the catastrophe into disaster. Connected to these environmental forces is the rapid depletion of earth's natural resources as oil, water, gas are devoured with little thought of the long term impact. Finally religious forces have been revitalised in this period - both for the devout and the non-believer - with governments pushing extremists further but also unable to successfully defend the secularists. In this 21st century structure, transnational and virtual actors hold the cards. Governments can favour interest groups - corporates, secularists or scientists for example - but for the most part they are simply observers powerless to control what is occurring.

This perspective of international relations is embryonic though and has subsumed the world so quickly that it is as yet undefined. But before it becomes the norm, the old state structure is making a comeback and hopes to stamp its authority on this amorphic upstart. Although in a state of flux, America will - once a new President is elected - look to revive its traditional hegemonic position. Russia has had enough of the doldrums and is looking for new arenas and cause celebres to assert itself. Added to this Cold war redux is the rise of India and China, who are slowly transferring manpower and natural resources into economic, military and cultural influence. The EU is suffering from years of identity crisis but still as an economic bloc surpasses the other superstates GDP and has centuries of culture to rely on.

But what about the wars in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation or civil wars in Africa and South America? Will these necessitate state structures to be resolved? These will continue to rage and draw in the major powers - but just as during the Cold war - will not alter the international system. Iraq like Vietnam has severely bruised America, but it still maintains it world status. Emerging forces like Iran will try and stake their claim to the top table, but years of economic neglect and a chaotic political scene limit any threat to the established order, regardless of recent cosmic ambitions. Obviously a long and painful war in either Iraq or Afghanistan could seriously undermine America's position, likewise a nuclear armed Iran may well change the rules of the game, but simile other sleeping giants might emerge and others may regress. The traditional state system is trying to hang onto its position and still is very much calling the shots, but new emerging threats and dynamics are rapidly making state boundaries and their decision making irrelevant.

Take the global economy. The sub-prime mortgage crisis and ensuing credit crunch has led to record losses for investment banks, widespread nerves and falls in stock markets, and the possibility of a full blown US recession in 2008. The cuts in Federal Reserves rates will be government's opportunity to turn the tide. Economists and lawmakers worldwide have devised a host of recovery plans to stimulate economic growth, but the sense of powerlessness is widespread. Opposition politicians will seek to blame economic mismanagement, but governments have been one of several guilty parties. Mortgage brokers, bankers, consumers are also to blame. In this fully integrated globalised market economy, government's role has been reduced - advocates say for the better - but control has been sacrificed. In our new economic world order, investment bankers, hedge fund managers, even the local mortgage broker, is as significant player as the treasury official. Greater mobility of labour has reduced state economic control further.

Climate change is also a global issue that crosses state boundaries and is so potentially devastating that political differences seem irrelevant. The leading industrialised powers are constantly debating what environmental policies to adopt without losing any economic advantage, but this will seem fairly irrelevant once serious climate change effects follow. The conflict between cuts in emissions and economic growth is being played out in the current US-China relationship. America feels threatened by Chinese growth, so is not prepared to make economic sacrifices. China wants to continue its ascendancy. Both states will need to set aside their competiveness if global warming is to be slowed down. IPCC projections on the impact of climate change leave no continent untouched. China faces flooding and famine; India flooding and consequently disease; America will suffer from heat waves and coastal damage. When it comes to climate change – either the state system will evaporate as global co-operation becomes essential or state rivalry becomes more acute as the situation becomes more desperate. A similar case can be made for the threat of global pandemics. Global co-operation is essential – inter state rivalry would have devastating consequences. Influence would also shift to scientists and academics who generally act in transnational ways.

The depletion of the planet’s natural resources will also undermine the traditional state system. As resources become sparse, nations assume new geographical importance, strategic alliances will develop. Since 1973 oil producing states have challenged Western states economic dominance. The rise of the energy superpowers has been in parallel to the rise of influential oil companies. If energy resources or water supplies diminish then the state has less control. A government cannot always provide for these necessities. This is where the private sector steps in and overseas exploration (and exploitation) – although far from a new international concept – is developing further and increasingly transcending state boundaries with ease. A state’s own resources and sovereignty are threatened as importing state’s dependency increases. The global reach and influence of large corporates in industrialised nations can potentially create sub state systems in which cultural pockets thrive. The expat community in the Gulf has remained fairly isolated from the locals, although recent Chinese exploration in Africa has seen unlikely cultural ties develop. Chinese companies have little interest in diplomatic relations - Africa’s resources are the target, state dynamics are an after thought. The absence of any significant natural resource commodity exchange in Africa highlights the disparity between resource extraction and financial gain.

Since oil’s discovery, state sovereignty has been threatened. Foreign oil speculators exploited reserves, gathered oil revenues and left their host states under developed – Iran is a prime historical example. Nationalisation did follow, but the oil companies – the Seven Sisters having rebranded themselves - still managed to have to carry an overt influence in the oil producing states. Securing oil supplies has been a priority for America since the Carter doctrine. The establishment of aggressive global military strategies in oil rich regions and support of undemocratic regimes has secured supplies but state sovereignty has been compromised. But when it comes to oil, an inter state conflict is more likely than independent actions by non state actors. A war between China and the United States over oil could occur. An oil led Cold war or even a military conflict would re-establish – for the worse – the international traditional state system.

The final domain where the state system has lost its influence and been threatened is the realm of religious extremism. Transnational terrorism has existed since the late 1960s when state less Arab radicals launched their socialist tinged campaign against Israel and its supporters. International counterterrorism co-operation followed, but lagged behind the growth of Islamist tinged terrorism that expanded in the 1990s. Post 9/11, a renewed state system effort has been designed to counter international jihadism. But whilst jihadists share a common ideology and goals – the state system is fragmented, un-coordinated and often contradictory in its response. The battle against Islamist terrorism has employed actors usually beyond the grip of governments. Intelligence officials have recruited warlords, former radicals, and religious leaders as their proxies in shady espionage campaign. Establishing a link between states and terrorists was one of the first policies in the U.S. War on terror and was also one of the first mistakes. This might have been easier for foreign policy novices to understand, but it represented a fundamental misunderstanding of how terrorist groups had come to interact with their state hosts in the preceding decade. The consequences of this policy have been played out in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon.

The state seeks control, through the use of traditional mechanisms: law enforcement, military capability, central fiscal or public policy. But these tools are static – the state inevitably sticks to what it knows. This leads to predictable and often ineffective responses to the new threats and challenges of the 21st century. The individual is proving more adept and in tune with this age. The power of the non-state actor over the state is becoming clearer. This might range from the citizen journalist, the academic, the philanthropist on the benign side. It includes the terrorist cell, the corrupt oligarch and unscrupulous financier on the negative. Either way, states aren’t what they were and in - who knows - ten years may evaporate altogether, leading to a new international relations era.

Endless cycles...

The world's most intractable conflict visits London this week as journalists from both sides put their arguments to the capital's lecture circuit. Palestinian Zaki Chehab, political editor of newspaper Al-Hayat, spoke of his close contacts with the Hamas leadership, as described in his acclaimed Inside Hamas. And editor of the Jerusalem Post David Horovitz presented the view from other side of the barbed wire fence. The backdrop is the desperate and dramatic events in Gaza this week, where a blockade has brought further misery but has been relieved across the Egyptian border as militants have destroyed parts of the fence.

The conclusion from both London events is that neither side is right or wrong - the solution will lie with those willing to compromise and probably through moderate politically secure leaders. Unfortunately neither have such direction. Despite a PR coup for Hamas this week, they are still considered too extreme for anyone away from the Arab street. Abbas is constantly undermined by Hamas and is powerless in Gaza and increasingly across the West Bank. Olmert is under renewed pressure from his conduct of last year's Lebanon war via the Winograd report. But the Israeli political minefield means that his departure would have no guarantees of enhanced political leadership.


Chehab describes Hamas leaders as friends and moderates, describing his people as oppressed, dispossessed but prepared to suffer whatever it takes to achieve the dream of statehood. Whilst his journalistic credentials are admirable, he is let down by an inability to criticise his own leaders, failure to understand the ordinary Israeli's perspective, and a naivety towards the role of Iran. A sentiment no different to that on the ground. Horovitz represents mainstream Israeli society. This narrative states that the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza has been squandered by Hamas; all Israel wants is a partner for peace; unlike the Palestinians there are no illusions towards the role of Iran. Leaving aside the permanent restrictions on travel, economic sanctions, checkpoints and assassinations, Israel - says Horovitz - want nothing to do with Gaza. If the Qassam rockets were to cease, the blockade would end and negotiation could follow.

Unfortunately - as Chehab seems to confer - resistance is regarded as the legitimate right in whatever form that might be, and Hamas are simply responding to Israeli restrictions and pressure, rather than attacking Israel unprovoked. The break over the Egyptian border has now undermined Israel's siege tactics and given no reason for Hamas to discontinue Qassam attacks. Horovitz believes Israel does not know what it is doing. Its tactics haven't succeeded, so what next? The full scale invasion of Gaza has been hinted for months, but negotiation looks more likely than total war. Former members of the Israeli military establishment have called for talks with Hamas. But this is a long way off, hatred and distrust are currently too great. Whatever the path to peace is, Hamas - despite the efforts of Bush, Abbas and Olmert to sideline - is too strong and an unavoidable player in the crisis. Horovitz is obviously sceptical - Hamas' religious imperative means that negotiation and concession are against their nature. But hardline religious parties are also influential in Israel and concessions in Judea and Samaria are equally difficult to extract.

Fuelling the feudalism...

Political assassinations, government corruption, state of emergency rule and an ongoing guerrilla war have brought Pakistan to its knees. Under such pressure, life still goes on though and Pakistan's economy - having shown steady growth over the last decade - has yet to be infected by the widespread political turmoil. But a sudden downturn in Pakistan's economy could be the tipping point. The diversity of Pakistan's economy fuels this political discord - the military retain vast industrial assets reinforcing their stranglehold on the state; whilst poverty and the collapse of state education fills madrasas and bloats radical jihadist movements. Recent power shortages and creeping inflation are signs of an impending economic collapse. The economy is moving up the long list of issues for candidates to discuss at the much delayed election. As India booms next door, the middle classes become further disillusioned - the group that politicians ultimately appeal to in elections.


The feudal system - that empowers landowners in a close knit clan society - has been Pakistan's backbone since its inception. Agrarian holdings provide economic power for aristocrats, from which - through corruption - political and military power is derived. And now this tradition has spread to the military establishment. The seminal text by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa on this hidden industrial empire estimates that the military holds £10bn of assets, 12m acres of public land and a third of heavy manufacturing output. Whilst this infrastructure accumulates untold wealth for a cadre of generals - a national network of bakeries, banks, insurance companies and universities funded by the army benefits Pakistani society. This omnipresent role has been accepted as part of Pakistan since partition and Pakistanis clearly benefit from the stability provided by such a behemoth. But since 2001, American aid has gone directly to reinforcing the military's dominance, undermining moves towards democratic economic transparency and perpetuating a culture of corruption and feudalism.

The black economy also plays a vital role in arming and supporting violent Islamist groups' war against the state. The hawala money transfer system has enabled an influx of funds from the Gulf and Europe. Despite efforts by Pakistan and American treasury intelligence to outlaw such transfers, Pakistan's porous financial system and foreign donations disguised as charitable gifts make prevention impossible. So this source of funds - with additional finances from the opium trade - leaves militant groups relatively unaffected by economic downturns. Recruitment to militant groups via madrasas also benefits from poverty, as through their dual position as welfare centres, religious schools provide shelter to the needy. Further poverty will maintain this flow of militant recruits, but the situation is already bad.

Bhutto suffers the inevitable

Having survived an assassination attempt on her first day and facing physical and political threats from all sides, Benazir Bhutto's return to Pakistan has ended in tragedy and sadly an inevitable assassination. With such a pressing Islamist threat, the Zia old guard still flexing their influence, and great uncertainty over how much control Musharraf actually has, this conclusion to Bhutto's career and undoubtedly the start of a new violent chapter for Pakistan is not surprising. Bhutto was without doubt a corrupt and feudal leader who had been unable to state a clear vision for the future since her return, but she was probably the second lesser of the four evils.

Two conclusions are clear from this assassination in Rawalpindi. Musharraf has no control over internal security and his state of emergency tactic of arresting moderates has clearly backfired. Second the Islamists are clearly in the ascendancy, they have penetrated internal state security apparatus with the capability to attack any politician regardless of their security detail. There is also the more alarming prospect of a return to the Zia-Islamist alliance of the 1980s. Zia ordered the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Rawalpindi, a garrison town, might be considered one of the more secure Pakistani cities but it's military and ISI presence may not be a coincidence. Rawalpindi has also witnessed several bomb attacks over the last few years, including an assassination attempt on Musharraf in December 2003 and recent suicide attacks against the military.

Where does this leave Pakistan? Firstly Musharraf's response will be closely monitored, especially those who accuse him of collusion in this attack. Then the elections are due to occur early next year, can any candidate feel safe when campaigning, will Islamists escalate their campaign emboldened by this success, will elections actually take place? Musharraf has evaporating support in Washington, Sharif has failed to convince, meanwhile America's ultimate concern - Al Qaeda and neo-Taliban forces along the Afghanistan border - can only feel stronger after this assassination. Bhutto was unequivocal in her support for a US onslaught in the tribal areas if elected. The Islamist violence that erupted after the storming of the Red Mosque has continued with relentless ferocity and Pakistan is now close to if not over the edge.

Tea with the enemy

In the secretive, delicate and ruthless covert arena, hard-nosed negotiations with adversaries occur regularly. Official admittance is often rare though, as it undermines public political statements, puts moderates (those usually doing the talking) at risk from extremists, and is often far from productive. Just as British intelligence negotiated with Irish republicans prior to an official agreement, Israelis liaised with Fatah, and the CIA have cultivated contacts with Sunni insurgents. Today's reports of MI6 meetings with the Taliban is not news therefore, not in terms of intelligence services historical activities nor in light of the current conflict in Afghanistan. This story has moved to the political level as British domestic opposition accuse Gordon Brown of backtracking on a previous promise not to negotiate with the Taliban; and Afghan authorities, having just expelled two diplomats, are looking but failing to convince the world that progress is being made. American commanders have also expressed dissatisfaction with the very idea of negotiations with an extremist movement that harboured Al-Qaeda militants - vital to the group's rise in the 1990s.


MI6, the British army, the UN and various other players in Afghanistan's latest great but not very gratifying game is without an end in sight. A war that appeared concluded in early 2002 has come back with a vengeance this year. MI6 are merely continuing a long held role and manipulating long held assets. SIS played an auxiliary role during the Afghan war against the Soviets, had a deep and valuable relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud in the following decade, and were at the forefront of the UK-US invasion in October 2001. Neither SIS nor the British government have verified these recent reports and will not do so.

Call it pragmatism or the product of an increasingly intractable conflict, as up to 10,000 Taliban insurgents in a six year plus war are forcing alternative and radical solutions. Splitting the Taliban between an acceptable indigenous faction and the hard line foreign mixed cadre could be the strategy behind MI6's liaison. The increasing foreign influence adds urgency to any possible deal with indigenous militias. The rise of the Pakistani neo-Taliban across the border - allied closely to the Afghan Taliban leadership - has narrowed options further. Suddenly NATO - despite the recent re-capture of Musa Qala - is in a position of weakness as the threat has been trebled by expanding militancy on either side.

Iranian estimate or guesstimate..

The drum is back in the cupboard for the time being. The drum beat of war that has become louder and faster for the last year has been knocked out of its stride. This week's National Intelligence Assessment (NIE) downplays the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme: "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program"; as of June 2007 the intelligence agencies "assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program". Iran still poses a threat, being "technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015," with "the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." The pressure seems to have abated and this volte-face appears to be an apparent triumph for the diplomatic voices of Britain and Europe. Russia and China will use this revision as a justification for their caution and resist stricter sanctions. The hawks in the Bush administration have had their march to Tehran cancelled, temporarily, but will there be a rapprochement with the long standing foe? On the evidence of today's White House conference, this seems unlikely. Iran continues to antagonise America (and Israel) in a variety of ways. Any grand bargain now still implies acceptance of Iran's behaviour and this seems inconceivable given the rhetoric of recent months. A clearer understanding of the Bush administrations animosity and intransigence towards Iran is provided by the fact that this estimate was drafted one year previous. Verbal assaults have been used to discourage Iranian meddling in Iraq, maintain Bush's "war president" status, and scare Democrats from any dovish position, in the knowledge that the threat isn't that great. The intelligence agencies have shown their hand early to avoid a repeat of the Iraq war build up - where the inevitability of war shaped intelligence, not the reverse. A collision course between Iran and Bush is still a route, but the CIA, NSA or anyone of the other 14 agencies are not providing the map this time. When neocons like Robert Kagan - an intellectual architect of the Iraq war - advise the administration to talk to Iran, the game seems up, a new era of peace will surely be upon us! Unfortunately we have two radical unpredictable and ignorant leaders on either side, who are more than capable of snatching defeat from the jaws of an acceptable score draw.

Iran's leadership will react with predictable self-satisfaction. A role exists for the Gulf Arab states - having concluded the recent Gulf Co-operation Council meeting in Qatar - facing a diminished Iranian threat, as a possible bridge between the Great Satan and the Mad Mullahs. The Democrats are refocusing the domestic debate with diplomacy as the sole elixir, putting to bed neoconservative militarism. But Bush probably would have gone to war against Iraq with or without credible intel, and Iran - as the estimate does state - still has the capability to go nuclear, so Ayatollahs lounging on Texan ranches or George and Laura admiring the mosques of Qom are far off visions at the moment I'm afraid.

Green Dragons' Den....

There was no Theo Pathitis wit, Duncan Bannatyne canniness or a Peter Jones put-down and only one wacky entrepreneur, rather serious products for a real global problem with an appropriately informed panel. The Green Dragons' Den - Dragons' Lair to avoid infringing IPR - was no less entertaining and certainly more inspiring, with sustainable products being pitched to a panel mixed with venture capitalists, academics and journos. With only seven minutes to convince, there was little opportunity to expand on the better products, but was a saviour for some badly thought out rambles that made up the numbers. The prize on offer - not a multimillionaire's cash or nause - but simply one month's PR. A couple of websites encouraging localism, democratic empowerment and sustainable green economics were credible but not going to change embedded bad habits. More radical ideas such as an extensive network of food tunnels around the UK and bio-reactors based on Australian lake deposits became bogged down and over elaborate, although the intention was benign. A bizarre plan to convert email - telephone booths into recycling photo booths was wackiest of the night. But it was the technological products that had the longest shelf life. A rechargeable battery that fitted into a USB port and PC energy saving software were up and running products that probably didn't need PR. Carbon 8 systems - a process that uses accelerated carbon technology to treat contaminated soils and waste - was the most innovative product of the night and got my vote. These entrepreneurs are at the forefront of the environmental battle against climate change and are shaping sustainable futures. Hopefully the next event will have a cash incentive above some simple PR.

http://environment.meetup.com/302/calendar/6770530/

South Asia’s militarists

South Asia is in the grip of a dual crisis - neighbours Iran and Pakistan face invasion and implosion respectively. The latest can be summarized as this: Iran is accused of developing a nuclear weapons programme, exporting terror and generating regional instability; Pakistan has a nuclear weapons programme, has exported and currently is an epicentre of terror, regarded by the West as a vital ally, but now faces an unpredictable internal political crisis. Both countries have arrived at these current states through dramatic upheaval over the last thirty years, but specifically, two individuals Reza Shah Pahlavi and General Zia ul-haq were critical players in this process. It would be easy to criticise the American foreign policy that supported these two regional strongmen, as part of its anti Soviet geopolitical strategy. The lack of foresight and application of realpolitik is a widely distributed critique and not without merit. But more importantly both dictators thrived in post colonial environments, where nationalism, industrialisation and militarism catapulted their respective states into revolution and division. South Asia’s desire to re-assert itself against the West was a stronger dynamic in shaping today’s predicament than misguided American foreign policy.

American support undoubtedly contributed to both leaders dominance. The Shah was considered by his opponents as America’s puppet, although he would gain the upper hand in the relationship after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. General Zia seizure of power – including the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – drew American criticism, but the Pakistani leader re-positioned his country as a vital weapon against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. American aid provided the basis for industrialisation for both countries, Iran in the 1960s from the Johnson administration, Pakistan in the 1980s from Carter then Reagan. Arms were the pivot of the dependency. Unprecedented volumes of military equipment were sold to Iran following Nixon’s 1972 carte blanche in exchange for oil revenues; Pakistan acted as the CIA’s conduit, supplying and training the Afghan mujahedin whilst building its own military capacity at the same time. In the post Vietnam era both nations benefited from a relocation of American arms supplies, but it was the ambition of these two leaders that drove their military dictatorships. It was their ambitions that led in different ways to two highly volatile states, now regarded as preeminent international security threats.

The obvious similarity between these two is the critical role designated to them by American Cold War strategy to contain communism. The Shah feared Soviet influence from the early days of his rule, was restored to power by the CIA’s 1953 coup against perceived communist influence, established the brutal security service SAVAK to repress domestic communism, and built up a fearsome military arsenal to counter Soviet influence in Iraq and the Gulf. Zia considered communism the preeminent ideological threat to Islam, cultivated relations with anti-communist hardliners in Washington, and directed Pakistan’s entire military resources in the Afghan-Soviet war.

Domestically both leaders consolidated their power through expansive economic development. The Shah pushed for stratospheric industrialisation fuelled by oil revenues, his ego, and Persian nationalism. Zia presided over modest growth in comparison - seven percent annually - but this development favoured the elites, the military class and Zia political allies. Whilst the Shah used Iran’s natural resource for development, Zia relied on Gulf and American aid. Corruption and economic mismanagement characterised both regimes, eventually creating widespread popular opposition.

The critical constant is Islam, but in totally opposing ways. The Shah acknowledged Shia Islam as part of Persian culture, but presented Pahlavi nationalism as preceding Islam and by implication superior. His extravagances, absolutism and, critically, alliance with the United States alienated the Shia clergy. By focusing on Marxist opposition, the Shia infrastructure – led by Khomeini – was free to develop, laying the path for Islamic revolution. Zia had seen how the power of Islam in Iran shaped politics, so sought to avoid the Shah’s mistakes. Once Zia had seized power, he embarked on an extensive Islamization programme, turning against the grain of Pakistani secular culture, imposing strict Sharia law, restructuring the economy to Islamic precepts, and elevating political party Jamaat e Islami to a central role. Pakistan received vast donations from Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East to establish madrasas and build mosques. Zia encouraged foreign support for both the Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s own Islamic renaissance. But ultimately the consequence of the Shah’s ambivalence and Zia’s proselytizing was the same – the growth of militant Islamism.

The second devastating legacy left by these two autocrats was the proliferation of nuclear technology. The Shah’s nuclear programme – assisted by Kissinger from 1975 - was short-lived and dismantled by Khomeini after 1979, but the infrastructure and expertise plus the very concept of an Iranian bomb remained. Zia’s contribution to South Asia’s nuclear arms race was clearer. Building on the programme established by Bhutto in the early 1970s, Zia pursued an active nuclear agenda – led by AQ Khan – that was ignored by the American leadership, for the sake of preserving Pakistan’s role against the greater Soviet threat. The balance between containment and proliferation always swung to the former in America’s Cold War policy.

Similarities continue in how they managed relations with the West. Both were opportunists, adept at exploiting American geopolitical interests against the backdrop of Cold war policy. The Shah played up the Soviet threat across Iran’s north border, exploited Nixon’s weak foreign policy position through 1972 and 1973, and ultimately received the freedom to purchase any military hardware needed and pursue a hawkish oil policy. Zia likewise seized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to re-establish relations in Washington and improve his poor international reputation, then exploited Reagan’s hardline against communism to up the military aid.

American arms policy and pursuit a wider geopolitical interests are commonly cited as factors in the region’s transformation in the last two decades of the Cold war, but it was the extremism that developed during both reigns that dominated. Khomeini’s militant rhetoric was inadvertently cultivated by the Shah’s excesses and American alliance, whilst Zia directly cultivated Islamic extremism, creating prototypes for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Just as the Shah pursued his pro Western secular rule to the end – despite fierce clerical opposition; Zia continued his support for the most radical elements in the Afghan jihad - especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – until his death.

The consequence of such autocratic behaviour differed in gestation. The Shah’s excesses exploded in Iran at the end of his reign; Zia’s legacy emerged again with a vengeance in the second year of this century in New York. Both leaders left a legacy of resentment, division and brutality. Critically both leaders used American foreign policy and military aid to reinforce their own positions, and while doing so, creating the impression that America only saw South Asian states as pawns against the Soviets. The anti-West sentiment that now exists in South Asia is as much down to the Shah and Zia’s thirst for militarism and its consequences, as it was from American foreign policy.

United Kingdoms of hypocrisy

Gordon Brown's claims to be a champion of democracy and courage will again be examined tomorrow. In his one-to-one meeting with King Abdullah II, Brown will have the opportunity to raise the question of human rights in the kingdom. Will he? Well bottler Brown created some distance from Bush shortly after taking office, but has not pursued a clear Iraq policy since. He attempted to take the lead during the recent Burma uprising, but this has slipped down the agenda after his snap election fiasco. The neocons are raising the pressure on Iran with military strikes closer than ever, but Brown again has failed to set out a clear British position. So during this completely unnecessary and shameful state visit, Brown has the opportunity to raise beheading, torture (of British subjects as well as countless Saudis), the absence of any democracy, zero advancement in equal gender rights, and the exporting of extremist Wahhabist literature to Britain and ideology across the Middle East. Will he? No probably not. Like his predecessor, his definition of an ethical foreign policy will fall flat under the slightest scrutiny or when money is involved. Through the subtle nuances of diplomatic politeness and blind translation, any attempt at raising HR will fail, the Saudis will simply ignore it or attempt another blackmail, in a similar mode to the BAE investigation. The Saudi royalty may be ignorant, misogynistic, anti semitic and extreme, but they are not stupid. Britain's vulnerability (real and perceived) to losing the Saudi relationship, has been exploited by the guardians of Islam's holiest sites for years to build more palaces and purchase more hi-tech (unused) military hardware.

The idea that Saudi Arabia is a vital ally in the war on terror also fails to convince. Firstly the Saudis were in the large part responsible for the extremist Islam's rise and provided 15 hijackers to prove it. Second, its efforts to prevent jihadists crossing to Iraq have been non-existent - the fear of an Iraqi Shia force is too great a danger to prevent the bombers. Although Saudi Arabian intelligence funded and trained Afghan mujahedin in the 1980s, its presence in South Asia has faded since 2001, when it ceased to be one of the Taliban's three supporters in the world. The recent terrorist threats to Britain emerged deep inside Pakistan's north west frontier not the Gulf.

A blind post-imperial oil-driven foreign policy has dug Britain a hole, in which we are unable to have honest relations with repugnant allies. Hypocrisy still rules the waves and, whether it's Brown or Cameron in charge, will continue to do so.

See also
http://www.johannhari.com/archive/article.php?id=1202

On the edge...

With an eerie sense of inevitability, Benazir Bhutto's return to Pakistan after an eight year exile turned into one of the country's worst acts of terrorism, with up to 130 people killed. Pakistan has taken one more step towards civil war, between the most likely suspects - militant Islamists - and pro democracy forces. Bhutto has promised to reinstall democracy in a pro American government. This statement in itself is easily enough to incur the wrath of Taleban linked militants and members of the intelligence services (ISI). She also stated her intent to up the battle against Al-Qaida in Pakistan's north west frontier. Forget Iraq, Pakistan is now the front in the global war against militant Islam. Al-Qaida have stated their intention to overthrow Musharraf's government, the Taleban are resurgent and now united with Pakistan's equivalent, and the military retain, possibly expand still, the country's nuclear arsenal. The stakes could not be higher.

Burma - The Lotus Revolution?

The world holds its breath, while world leaders and diplomats discuss the situation in Burma. At what point does the world do anything? Obviously this is a domestic situation and there is a limit to what can be done, but if violence does break out - will the world act? I am sure that various intelligence, diplomatic and unclassifiable figures are working behind the scenes here, but on the surface it seems like we are simply reacting, waiting for something bad to happen and will wheel out some condemnations and sanctions that will make little difference to the insane generals who rule this country. For once a good old fashioned coup - a la Iran 53 - might be acceptable.

It's great that David Milliband makes statements on News24, but this will make little difference to the junta. The pressure needs to put on China first, as they understand that repression is simply unacceptable. It's great that Gordon Brown wrote a book on Aung San Suu Kyi but what will actually do, now this critical moment has arrived. Forget all the other foreign policy issues for the Brown rule, this will be the true test. It also seems astonishing that whilst the UN Security council meet, members countries retain investments there (i.e. French oil company Total), providing economic support to the regime. You either have an ethical CSR programme or you don't. You may oppose forced labour and be aware of local human rights issues, but that is contradicted by actual investment there, which inevitable feeds into the coffers of the corrupt regime.

Limited information is seeping through from Burma, but critically with various media available, any repression will not be kept in the dark. Whether the outcome resembles a Velvet revolution or another 1988 / Tianamen square massacre is unclear. Limited democratic reform could be the solution, if brokered by China. This would establish momentum for eventual democracy. But the tight grip and paranoid outlook of the junta makes compromise unlikely. Mind you, has there ever been a Buddhist revolution?

http://www.burmanet.org/news/
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php