The discovery of oil could be regarded in the same breath as the discovery of fire, electricity or nuclear technology, but none of these human revelations has created the division and conflict that the black gold has inflicted on the world. Oil has fed greed the world over, led to countless wars and set in motion a potentially unstoppable environmental catastrophe. Without oil our standards of living might not be as high and access to essentials may not be as instantaneous, but we could have adapted. Oil has enabled transportation to move at what would have seemed galactic pace only a few hundred years ago, but do we need to get across the globe in such a short space of time. Electrical communications may make physical communication - that is actual travel - irrelevant one day. Oil has been responsible for creating the world as it is, but would an alternative world been worse? It's debatable. So oil has achieved short term gratification but long term damage.
In 1973 the West's reliance of oil for the first time was laid bare. Finally the Achilles heal had been exposed. And this was only after a limited one month embargo and a price increase to a mere $11.65 per barrel. But the West managed to tame the Saudis and consequently OPEC through weapons and various other backhanders and oil prices stabilised (although they increased to $30-40 per barrel for much of the 1980s and 1990s), allowing sustained growth. But this Achilles heal is laid bare once more. The Middle East is floating on immense oil revenues, it is an architects paradise and is now providing finance back to its customers just to reiterate its economic clout. So for this part of the world, higher oil prices mean even greater wealth. And to rub it, petrol prices in the Middle East are decreasing.
Oil is a finite resource, so unless the Middle East diversifies (which it is doing through education, finance and science), it will be washed up in a century. Likewise, but more immediately, the West needs to wake up to the reality of a limited resource and shift its economy to non-petroleum reliance. Predictably this has been left too late, so now it will only be achieved the hard way and may well lead to violence, social unrest, etc. Now the West are not the only consumers, India and China, with a combined population closing on the 3 billion mark, are radically altering the market.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Organized Chaos
The tide of globalisation was unstoppable in the 1990s and whilst free trade benefited the Western world with an enhanced communication networks and higher standards of living, the downside - exploitation of the Third world, vast disparities in the distribution of wealth, unchecked and corrupt power to corporates - has been clearly evident. But even worse consequences have emergedv - terrorism and crime. Transnational terrorism has benefited from globalisation rather than being caused by it, but organized crime has evolved and mixed with this new globalised world into a hybrid operating at new unprecedented and dangerous levels. Journalist and historian Misha Glenny investigates this post globalisation criminal underworld in his new book McMafia. Having reported first on the collapse of communism in 1989 and then the Balkan wars 1991-1995, Glenny has witnessed, first hand, the rise of Eastern European thugs, gangsters and wrestlers to the form a new elite mafia.
The mix of rampant capitalism, corruption, unscrupulous morality and plain old brutality underpinned the rise of gangs in Serbia, Russia and Bulgaria in the early 1990s. Glenny identifies the imposing of an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1991 as a significant moment. The republic was not short of weaponry, but this gave every incentive for smugglers and gangs to create sophisticated plans to circumvent the embargo and get rich in the process. Another factor - following the collapse of communism - was the mass dismissal of intelligence services personnel who had enforced the Iron curtain's will. Individuals trained in surveillance, assassination and deception were perfect recruits for criminal gangs. Another key factor that Glenny explains - is the unbreakable link between politics and organized crime in the region. This was brutally demonstrated by the 2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjic, who had mixed with organized criminals and relied on their support on his rise to office. His death followed a pledge to crack down on these groups.
The mix of rampant capitalism, corruption, unscrupulous morality and plain old brutality underpinned the rise of gangs in Serbia, Russia and Bulgaria in the early 1990s. Glenny identifies the imposing of an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1991 as a significant moment. The republic was not short of weaponry, but this gave every incentive for smugglers and gangs to create sophisticated plans to circumvent the embargo and get rich in the process. Another factor - following the collapse of communism - was the mass dismissal of intelligence services personnel who had enforced the Iron curtain's will. Individuals trained in surveillance, assassination and deception were perfect recruits for criminal gangs. Another key factor that Glenny explains - is the unbreakable link between politics and organized crime in the region. This was brutally demonstrated by the 2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjic, who had mixed with organized criminals and relied on their support on his rise to office. His death followed a pledge to crack down on these groups.
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
States of decline
The world has witnessed several seismic shifts in the last eight years, but these transformations to the international order have fallen beyond the traditional realm of the state system and in particular the leading Western powers plus China, India and Russia. Control is moving beyond the capacity of governments, statesman, alliances or treaties. The state system is becoming a redundant order – power has spread to every corner of the globe. We live now in a world where economic fluctuations are so complex that unitary political control is impossible. Climate change has reached unstoppable levels and measures taken now will only turn the catastrophe into disaster. Connected to these environmental forces is the rapid depletion of earth's natural resources as oil, water, gas are devoured with little thought of the long term impact. Finally religious forces have been revitalised in this period - both for the devout and the non-believer - with governments pushing extremists further but also unable to successfully defend the secularists. In this 21st century structure, transnational and virtual actors hold the cards. Governments can favour interest groups - corporates, secularists or scientists for example - but for the most part they are simply observers powerless to control what is occurring.
This perspective of international relations is embryonic though and has subsumed the world so quickly that it is as yet undefined. But before it becomes the norm, the old state structure is making a comeback and hopes to stamp its authority on this amorphic upstart. Although in a state of flux, America will - once a new President is elected - look to revive its traditional hegemonic position. Russia has had enough of the doldrums and is looking for new arenas and cause celebres to assert itself. Added to this Cold war redux is the rise of India and China, who are slowly transferring manpower and natural resources into economic, military and cultural influence. The EU is suffering from years of identity crisis but still as an economic bloc surpasses the other superstates GDP and has centuries of culture to rely on.
But what about the wars in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation or civil wars in Africa and South America? Will these necessitate state structures to be resolved? These will continue to rage and draw in the major powers - but just as during the Cold war - will not alter the international system. Iraq like Vietnam has severely bruised America, but it still maintains it world status. Emerging forces like Iran will try and stake their claim to the top table, but years of economic neglect and a chaotic political scene limit any threat to the established order, regardless of recent cosmic ambitions. Obviously a long and painful war in either Iraq or Afghanistan could seriously undermine America's position, likewise a nuclear armed Iran may well change the rules of the game, but simile other sleeping giants might emerge and others may regress. The traditional state system is trying to hang onto its position and still is very much calling the shots, but new emerging threats and dynamics are rapidly making state boundaries and their decision making irrelevant.
Take the global economy. The sub-prime mortgage crisis and ensuing credit crunch has led to record losses for investment banks, widespread nerves and falls in stock markets, and the possibility of a full blown US recession in 2008. The cuts in Federal Reserves rates will be government's opportunity to turn the tide. Economists and lawmakers worldwide have devised a host of recovery plans to stimulate economic growth, but the sense of powerlessness is widespread. Opposition politicians will seek to blame economic mismanagement, but governments have been one of several guilty parties. Mortgage brokers, bankers, consumers are also to blame. In this fully integrated globalised market economy, government's role has been reduced - advocates say for the better - but control has been sacrificed. In our new economic world order, investment bankers, hedge fund managers, even the local mortgage broker, is as significant player as the treasury official. Greater mobility of labour has reduced state economic control further.
Climate change is also a global issue that crosses state boundaries and is so potentially devastating that political differences seem irrelevant. The leading industrialised powers are constantly debating what environmental policies to adopt without losing any economic advantage, but this will seem fairly irrelevant once serious climate change effects follow. The conflict between cuts in emissions and economic growth is being played out in the current US-China relationship. America feels threatened by Chinese growth, so is not prepared to make economic sacrifices. China wants to continue its ascendancy. Both states will need to set aside their competiveness if global warming is to be slowed down. IPCC projections on the impact of climate change leave no continent untouched. China faces flooding and famine; India flooding and consequently disease; America will suffer from heat waves and coastal damage. When it comes to climate change – either the state system will evaporate as global co-operation becomes essential or state rivalry becomes more acute as the situation becomes more desperate. A similar case can be made for the threat of global pandemics. Global co-operation is essential – inter state rivalry would have devastating consequences. Influence would also shift to scientists and academics who generally act in transnational ways.
The depletion of the planet’s natural resources will also undermine the traditional state system. As resources become sparse, nations assume new geographical importance, strategic alliances will develop. Since 1973 oil producing states have challenged Western states economic dominance. The rise of the energy superpowers has been in parallel to the rise of influential oil companies. If energy resources or water supplies diminish then the state has less control. A government cannot always provide for these necessities. This is where the private sector steps in and overseas exploration (and exploitation) – although far from a new international concept – is developing further and increasingly transcending state boundaries with ease. A state’s own resources and sovereignty are threatened as importing state’s dependency increases. The global reach and influence of large corporates in industrialised nations can potentially create sub state systems in which cultural pockets thrive. The expat community in the Gulf has remained fairly isolated from the locals, although recent Chinese exploration in Africa has seen unlikely cultural ties develop. Chinese companies have little interest in diplomatic relations - Africa’s resources are the target, state dynamics are an after thought. The absence of any significant natural resource commodity exchange in Africa highlights the disparity between resource extraction and financial gain.
Since oil’s discovery, state sovereignty has been threatened. Foreign oil speculators exploited reserves, gathered oil revenues and left their host states under developed – Iran is a prime historical example. Nationalisation did follow, but the oil companies – the Seven Sisters having rebranded themselves - still managed to have to carry an overt influence in the oil producing states. Securing oil supplies has been a priority for America since the Carter doctrine. The establishment of aggressive global military strategies in oil rich regions and support of undemocratic regimes has secured supplies but state sovereignty has been compromised. But when it comes to oil, an inter state conflict is more likely than independent actions by non state actors. A war between China and the United States over oil could occur. An oil led Cold war or even a military conflict would re-establish – for the worse – the international traditional state system.
The final domain where the state system has lost its influence and been threatened is the realm of religious extremism. Transnational terrorism has existed since the late 1960s when state less Arab radicals launched their socialist tinged campaign against Israel and its supporters. International counterterrorism co-operation followed, but lagged behind the growth of Islamist tinged terrorism that expanded in the 1990s. Post 9/11, a renewed state system effort has been designed to counter international jihadism. But whilst jihadists share a common ideology and goals – the state system is fragmented, un-coordinated and often contradictory in its response. The battle against Islamist terrorism has employed actors usually beyond the grip of governments. Intelligence officials have recruited warlords, former radicals, and religious leaders as their proxies in shady espionage campaign. Establishing a link between states and terrorists was one of the first policies in the U.S. War on terror and was also one of the first mistakes. This might have been easier for foreign policy novices to understand, but it represented a fundamental misunderstanding of how terrorist groups had come to interact with their state hosts in the preceding decade. The consequences of this policy have been played out in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon.
The state seeks control, through the use of traditional mechanisms: law enforcement, military capability, central fiscal or public policy. But these tools are static – the state inevitably sticks to what it knows. This leads to predictable and often ineffective responses to the new threats and challenges of the 21st century. The individual is proving more adept and in tune with this age. The power of the non-state actor over the state is becoming clearer. This might range from the citizen journalist, the academic, the philanthropist on the benign side. It includes the terrorist cell, the corrupt oligarch and unscrupulous financier on the negative. Either way, states aren’t what they were and in - who knows - ten years may evaporate altogether, leading to a new international relations era.
This perspective of international relations is embryonic though and has subsumed the world so quickly that it is as yet undefined. But before it becomes the norm, the old state structure is making a comeback and hopes to stamp its authority on this amorphic upstart. Although in a state of flux, America will - once a new President is elected - look to revive its traditional hegemonic position. Russia has had enough of the doldrums and is looking for new arenas and cause celebres to assert itself. Added to this Cold war redux is the rise of India and China, who are slowly transferring manpower and natural resources into economic, military and cultural influence. The EU is suffering from years of identity crisis but still as an economic bloc surpasses the other superstates GDP and has centuries of culture to rely on.
But what about the wars in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation or civil wars in Africa and South America? Will these necessitate state structures to be resolved? These will continue to rage and draw in the major powers - but just as during the Cold war - will not alter the international system. Iraq like Vietnam has severely bruised America, but it still maintains it world status. Emerging forces like Iran will try and stake their claim to the top table, but years of economic neglect and a chaotic political scene limit any threat to the established order, regardless of recent cosmic ambitions. Obviously a long and painful war in either Iraq or Afghanistan could seriously undermine America's position, likewise a nuclear armed Iran may well change the rules of the game, but simile other sleeping giants might emerge and others may regress. The traditional state system is trying to hang onto its position and still is very much calling the shots, but new emerging threats and dynamics are rapidly making state boundaries and their decision making irrelevant.
Take the global economy. The sub-prime mortgage crisis and ensuing credit crunch has led to record losses for investment banks, widespread nerves and falls in stock markets, and the possibility of a full blown US recession in 2008. The cuts in Federal Reserves rates will be government's opportunity to turn the tide. Economists and lawmakers worldwide have devised a host of recovery plans to stimulate economic growth, but the sense of powerlessness is widespread. Opposition politicians will seek to blame economic mismanagement, but governments have been one of several guilty parties. Mortgage brokers, bankers, consumers are also to blame. In this fully integrated globalised market economy, government's role has been reduced - advocates say for the better - but control has been sacrificed. In our new economic world order, investment bankers, hedge fund managers, even the local mortgage broker, is as significant player as the treasury official. Greater mobility of labour has reduced state economic control further.
Climate change is also a global issue that crosses state boundaries and is so potentially devastating that political differences seem irrelevant. The leading industrialised powers are constantly debating what environmental policies to adopt without losing any economic advantage, but this will seem fairly irrelevant once serious climate change effects follow. The conflict between cuts in emissions and economic growth is being played out in the current US-China relationship. America feels threatened by Chinese growth, so is not prepared to make economic sacrifices. China wants to continue its ascendancy. Both states will need to set aside their competiveness if global warming is to be slowed down. IPCC projections on the impact of climate change leave no continent untouched. China faces flooding and famine; India flooding and consequently disease; America will suffer from heat waves and coastal damage. When it comes to climate change – either the state system will evaporate as global co-operation becomes essential or state rivalry becomes more acute as the situation becomes more desperate. A similar case can be made for the threat of global pandemics. Global co-operation is essential – inter state rivalry would have devastating consequences. Influence would also shift to scientists and academics who generally act in transnational ways.
The depletion of the planet’s natural resources will also undermine the traditional state system. As resources become sparse, nations assume new geographical importance, strategic alliances will develop. Since 1973 oil producing states have challenged Western states economic dominance. The rise of the energy superpowers has been in parallel to the rise of influential oil companies. If energy resources or water supplies diminish then the state has less control. A government cannot always provide for these necessities. This is where the private sector steps in and overseas exploration (and exploitation) – although far from a new international concept – is developing further and increasingly transcending state boundaries with ease. A state’s own resources and sovereignty are threatened as importing state’s dependency increases. The global reach and influence of large corporates in industrialised nations can potentially create sub state systems in which cultural pockets thrive. The expat community in the Gulf has remained fairly isolated from the locals, although recent Chinese exploration in Africa has seen unlikely cultural ties develop. Chinese companies have little interest in diplomatic relations - Africa’s resources are the target, state dynamics are an after thought. The absence of any significant natural resource commodity exchange in Africa highlights the disparity between resource extraction and financial gain.
Since oil’s discovery, state sovereignty has been threatened. Foreign oil speculators exploited reserves, gathered oil revenues and left their host states under developed – Iran is a prime historical example. Nationalisation did follow, but the oil companies – the Seven Sisters having rebranded themselves - still managed to have to carry an overt influence in the oil producing states. Securing oil supplies has been a priority for America since the Carter doctrine. The establishment of aggressive global military strategies in oil rich regions and support of undemocratic regimes has secured supplies but state sovereignty has been compromised. But when it comes to oil, an inter state conflict is more likely than independent actions by non state actors. A war between China and the United States over oil could occur. An oil led Cold war or even a military conflict would re-establish – for the worse – the international traditional state system.
The final domain where the state system has lost its influence and been threatened is the realm of religious extremism. Transnational terrorism has existed since the late 1960s when state less Arab radicals launched their socialist tinged campaign against Israel and its supporters. International counterterrorism co-operation followed, but lagged behind the growth of Islamist tinged terrorism that expanded in the 1990s. Post 9/11, a renewed state system effort has been designed to counter international jihadism. But whilst jihadists share a common ideology and goals – the state system is fragmented, un-coordinated and often contradictory in its response. The battle against Islamist terrorism has employed actors usually beyond the grip of governments. Intelligence officials have recruited warlords, former radicals, and religious leaders as their proxies in shady espionage campaign. Establishing a link between states and terrorists was one of the first policies in the U.S. War on terror and was also one of the first mistakes. This might have been easier for foreign policy novices to understand, but it represented a fundamental misunderstanding of how terrorist groups had come to interact with their state hosts in the preceding decade. The consequences of this policy have been played out in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon.
The state seeks control, through the use of traditional mechanisms: law enforcement, military capability, central fiscal or public policy. But these tools are static – the state inevitably sticks to what it knows. This leads to predictable and often ineffective responses to the new threats and challenges of the 21st century. The individual is proving more adept and in tune with this age. The power of the non-state actor over the state is becoming clearer. This might range from the citizen journalist, the academic, the philanthropist on the benign side. It includes the terrorist cell, the corrupt oligarch and unscrupulous financier on the negative. Either way, states aren’t what they were and in - who knows - ten years may evaporate altogether, leading to a new international relations era.
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
Endless cycles...
The world's most intractable conflict visits London this week as journalists from both sides put their arguments to the capital's lecture circuit. Palestinian Zaki Chehab, political editor of newspaper Al-Hayat, spoke of his close contacts with the Hamas leadership, as described in his acclaimed Inside Hamas. And editor of the Jerusalem Post David Horovitz presented the view from other side of the barbed wire fence. The backdrop is the desperate and dramatic events in Gaza this week, where a blockade has brought further misery but has been relieved across the Egyptian border as militants have destroyed parts of the fence.
The conclusion from both London events is that neither side is right or wrong - the solution will lie with those willing to compromise and probably through moderate politically secure leaders. Unfortunately neither have such direction. Despite a PR coup for Hamas this week, they are still considered too extreme for anyone away from the Arab street. Abbas is constantly undermined by Hamas and is powerless in Gaza and increasingly across the West Bank. Olmert is under renewed pressure from his conduct of last year's Lebanon war via the Winograd report. But the Israeli political minefield means that his departure would have no guarantees of enhanced political leadership.
Chehab describes Hamas leaders as friends and moderates, describing his people as oppressed, dispossessed but prepared to suffer whatever it takes to achieve the dream of statehood. Whilst his journalistic credentials are admirable, he is let down by an inability to criticise his own leaders, failure to understand the ordinary Israeli's perspective, and a naivety towards the role of Iran. A sentiment no different to that on the ground. Horovitz represents mainstream Israeli society. This narrative states that the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza has been squandered by Hamas; all Israel wants is a partner for peace; unlike the Palestinians there are no illusions towards the role of Iran. Leaving aside the permanent restrictions on travel, economic sanctions, checkpoints and assassinations, Israel - says Horovitz - want nothing to do with Gaza. If the Qassam rockets were to cease, the blockade would end and negotiation could follow.
Unfortunately - as Chehab seems to confer - resistance is regarded as the legitimate right in whatever form that might be, and Hamas are simply responding to Israeli restrictions and pressure, rather than attacking Israel unprovoked. The break over the Egyptian border has now undermined Israel's siege tactics and given no reason for Hamas to discontinue Qassam attacks. Horovitz believes Israel does not know what it is doing. Its tactics haven't succeeded, so what next? The full scale invasion of Gaza has been hinted for months, but negotiation looks more likely than total war. Former members of the Israeli military establishment have called for talks with Hamas. But this is a long way off, hatred and distrust are currently too great. Whatever the path to peace is, Hamas - despite the efforts of Bush, Abbas and Olmert to sideline - is too strong and an unavoidable player in the crisis. Horovitz is obviously sceptical - Hamas' religious imperative means that negotiation and concession are against their nature. But hardline religious parties are also influential in Israel and concessions in Judea and Samaria are equally difficult to extract.
The conclusion from both London events is that neither side is right or wrong - the solution will lie with those willing to compromise and probably through moderate politically secure leaders. Unfortunately neither have such direction. Despite a PR coup for Hamas this week, they are still considered too extreme for anyone away from the Arab street. Abbas is constantly undermined by Hamas and is powerless in Gaza and increasingly across the West Bank. Olmert is under renewed pressure from his conduct of last year's Lebanon war via the Winograd report. But the Israeli political minefield means that his departure would have no guarantees of enhanced political leadership.
Chehab describes Hamas leaders as friends and moderates, describing his people as oppressed, dispossessed but prepared to suffer whatever it takes to achieve the dream of statehood. Whilst his journalistic credentials are admirable, he is let down by an inability to criticise his own leaders, failure to understand the ordinary Israeli's perspective, and a naivety towards the role of Iran. A sentiment no different to that on the ground. Horovitz represents mainstream Israeli society. This narrative states that the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza has been squandered by Hamas; all Israel wants is a partner for peace; unlike the Palestinians there are no illusions towards the role of Iran. Leaving aside the permanent restrictions on travel, economic sanctions, checkpoints and assassinations, Israel - says Horovitz - want nothing to do with Gaza. If the Qassam rockets were to cease, the blockade would end and negotiation could follow.
Unfortunately - as Chehab seems to confer - resistance is regarded as the legitimate right in whatever form that might be, and Hamas are simply responding to Israeli restrictions and pressure, rather than attacking Israel unprovoked. The break over the Egyptian border has now undermined Israel's siege tactics and given no reason for Hamas to discontinue Qassam attacks. Horovitz believes Israel does not know what it is doing. Its tactics haven't succeeded, so what next? The full scale invasion of Gaza has been hinted for months, but negotiation looks more likely than total war. Former members of the Israeli military establishment have called for talks with Hamas. But this is a long way off, hatred and distrust are currently too great. Whatever the path to peace is, Hamas - despite the efforts of Bush, Abbas and Olmert to sideline - is too strong and an unavoidable player in the crisis. Horovitz is obviously sceptical - Hamas' religious imperative means that negotiation and concession are against their nature. But hardline religious parties are also influential in Israel and concessions in Judea and Samaria are equally difficult to extract.
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Fuelling the feudalism...
Political assassinations, government corruption, state of emergency rule and an ongoing guerrilla war have brought Pakistan to its knees. Under such pressure, life still goes on though and Pakistan's economy - having shown steady growth over the last decade - has yet to be infected by the widespread political turmoil. But a sudden downturn in Pakistan's economy could be the tipping point. The diversity of Pakistan's economy fuels this political discord - the military retain vast industrial assets reinforcing their stranglehold on the state; whilst poverty and the collapse of state education fills madrasas and bloats radical jihadist movements. Recent power shortages and creeping inflation are signs of an impending economic collapse. The economy is moving up the long list of issues for candidates to discuss at the much delayed election. As India booms next door, the middle classes become further disillusioned - the group that politicians ultimately appeal to in elections.
The feudal system - that empowers landowners in a close knit clan society - has been Pakistan's backbone since its inception. Agrarian holdings provide economic power for aristocrats, from which - through corruption - political and military power is derived. And now this tradition has spread to the military establishment. The seminal text by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa on this hidden industrial empire estimates that the military holds £10bn of assets, 12m acres of public land and a third of heavy manufacturing output. Whilst this infrastructure accumulates untold wealth for a cadre of generals - a national network of bakeries, banks, insurance companies and universities funded by the army benefits Pakistani society. This omnipresent role has been accepted as part of Pakistan since partition and Pakistanis clearly benefit from the stability provided by such a behemoth. But since 2001, American aid has gone directly to reinforcing the military's dominance, undermining moves towards democratic economic transparency and perpetuating a culture of corruption and feudalism.
The feudal system - that empowers landowners in a close knit clan society - has been Pakistan's backbone since its inception. Agrarian holdings provide economic power for aristocrats, from which - through corruption - political and military power is derived. And now this tradition has spread to the military establishment. The seminal text by Dr Ayesha Siddiqa on this hidden industrial empire estimates that the military holds £10bn of assets, 12m acres of public land and a third of heavy manufacturing output. Whilst this infrastructure accumulates untold wealth for a cadre of generals - a national network of bakeries, banks, insurance companies and universities funded by the army benefits Pakistani society. This omnipresent role has been accepted as part of Pakistan since partition and Pakistanis clearly benefit from the stability provided by such a behemoth. But since 2001, American aid has gone directly to reinforcing the military's dominance, undermining moves towards democratic economic transparency and perpetuating a culture of corruption and feudalism.
The black economy also plays a vital role in arming and supporting violent Islamist groups' war against the state. The hawala money transfer system has enabled an influx of funds from the Gulf and Europe. Despite efforts by Pakistan and American treasury intelligence to outlaw such transfers, Pakistan's porous financial system and foreign donations disguised as charitable gifts make prevention impossible. So this source of funds - with additional finances from the opium trade - leaves militant groups relatively unaffected by economic downturns. Recruitment to militant groups via madrasas also benefits from poverty, as through their dual position as welfare centres, religious schools provide shelter to the needy. Further poverty will maintain this flow of militant recruits, but the situation is already bad.
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Bhutto suffers the inevitable
Having survived an assassination attempt on her first day and facing physical and political threats from all sides, Benazir Bhutto's return to Pakistan has ended in tragedy and sadly an inevitable assassination. With such a pressing Islamist threat, the Zia old guard still flexing their influence, and great uncertainty over how much control Musharraf actually has, this conclusion to Bhutto's career and undoubtedly the start of a new violent chapter for Pakistan is not surprising. Bhutto was without doubt a corrupt and feudal leader who had been unable to state a clear vision for the future since her return, but she was probably the second lesser of the four evils.
Two conclusions are clear from this assassination in Rawalpindi. Musharraf has no control over internal security and his state of emergency tactic of arresting moderates has clearly backfired. Second the Islamists are clearly in the ascendancy, they have penetrated internal state security apparatus with the capability to attack any politician regardless of their security detail. There is also the more alarming prospect of a return to the Zia-Islamist alliance of the 1980s. Zia ordered the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Rawalpindi, a garrison town, might be considered one of the more secure Pakistani cities but it's military and ISI presence may not be a coincidence. Rawalpindi has also witnessed several bomb attacks over the last few years, including an assassination attempt on Musharraf in December 2003 and recent suicide attacks against the military.
Where does this leave Pakistan? Firstly Musharraf's response will be closely monitored, especially those who accuse him of collusion in this attack. Then the elections are due to occur early next year, can any candidate feel safe when campaigning, will Islamists escalate their campaign emboldened by this success, will elections actually take place? Musharraf has evaporating support in Washington, Sharif has failed to convince, meanwhile America's ultimate concern - Al Qaeda and neo-Taliban forces along the Afghanistan border - can only feel stronger after this assassination. Bhutto was unequivocal in her support for a US onslaught in the tribal areas if elected. The Islamist violence that erupted after the storming of the Red Mosque has continued with relentless ferocity and Pakistan is now close to if not over the edge.
Two conclusions are clear from this assassination in Rawalpindi. Musharraf has no control over internal security and his state of emergency tactic of arresting moderates has clearly backfired. Second the Islamists are clearly in the ascendancy, they have penetrated internal state security apparatus with the capability to attack any politician regardless of their security detail. There is also the more alarming prospect of a return to the Zia-Islamist alliance of the 1980s. Zia ordered the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. Rawalpindi, a garrison town, might be considered one of the more secure Pakistani cities but it's military and ISI presence may not be a coincidence. Rawalpindi has also witnessed several bomb attacks over the last few years, including an assassination attempt on Musharraf in December 2003 and recent suicide attacks against the military.
Where does this leave Pakistan? Firstly Musharraf's response will be closely monitored, especially those who accuse him of collusion in this attack. Then the elections are due to occur early next year, can any candidate feel safe when campaigning, will Islamists escalate their campaign emboldened by this success, will elections actually take place? Musharraf has evaporating support in Washington, Sharif has failed to convince, meanwhile America's ultimate concern - Al Qaeda and neo-Taliban forces along the Afghanistan border - can only feel stronger after this assassination. Bhutto was unequivocal in her support for a US onslaught in the tribal areas if elected. The Islamist violence that erupted after the storming of the Red Mosque has continued with relentless ferocity and Pakistan is now close to if not over the edge.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Tea with the enemy
In the secretive, delicate and ruthless covert arena, hard-nosed negotiations with adversaries occur regularly. Official admittance is often rare though, as it undermines public political statements, puts moderates (those usually doing the talking) at risk from extremists, and is often far from productive. Just as British intelligence negotiated with Irish republicans prior to an official agreement, Israelis liaised with Fatah, and the CIA have cultivated contacts with Sunni insurgents. Today's reports of MI6 meetings with the Taliban is not news therefore, not in terms of intelligence services historical activities nor in light of the current conflict in Afghanistan. This story has moved to the political level as British domestic opposition accuse Gordon Brown of backtracking on a previous promise not to negotiate with the Taliban; and Afghan authorities, having just expelled two diplomats, are looking but failing to convince the world that progress is being made. American commanders have also expressed dissatisfaction with the very idea of negotiations with an extremist movement that harboured Al-Qaeda militants - vital to the group's rise in the 1990s.
MI6, the British army, the UN and various other players in Afghanistan's latest great but not very gratifying game is without an end in sight. A war that appeared concluded in early 2002 has come back with a vengeance this year. MI6 are merely continuing a long held role and manipulating long held assets. SIS played an auxiliary role during the Afghan war against the Soviets, had a deep and valuable relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud in the following decade, and were at the forefront of the UK-US invasion in October 2001. Neither SIS nor the British government have verified these recent reports and will not do so.
Call it pragmatism or the product of an increasingly intractable conflict, as up to 10,000 Taliban insurgents in a six year plus war are forcing alternative and radical solutions. Splitting the Taliban between an acceptable indigenous faction and the hard line foreign mixed cadre could be the strategy behind MI6's liaison. The increasing foreign influence adds urgency to any possible deal with indigenous militias. The rise of the Pakistani neo-Taliban across the border - allied closely to the Afghan Taliban leadership - has narrowed options further. Suddenly NATO - despite the recent re-capture of Musa Qala - is in a position of weakness as the threat has been trebled by expanding militancy on either side.
MI6, the British army, the UN and various other players in Afghanistan's latest great but not very gratifying game is without an end in sight. A war that appeared concluded in early 2002 has come back with a vengeance this year. MI6 are merely continuing a long held role and manipulating long held assets. SIS played an auxiliary role during the Afghan war against the Soviets, had a deep and valuable relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud in the following decade, and were at the forefront of the UK-US invasion in October 2001. Neither SIS nor the British government have verified these recent reports and will not do so.
Call it pragmatism or the product of an increasingly intractable conflict, as up to 10,000 Taliban insurgents in a six year plus war are forcing alternative and radical solutions. Splitting the Taliban between an acceptable indigenous faction and the hard line foreign mixed cadre could be the strategy behind MI6's liaison. The increasing foreign influence adds urgency to any possible deal with indigenous militias. The rise of the Pakistani neo-Taliban across the border - allied closely to the Afghan Taliban leadership - has narrowed options further. Suddenly NATO - despite the recent re-capture of Musa Qala - is in a position of weakness as the threat has been trebled by expanding militancy on either side.
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Iranian estimate or guesstimate..
The drum is back in the cupboard for the time being. The drum beat of war that has become louder and faster for the last year has been knocked out of its stride. This week's National Intelligence Assessment (NIE) downplays the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme: "in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program"; as of June 2007 the intelligence agencies "assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program". Iran still poses a threat, being "technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015," with "the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." The pressure seems to have abated and this volte-face appears to be an apparent triumph for the diplomatic voices of Britain and Europe. Russia and China will use this revision as a justification for their caution and resist stricter sanctions. The hawks in the Bush administration have had their march to Tehran cancelled, temporarily, but will there be a rapprochement with the long standing foe? On the evidence of today's White House conference, this seems unlikely. Iran continues to antagonise America (and Israel) in a variety of ways. Any grand bargain now still implies acceptance of Iran's behaviour and this seems inconceivable given the rhetoric of recent months. A clearer understanding of the Bush administrations animosity and intransigence towards Iran is provided by the fact that this estimate was drafted one year previous. Verbal assaults have been used to discourage Iranian meddling in Iraq, maintain Bush's "war president" status, and scare Democrats from any dovish position, in the knowledge that the threat isn't that great. The intelligence agencies have shown their hand early to avoid a repeat of the Iraq war build up - where the inevitability of war shaped intelligence, not the reverse. A collision course between Iran and Bush is still a route, but the CIA, NSA or anyone of the other 14 agencies are not providing the map this time. When neocons like Robert Kagan - an intellectual architect of the Iraq war - advise the administration to talk to Iran, the game seems up, a new era of peace will surely be upon us! Unfortunately we have two radical unpredictable and ignorant leaders on either side, who are more than capable of snatching defeat from the jaws of an acceptable score draw.
Iran's leadership will react with predictable self-satisfaction. A role exists for the Gulf Arab states - having concluded the recent Gulf Co-operation Council meeting in Qatar - facing a diminished Iranian threat, as a possible bridge between the Great Satan and the Mad Mullahs. The Democrats are refocusing the domestic debate with diplomacy as the sole elixir, putting to bed neoconservative militarism. But Bush probably would have gone to war against Iraq with or without credible intel, and Iran - as the estimate does state - still has the capability to go nuclear, so Ayatollahs lounging on Texan ranches or George and Laura admiring the mosques of Qom are far off visions at the moment I'm afraid.
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015," with "the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." The pressure seems to have abated and this volte-face appears to be an apparent triumph for the diplomatic voices of Britain and Europe. Russia and China will use this revision as a justification for their caution and resist stricter sanctions. The hawks in the Bush administration have had their march to Tehran cancelled, temporarily, but will there be a rapprochement with the long standing foe? On the evidence of today's White House conference, this seems unlikely. Iran continues to antagonise America (and Israel) in a variety of ways. Any grand bargain now still implies acceptance of Iran's behaviour and this seems inconceivable given the rhetoric of recent months. A clearer understanding of the Bush administrations animosity and intransigence towards Iran is provided by the fact that this estimate was drafted one year previous. Verbal assaults have been used to discourage Iranian meddling in Iraq, maintain Bush's "war president" status, and scare Democrats from any dovish position, in the knowledge that the threat isn't that great. The intelligence agencies have shown their hand early to avoid a repeat of the Iraq war build up - where the inevitability of war shaped intelligence, not the reverse. A collision course between Iran and Bush is still a route, but the CIA, NSA or anyone of the other 14 agencies are not providing the map this time. When neocons like Robert Kagan - an intellectual architect of the Iraq war - advise the administration to talk to Iran, the game seems up, a new era of peace will surely be upon us! Unfortunately we have two radical unpredictable and ignorant leaders on either side, who are more than capable of snatching defeat from the jaws of an acceptable score draw.
Iran's leadership will react with predictable self-satisfaction. A role exists for the Gulf Arab states - having concluded the recent Gulf Co-operation Council meeting in Qatar - facing a diminished Iranian threat, as a possible bridge between the Great Satan and the Mad Mullahs. The Democrats are refocusing the domestic debate with diplomacy as the sole elixir, putting to bed neoconservative militarism. But Bush probably would have gone to war against Iraq with or without credible intel, and Iran - as the estimate does state - still has the capability to go nuclear, so Ayatollahs lounging on Texan ranches or George and Laura admiring the mosques of Qom are far off visions at the moment I'm afraid.
Monday, November 19, 2007
Green Dragons' Den....
There was no Theo Pathitis wit, Duncan Bannatyne canniness or a Peter Jones put-down and only one wacky entrepreneur, rather serious products for a real global problem with an appropriately informed panel. The Green Dragons' Den - Dragons' Lair to avoid infringing IPR - was no less entertaining and certainly more inspiring, with sustainable products being pitched to a panel mixed with venture capitalists, academics and journos. With only seven minutes to convince, there was little opportunity to expand on the better products, but was a saviour for some badly thought out rambles that made up the numbers. The prize on offer - not a multimillionaire's cash or nause - but simply one month's PR. A couple of websites encouraging localism, democratic empowerment and sustainable green economics were credible but not going to change embedded bad habits. More radical ideas such as an extensive network of food tunnels around the UK and bio-reactors based on Australian lake deposits became bogged down and over elaborate, although the intention was benign. A bizarre plan to convert email - telephone booths into recycling photo booths was wackiest of the night. But it was the technological products that had the longest shelf life. A rechargeable battery that fitted into a USB port and PC energy saving software were up and running products that probably didn't need PR. Carbon 8 systems - a process that uses accelerated carbon technology to treat contaminated soils and waste - was the most innovative product of the night and got my vote. These entrepreneurs are at the forefront of the environmental battle against climate change and are shaping sustainable futures. Hopefully the next event will have a cash incentive above some simple PR.
http://environment.meetup.com/302/calendar/6770530/
http://environment.meetup.com/302/calendar/6770530/
Monday, November 12, 2007
South Asia’s militarists
South Asia is in the grip of a dual crisis - neighbours Iran and Pakistan face invasion and implosion respectively. The latest can be summarized as this: Iran is accused of developing a nuclear weapons programme, exporting terror and generating regional instability; Pakistan has a nuclear weapons programme, has exported and currently is an epicentre of terror, regarded by the West as a vital ally, but now faces an unpredictable internal political crisis. Both countries have arrived at these current states through dramatic upheaval over the last thirty years, but specifically, two individuals Reza Shah Pahlavi and General Zia ul-haq were critical players in this process. It would be easy to criticise the American foreign policy that supported these two regional strongmen, as part of its anti Soviet geopolitical strategy. The lack of foresight and application of realpolitik is a widely distributed critique and not without merit. But more importantly both dictators thrived in post colonial environments, where nationalism, industrialisation and militarism catapulted their respective states into revolution and division. South Asia’s desire to re-assert itself against the West was a stronger dynamic in shaping today’s predicament than misguided American foreign policy.
American support undoubtedly contributed to both leaders dominance. The Shah was considered by his opponents as America’s puppet, although he would gain the upper hand in the relationship after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. General Zia seizure of power – including the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – drew American criticism, but the Pakistani leader re-positioned his country as a vital weapon against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. American aid provided the basis for industrialisation for both countries, Iran in the 1960s from the Johnson administration, Pakistan in the 1980s from Carter then Reagan. Arms were the pivot of the dependency. Unprecedented volumes of military equipment were sold to Iran following Nixon’s 1972 carte blanche in exchange for oil revenues; Pakistan acted as the CIA’s conduit, supplying and training the Afghan mujahedin whilst building its own military capacity at the same time. In the post Vietnam era both nations benefited from a relocation of American arms supplies, but it was the ambition of these two leaders that drove their military dictatorships. It was their ambitions that led in different ways to two highly volatile states, now regarded as preeminent international security threats.
The obvious similarity between these two is the critical role designated to them by American Cold War strategy to contain communism. The Shah feared Soviet influence from the early days of his rule, was restored to power by the CIA’s 1953 coup against perceived communist influence, established the brutal security service SAVAK to repress domestic communism, and built up a fearsome military arsenal to counter Soviet influence in Iraq and the Gulf. Zia considered communism the preeminent ideological threat to Islam, cultivated relations with anti-communist hardliners in Washington, and directed Pakistan’s entire military resources in the Afghan-Soviet war.
Domestically both leaders consolidated their power through expansive economic development. The Shah pushed for stratospheric industrialisation fuelled by oil revenues, his ego, and Persian nationalism. Zia presided over modest growth in comparison - seven percent annually - but this development favoured the elites, the military class and Zia political allies. Whilst the Shah used Iran’s natural resource for development, Zia relied on Gulf and American aid. Corruption and economic mismanagement characterised both regimes, eventually creating widespread popular opposition.
The critical constant is Islam, but in totally opposing ways. The Shah acknowledged Shia Islam as part of Persian culture, but presented Pahlavi nationalism as preceding Islam and by implication superior. His extravagances, absolutism and, critically, alliance with the United States alienated the Shia clergy. By focusing on Marxist opposition, the Shia infrastructure – led by Khomeini – was free to develop, laying the path for Islamic revolution. Zia had seen how the power of Islam in Iran shaped politics, so sought to avoid the Shah’s mistakes. Once Zia had seized power, he embarked on an extensive Islamization programme, turning against the grain of Pakistani secular culture, imposing strict Sharia law, restructuring the economy to Islamic precepts, and elevating political party Jamaat e Islami to a central role. Pakistan received vast donations from Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East to establish madrasas and build mosques. Zia encouraged foreign support for both the Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s own Islamic renaissance. But ultimately the consequence of the Shah’s ambivalence and Zia’s proselytizing was the same – the growth of militant Islamism.
The second devastating legacy left by these two autocrats was the proliferation of nuclear technology. The Shah’s nuclear programme – assisted by Kissinger from 1975 - was short-lived and dismantled by Khomeini after 1979, but the infrastructure and expertise plus the very concept of an Iranian bomb remained. Zia’s contribution to South Asia’s nuclear arms race was clearer. Building on the programme established by Bhutto in the early 1970s, Zia pursued an active nuclear agenda – led by AQ Khan – that was ignored by the American leadership, for the sake of preserving Pakistan’s role against the greater Soviet threat. The balance between containment and proliferation always swung to the former in America’s Cold War policy.
Similarities continue in how they managed relations with the West. Both were opportunists, adept at exploiting American geopolitical interests against the backdrop of Cold war policy. The Shah played up the Soviet threat across Iran’s north border, exploited Nixon’s weak foreign policy position through 1972 and 1973, and ultimately received the freedom to purchase any military hardware needed and pursue a hawkish oil policy. Zia likewise seized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to re-establish relations in Washington and improve his poor international reputation, then exploited Reagan’s hardline against communism to up the military aid.
American arms policy and pursuit a wider geopolitical interests are commonly cited as factors in the region’s transformation in the last two decades of the Cold war, but it was the extremism that developed during both reigns that dominated. Khomeini’s militant rhetoric was inadvertently cultivated by the Shah’s excesses and American alliance, whilst Zia directly cultivated Islamic extremism, creating prototypes for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Just as the Shah pursued his pro Western secular rule to the end – despite fierce clerical opposition; Zia continued his support for the most radical elements in the Afghan jihad - especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – until his death.
The consequence of such autocratic behaviour differed in gestation. The Shah’s excesses exploded in Iran at the end of his reign; Zia’s legacy emerged again with a vengeance in the second year of this century in New York. Both leaders left a legacy of resentment, division and brutality. Critically both leaders used American foreign policy and military aid to reinforce their own positions, and while doing so, creating the impression that America only saw South Asian states as pawns against the Soviets. The anti-West sentiment that now exists in South Asia is as much down to the Shah and Zia’s thirst for militarism and its consequences, as it was from American foreign policy.
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
United Kingdoms of hypocrisy
Gordon Brown's claims to be a champion of democracy and courage will again be examined tomorrow. In his one-to-one meeting with King Abdullah II, Brown will have the opportunity to raise the question of human rights in the kingdom. Will he? Well bottler Brown created some distance from Bush shortly after taking office, but has not pursued a clear Iraq policy since. He attempted to take the lead during the recent Burma uprising, but this has slipped down the agenda after his snap election fiasco. The neocons are raising the pressure on Iran with military strikes closer than ever, but Brown again has failed to set out a clear British position. So during this completely unnecessary and shameful state visit, Brown has the opportunity to raise beheading, torture (of British subjects as well as countless Saudis), the absence of any democracy, zero advancement in equal gender rights, and the exporting of extremist Wahhabist literature to Britain and ideology across the Middle East. Will he? No probably not. Like his predecessor, his definition of an ethical foreign policy will fall flat under the slightest scrutiny or when money is involved. Through the subtle nuances of diplomatic politeness and blind translation, any attempt at raising HR will fail, the Saudis will simply ignore it or attempt another blackmail, in a similar mode to the BAE investigation. The Saudi royalty may be ignorant, misogynistic, anti semitic and extreme, but they are not stupid. Britain's vulnerability (real and perceived) to losing the Saudi relationship, has been exploited by the guardians of Islam's holiest sites for years to build more palaces and purchase more hi-tech (unused) military hardware.
The idea that Saudi Arabia is a vital ally in the war on terror also fails to convince. Firstly the Saudis were in the large part responsible for the extremist Islam's rise and provided 15 hijackers to prove it. Second, its efforts to prevent jihadists crossing to Iraq have been non-existent - the fear of an Iraqi Shia force is too great a danger to prevent the bombers. Although Saudi Arabian intelligence funded and trained Afghan mujahedin in the 1980s, its presence in South Asia has faded since 2001, when it ceased to be one of the Taliban's three supporters in the world. The recent terrorist threats to Britain emerged deep inside Pakistan's north west frontier not the Gulf.
A blind post-imperial oil-driven foreign policy has dug Britain a hole, in which we are unable to have honest relations with repugnant allies. Hypocrisy still rules the waves and, whether it's Brown or Cameron in charge, will continue to do so.
See also
http://www.johannhari.com/archive/article.php?id=1202
The idea that Saudi Arabia is a vital ally in the war on terror also fails to convince. Firstly the Saudis were in the large part responsible for the extremist Islam's rise and provided 15 hijackers to prove it. Second, its efforts to prevent jihadists crossing to Iraq have been non-existent - the fear of an Iraqi Shia force is too great a danger to prevent the bombers. Although Saudi Arabian intelligence funded and trained Afghan mujahedin in the 1980s, its presence in South Asia has faded since 2001, when it ceased to be one of the Taliban's three supporters in the world. The recent terrorist threats to Britain emerged deep inside Pakistan's north west frontier not the Gulf.
A blind post-imperial oil-driven foreign policy has dug Britain a hole, in which we are unable to have honest relations with repugnant allies. Hypocrisy still rules the waves and, whether it's Brown or Cameron in charge, will continue to do so.
See also
http://www.johannhari.com/archive/article.php?id=1202
Friday, October 19, 2007
On the edge...
With an eerie sense of inevitability, Benazir Bhutto's return to Pakistan after an eight year exile turned into one of the country's worst acts of terrorism, with up to 130 people killed. Pakistan has taken one more step towards civil war, between the most likely suspects - militant Islamists - and pro democracy forces. Bhutto has promised to reinstall democracy in a pro American government. This statement in itself is easily enough to incur the wrath of Taleban linked militants and members of the intelligence services (ISI). She also stated her intent to up the battle against Al-Qaida in Pakistan's north west frontier. Forget Iraq, Pakistan is now the front in the global war against militant Islam. Al-Qaida have stated their intention to overthrow Musharraf's government, the Taleban are resurgent and now united with Pakistan's equivalent, and the military retain, possibly expand still, the country's nuclear arsenal. The stakes could not be higher.
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Burma - The Lotus Revolution?
The world holds its breath, while world leaders and diplomats discuss the situation in Burma. At what point does the world do anything? Obviously this is a domestic situation and there is a limit to what can be done, but if violence does break out - will the world act? I am sure that various intelligence, diplomatic and unclassifiable figures are working behind the scenes here, but on the surface it seems like we are simply reacting, waiting for something bad to happen and will wheel out some condemnations and sanctions that will make little difference to the insane generals who rule this country. For once a good old fashioned coup - a la Iran 53 - might be acceptable.
It's great that David Milliband makes statements on News24, but this will make little difference to the junta. The pressure needs to put on China first, as they understand that repression is simply unacceptable. It's great that Gordon Brown wrote a book on Aung San Suu Kyi but what will actually do, now this critical moment has arrived. Forget all the other foreign policy issues for the Brown rule, this will be the true test. It also seems astonishing that whilst the UN Security council meet, members countries retain investments there (i.e. French oil company Total), providing economic support to the regime. You either have an ethical CSR programme or you don't. You may oppose forced labour and be aware of local human rights issues, but that is contradicted by actual investment there, which inevitable feeds into the coffers of the corrupt regime.
Limited information is seeping through from Burma, but critically with various media available, any repression will not be kept in the dark. Whether the outcome resembles a Velvet revolution or another 1988 / Tianamen square massacre is unclear. Limited democratic reform could be the solution, if brokered by China. This would establish momentum for eventual democracy. But the tight grip and paranoid outlook of the junta makes compromise unlikely. Mind you, has there ever been a Buddhist revolution?
http://www.burmanet.org/news/
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php
It's great that David Milliband makes statements on News24, but this will make little difference to the junta. The pressure needs to put on China first, as they understand that repression is simply unacceptable. It's great that Gordon Brown wrote a book on Aung San Suu Kyi but what will actually do, now this critical moment has arrived. Forget all the other foreign policy issues for the Brown rule, this will be the true test. It also seems astonishing that whilst the UN Security council meet, members countries retain investments there (i.e. French oil company Total), providing economic support to the regime. You either have an ethical CSR programme or you don't. You may oppose forced labour and be aware of local human rights issues, but that is contradicted by actual investment there, which inevitable feeds into the coffers of the corrupt regime.
Limited information is seeping through from Burma, but critically with various media available, any repression will not be kept in the dark. Whether the outcome resembles a Velvet revolution or another 1988 / Tianamen square massacre is unclear. Limited democratic reform could be the solution, if brokered by China. This would establish momentum for eventual democracy. But the tight grip and paranoid outlook of the junta makes compromise unlikely. Mind you, has there ever been a Buddhist revolution?
http://www.burmanet.org/news/
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php
New wave foreign policy
Gordon Brown in his Treasury straight jacket made only a handful of comments on foreign policy during Blair's ten years, so it is not surprising that this trend continues. Brown obviously had to establish his position over the critical issues - Iraq, the Special Relationship, global poverty - early in his tenure, but the detail has rightly been left to the new Foreign Secretary. David Milliband's predecessors had declining influence over the Blair decade, from Robin Cook's ethical but underachieving first term effort, through Jack Straw's ultimate flattening by Blair's post 9/11 Iraq war juggernaut, to Margaret Beckett's complete awe then subservience with last year's Lebanon war marking the nadir for the Blair era FCO role. Milliband will seek to reassure the FCO staff that this tide is being reversed. But remember only three months ago, he was the Blairite candidate for the next leader and hence with a Blairite foreign policy.
Not unexpectedly, Milliband told Labour conference delegates that lessons had been learnt in the previous years, that multilateral diplomatic solutions were the priority, and that flawed military actions were the cause of current predicaments: "The lesson is that while there are military victories there is never a military solution. There's only military action that creates the space for economic and political life." Current crises in Darfur and Burma were touched on, plus Europe, although this is more political battle with the Murdoch press than a genuine foreign policy issue these days. In the "second wave" of New Labour foreign policy, "progress is possible. Britain has a vital role to play. And the prize is immense."
This is all optimistic stuff, but new crises will emerge and fault lines will develop. Britain can carve out a unique international position or fall into America's slipstream. Brown's frosty encounter with Bush this summer suggests a change, but the unpopularity of Blair's Middle East policy has left such a mark that a change of direction is inevitable. A refocus away from the Middle East is the most likely change ahead, Burma and Zimbabwe are two immediate concerns that will assist this shift. Blair's current role for the Quartet and the Iraq withdrawal, allows Britain to create some distance and unalientate millions of Muslims offended by recent actions. Recreating a positive image of Britain in the Islamic world is surely Milliband's priority. Britain's withdrawal from region also makes involvement in the most serious crisis on the horizon - Iran's nuclear programme - easier. With the end to a proxy war with Iran in Basra, Britain is less likely to be swept along in this crisis. As the diplomatic fulcrum, Britain can carve out a diplomatic role between Iran, America and Israel, improving its world standing immeasurably in the process. An optimistic vision, I admit. There remains a painful contradiction in Britain's foreign policy: the link between business interests and support for repressive regimes. Until we move beyond the BAEs, annual DSEI arms supermarkets and support for military regimes like Pakistan, our foreign policy will continue to be self-defeating.
Rapid global power shifts, climate change and the obvious unexpected crises, mean that the next ten years could look very different to the proceeding decade. India and China are superpowers in the making, but it does not take much for small events to create diplomatic crises - look at Russia-British relations since the Litvinenko murder. Climate change may well supersede all these international spats, when such a global issue arises, it makes diplomatic difference seem irrelevant. Foreign policy may well decline over the next decade and be replaced by International policy. Dramatic changes in environmental conditions could make the idea of an independent foreign policy self defeating and of minor importance.
Not unexpectedly, Milliband told Labour conference delegates that lessons had been learnt in the previous years, that multilateral diplomatic solutions were the priority, and that flawed military actions were the cause of current predicaments: "The lesson is that while there are military victories there is never a military solution. There's only military action that creates the space for economic and political life." Current crises in Darfur and Burma were touched on, plus Europe, although this is more political battle with the Murdoch press than a genuine foreign policy issue these days. In the "second wave" of New Labour foreign policy, "progress is possible. Britain has a vital role to play. And the prize is immense."
This is all optimistic stuff, but new crises will emerge and fault lines will develop. Britain can carve out a unique international position or fall into America's slipstream. Brown's frosty encounter with Bush this summer suggests a change, but the unpopularity of Blair's Middle East policy has left such a mark that a change of direction is inevitable. A refocus away from the Middle East is the most likely change ahead, Burma and Zimbabwe are two immediate concerns that will assist this shift. Blair's current role for the Quartet and the Iraq withdrawal, allows Britain to create some distance and unalientate millions of Muslims offended by recent actions. Recreating a positive image of Britain in the Islamic world is surely Milliband's priority. Britain's withdrawal from region also makes involvement in the most serious crisis on the horizon - Iran's nuclear programme - easier. With the end to a proxy war with Iran in Basra, Britain is less likely to be swept along in this crisis. As the diplomatic fulcrum, Britain can carve out a diplomatic role between Iran, America and Israel, improving its world standing immeasurably in the process. An optimistic vision, I admit. There remains a painful contradiction in Britain's foreign policy: the link between business interests and support for repressive regimes. Until we move beyond the BAEs, annual DSEI arms supermarkets and support for military regimes like Pakistan, our foreign policy will continue to be self-defeating.
Rapid global power shifts, climate change and the obvious unexpected crises, mean that the next ten years could look very different to the proceeding decade. India and China are superpowers in the making, but it does not take much for small events to create diplomatic crises - look at Russia-British relations since the Litvinenko murder. Climate change may well supersede all these international spats, when such a global issue arises, it makes diplomatic difference seem irrelevant. Foreign policy may well decline over the next decade and be replaced by International policy. Dramatic changes in environmental conditions could make the idea of an independent foreign policy self defeating and of minor importance.
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Green Wars
A combination of David Cameron's political opportunism, rampant floods across Britain this summer and the boom of supposedly green corporate marketing campaigns by high street retailers, has thrown the issue of greenism to the political forefront. Never before has environmentalism been so prominent in public discourse, but like any other burning issue - in our polarised and sceptical society - naysayers, exploiters, bickerers and political opportunists seek to turn the issue to their advantage. First take the Conservatives, many will see their green agenda as refreshing and full of foresight, bringing in the rural intelligentsia and young urban neo-libs. Others - including Tory grandees descended from 19th century fat cat industrialists, a weary and inherently cynical right wing press, and a handful of Atlanticist CC deniers - tear the party in the opposite direction. The heralded Quality of Life report triggered more debate internally than with the public. If in power, their fragmented views would only worsen.
As political parties act with greater inefficacy, high street brands have attempted to fill the void. And surely they are acting for the greater good, surely they have ample profits to restructure their entire businesses for our new verdant age, and surely they are going to been universally green rather than simply recycling plastic carrier bags. It looks great and green has so far been underused in the marketeers colour scheme, but without actual clear planning and environmental know how, this supermarket sustainability will be unsustained. These contradictions were set out in an excellent article this week.
The final theatre of war in our ecogeddon is a civil war in which both sides will lose but is in political sphere with the most potential and sadly offers the only purist option. In November this year, Green party members will vote in a referendum to decide whether to reform their structure and elect a party leader. Or to maintain the existing non-hierarchical system, where power is horizontal, and two principal speakers front the party. To make progress in British politics and be electable, the Yes campaign argue it is necessary for the public to see a formal figure who can represent the Greens. Leaders can misrepresent, corrupt and erodes party participation, as Derek Wall current principal speaker and No or Green Empowerment voice says: "Conventional leadership with a single leader almost always comes with commitments to water down the message, to remove real debate and participation." Since the major political parties have jumped on the green bandwagon, the pressure on the Green party is more acute. The next election - whenever that is - will be make or break. But would have a leader make a difference? It would be superficial, yes, but could - with the right individual - break down perceptions of Greens and make the party more electable. Cliches of clause 4 aside, something radical does need to happen, as support for the Greens is levelling out with only slow election on election increases. There is real potential for expansion amongst the 18-35 demographic, and any fillip to that would help. Voters don't like divided parties and favour divided confused parties even less. The referendum could provide clarity internally and to the public, then again it could create more disharmony. Then then again, most voters could see it as irrelevant.
Amidst this debate and discord, groups across the country promote their own self-sufficiency. Festivals like Waveform are mostly hedonism, but with a dose of awareness. Government and institutions might continue the debate, but individuals are making real changes themselves.
As political parties act with greater inefficacy, high street brands have attempted to fill the void. And surely they are acting for the greater good, surely they have ample profits to restructure their entire businesses for our new verdant age, and surely they are going to been universally green rather than simply recycling plastic carrier bags. It looks great and green has so far been underused in the marketeers colour scheme, but without actual clear planning and environmental know how, this supermarket sustainability will be unsustained. These contradictions were set out in an excellent article this week.
The final theatre of war in our ecogeddon is a civil war in which both sides will lose but is in political sphere with the most potential and sadly offers the only purist option. In November this year, Green party members will vote in a referendum to decide whether to reform their structure and elect a party leader. Or to maintain the existing non-hierarchical system, where power is horizontal, and two principal speakers front the party. To make progress in British politics and be electable, the Yes campaign argue it is necessary for the public to see a formal figure who can represent the Greens. Leaders can misrepresent, corrupt and erodes party participation, as Derek Wall current principal speaker and No or Green Empowerment voice says: "Conventional leadership with a single leader almost always comes with commitments to water down the message, to remove real debate and participation." Since the major political parties have jumped on the green bandwagon, the pressure on the Green party is more acute. The next election - whenever that is - will be make or break. But would have a leader make a difference? It would be superficial, yes, but could - with the right individual - break down perceptions of Greens and make the party more electable. Cliches of clause 4 aside, something radical does need to happen, as support for the Greens is levelling out with only slow election on election increases. There is real potential for expansion amongst the 18-35 demographic, and any fillip to that would help. Voters don't like divided parties and favour divided confused parties even less. The referendum could provide clarity internally and to the public, then again it could create more disharmony. Then then again, most voters could see it as irrelevant.
Amidst this debate and discord, groups across the country promote their own self-sufficiency. Festivals like Waveform are mostly hedonism, but with a dose of awareness. Government and institutions might continue the debate, but individuals are making real changes themselves.
Monday, July 30, 2007
Relations Renewed?
Predictions of Gordon Brown opening up a cross Atlantic divide or making an immediate Iraq withdrawal, as a gesture to Labour backbenchers, now seem way off the mark after today's first summit with George Bush. A public spat was always unlikely for such a cautious and calculated politician. Rather a more subtle schism has evolved. Brown is the consummate professional and today's performance was business-like, free of his predecessor's showbiz and machismo, and looking towards sorting out serious world issues first and foremost.
Behind the scenes, life goes on. Whether financial, legal, cultural or diplomatic, the ties will not feel even a ripple from Brown's political tide. Britain and the United States will remain bound in the Anglo-America sphere long after the two current leaders have moved on. The focus on personality - whether Colgate or communion - over the last six years clouded what the Special Relationship really is about. Brown - true Atlanticist and devotee of the free market - represents something closer to the core of the relationship. His passion for liberal democracy, open markets, globalisation and humanitarian intervention is probably stronger than Blair's ever was. It was these values that united the Atlantic in the immediate post-war period.
Both current leaders are moving in opposite directions. Brown's successful opening month in office, sees him ahead again in the polls with complete control over his party. Bush's popularity has plummeted, he is lacking any political direction and is isolated with few allies. Brown has been able to play this meeting from a position of strength, maintain cordiality and act firstly in British interests, for the crowd second.
The "special relationship" has always been an obsession of the British media. America has many "special relationships" as well as Britain. Global issues - climate change, international terrorism, Third world poverty - are now reaching critical points. Ensuring that solutions are forged through US-UK leadership seems to be Brown's primary objective, before heading off to the next diplomatic destination. Always the one-man political juggernaut, establishing links with his soulmates amongst the Democrats and tweaking yet more advantage over the Tories seems also to be a Brown prerogative.
But there are several issues that blighted relations in Blair's days and unfortunately it is too early to expect resolution on these, in public at least. Guantanamo, rendition, extradition treaties and Iraq have the potential to re-emerge as divisive and unpopular sticking points. Brown might have made smart political moves, keeping relations civil whilst appeasing both the Murdoch lobby and his own backbenchers, but within his first year in office, he will face the same difficult decisions and cross-Atlantic dilemmas, that did so much harm to his predecessor.
Behind the scenes, life goes on. Whether financial, legal, cultural or diplomatic, the ties will not feel even a ripple from Brown's political tide. Britain and the United States will remain bound in the Anglo-America sphere long after the two current leaders have moved on. The focus on personality - whether Colgate or communion - over the last six years clouded what the Special Relationship really is about. Brown - true Atlanticist and devotee of the free market - represents something closer to the core of the relationship. His passion for liberal democracy, open markets, globalisation and humanitarian intervention is probably stronger than Blair's ever was. It was these values that united the Atlantic in the immediate post-war period.
Both current leaders are moving in opposite directions. Brown's successful opening month in office, sees him ahead again in the polls with complete control over his party. Bush's popularity has plummeted, he is lacking any political direction and is isolated with few allies. Brown has been able to play this meeting from a position of strength, maintain cordiality and act firstly in British interests, for the crowd second.
The "special relationship" has always been an obsession of the British media. America has many "special relationships" as well as Britain. Global issues - climate change, international terrorism, Third world poverty - are now reaching critical points. Ensuring that solutions are forged through US-UK leadership seems to be Brown's primary objective, before heading off to the next diplomatic destination. Always the one-man political juggernaut, establishing links with his soulmates amongst the Democrats and tweaking yet more advantage over the Tories seems also to be a Brown prerogative.
But there are several issues that blighted relations in Blair's days and unfortunately it is too early to expect resolution on these, in public at least. Guantanamo, rendition, extradition treaties and Iraq have the potential to re-emerge as divisive and unpopular sticking points. Brown might have made smart political moves, keeping relations civil whilst appeasing both the Murdoch lobby and his own backbenchers, but within his first year in office, he will face the same difficult decisions and cross-Atlantic dilemmas, that did so much harm to his predecessor.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
The Second War on Terror
Nearly six years on from 9/11, since which two major wars have been launched and numerous military operations have been undertaken against Islamist enemies, a new far more potentially dangerous showdown is looming. Following the US led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the destruction of large segments of Al-Qaeda's infrastructure, the militant group's leadership escaped via Tora Bora to Pakistan's North-West frontier. This remote and rugged border territory has provided the safe haven for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda's upper echelon since. It has also assumed the operational centre for attempted plots in Europe and Asia - the 7/7 attacks were co-ordinated from this refuge. The region's importance to Al-Qaeda has now been acknowledged in the latest National Intelligence Estimate. Its value as a safehaven has been long undervalued by the Bush administration, as they maintain that Iraq is now the central front against Islamic extremism. But Pakistan's north flank remains the ideological and operational nerve centre.
Whilst Al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq has been a steady source of violence and provided a valuable training arena for future jihadist terrorist operations, the war there remains nationalist and sectarian. The presence of international jihadists in Iraq has long been exaggerated by both the Bush administration and Al-Qaeda to justify the initial invasion and to recruit volunteers to fight the US occupation. The test of wills that exists there means that jihadists will be enlisted and then killed by US troops in a continuous apocalyptic cycle of violence. Protecting the American Homeland will not be influenced by this endless struggle, the terrorism that emits from Iraq has so far been regional and lacks strategic input.
So while Al-Qaida "seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of Al-Qaida in Iraq" and uses AQI to "raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives", its command centre remains Pakistan's North West frontier. This is not a unexpected revelation, the US have fought a low level and unsuccessful campaign alongside the Pakistan army in Waziristan since 2004. Numerous propaganda videos have emerged from the region and intelligence in European terror plots regularly points back to Pakistan. But critically the upsurge in Taliban insurgency, the radicalisation of Pakistani Islamist groups and the recent siege of the Red Mosque, now places the country as the main concern for the US.
The National Intelligence Assessment has been picked up as further evidence of the Bush administration's flawed counterterrorism policy. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. “Changing our strategy in Iraq and narrowing our military mission to countering al Qaeda terrorism [..]would be the single greatest thing we could do to undermine al Qaeda’s ability to use Iraq as a recruiting and propaganda tool fueling the growth of regional terrorist groups.” Countering the threat that exists globally has been hindered by the drain of resources in Iraq. “It is a travesty that Osama bin Laden remains at large nearly six years after the 9/11...the Bush administration and most congressional Republicans remain stubbornly wedded to a flawed strategy in Iraq,” Reid adds. And this is where Pakistan's importance comes in.
President Musharraf's precarious position means that the US will be waiting in the wings to provide military support when needed. This - without doubt - will worsen the situation. The Bush administration have unfinished business with Bin Laden, and any campaign of airstrikes will also make matters worse. Al-Qaeda's links to local tribal leaders, its patronage and the Talibanisation of Pakistan military and civic institutions means that the US face an ever harder hearts-and-minds task than Iraq. Military success will be hard to find. The US unleashed all its military might in October 2001 without achieving their primary objective. Local allies and intelligence agencies are notoriously corrupt, unreliable and prone to change sides in an instance. Airstrikes are also highly flawed and offer easy propaganda.
Cultivating local tribal contacts in a similar way to tactics employed in Iraq's Anbar province could present success. North and South Waziristan have witnessed an influx of 40,000 trained fighters of Arab, Chechen and Uzbek origin. Local Taliban leaders and the Pakistan army came to a peace accord in September 2006, but this was sabotaged by Al-Qaeda. The US (and indeed Britain) are desperate to prop up Musharraf, but face a situation as complicated as Iraq, that they dare not leave to play out to a violent conclusion nor interfere with unpredictable consequences. The border region may be vast and undefined, but the possibility of US attacks on Pakistani soil have been fiercely resisted by officials.
Whilst Al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq has been a steady source of violence and provided a valuable training arena for future jihadist terrorist operations, the war there remains nationalist and sectarian. The presence of international jihadists in Iraq has long been exaggerated by both the Bush administration and Al-Qaeda to justify the initial invasion and to recruit volunteers to fight the US occupation. The test of wills that exists there means that jihadists will be enlisted and then killed by US troops in a continuous apocalyptic cycle of violence. Protecting the American Homeland will not be influenced by this endless struggle, the terrorism that emits from Iraq has so far been regional and lacks strategic input.
So while Al-Qaida "seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of Al-Qaida in Iraq" and uses AQI to "raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives", its command centre remains Pakistan's North West frontier. This is not a unexpected revelation, the US have fought a low level and unsuccessful campaign alongside the Pakistan army in Waziristan since 2004. Numerous propaganda videos have emerged from the region and intelligence in European terror plots regularly points back to Pakistan. But critically the upsurge in Taliban insurgency, the radicalisation of Pakistani Islamist groups and the recent siege of the Red Mosque, now places the country as the main concern for the US.
The National Intelligence Assessment has been picked up as further evidence of the Bush administration's flawed counterterrorism policy. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. “Changing our strategy in Iraq and narrowing our military mission to countering al Qaeda terrorism [..]would be the single greatest thing we could do to undermine al Qaeda’s ability to use Iraq as a recruiting and propaganda tool fueling the growth of regional terrorist groups.” Countering the threat that exists globally has been hindered by the drain of resources in Iraq. “It is a travesty that Osama bin Laden remains at large nearly six years after the 9/11...the Bush administration and most congressional Republicans remain stubbornly wedded to a flawed strategy in Iraq,” Reid adds. And this is where Pakistan's importance comes in.
President Musharraf's precarious position means that the US will be waiting in the wings to provide military support when needed. This - without doubt - will worsen the situation. The Bush administration have unfinished business with Bin Laden, and any campaign of airstrikes will also make matters worse. Al-Qaeda's links to local tribal leaders, its patronage and the Talibanisation of Pakistan military and civic institutions means that the US face an ever harder hearts-and-minds task than Iraq. Military success will be hard to find. The US unleashed all its military might in October 2001 without achieving their primary objective. Local allies and intelligence agencies are notoriously corrupt, unreliable and prone to change sides in an instance. Airstrikes are also highly flawed and offer easy propaganda.
Cultivating local tribal contacts in a similar way to tactics employed in Iraq's Anbar province could present success. North and South Waziristan have witnessed an influx of 40,000 trained fighters of Arab, Chechen and Uzbek origin. Local Taliban leaders and the Pakistan army came to a peace accord in September 2006, but this was sabotaged by Al-Qaeda. The US (and indeed Britain) are desperate to prop up Musharraf, but face a situation as complicated as Iraq, that they dare not leave to play out to a violent conclusion nor interfere with unpredictable consequences. The border region may be vast and undefined, but the possibility of US attacks on Pakistani soil have been fiercely resisted by officials.
A Flood of Excuses....
The floods that have hit England in the last few weeks are a massive wake up call, both for responses to climate change and preparedness for the inevitable disasters that this will bring. Natural disasters not only lay a physical toll on a country's infrastructure in particular housing but also exact a heavy political price on government. Whereas terrorism, economic downturn or social disorder can be attributed to certain groups, global trends or individuals, natural disasters have no scapegoat. A political response above blame-pointing is now needed.
President Bush was left floundering with no one to blame in the wake of hurricane Katrina, but managed to make Michael D. Brown the fall guy. Environmental secretary Hillary Benn puts this down to unprecedented rain levels rather than poor flood defences, in an old new labour spin. Prime minister Brown has avoided the denial and thankfully acknowledged that global environmental changes are a cause, but must admit that the country has been hit hard. However stating that we must adapt and cope is not a satisfactory approach for the future.
The political debate focuses on whether the government was prepared, but no political party anticipated this and their reactions have been damp. David Cameron has been criticised for an overseas trip to Africa, whilst his county is three feet under. Since no political party had factored in these events in their environmental policy, they are all treading water.
Environmental disasters always offer an opportunity for the Green party to state their case, and Principal Speaker Dr. Derek Wall has condemned the government's hypocritical environmental policy: "Government failure to prepare for the flooding is matched by government failure to tackle the causes of climate change. On the one hand the government is encouraging the building of new houses on flood plains, on the other it is expanding Heathrow and our motorway network." How much of a role climate change played in this deluge is unclear though. Dr Malcolm Haylock, an expert on climate extremes: "You can't attribute any specific event to climate change."
As the floods subside though, will this be an opening salvo in our future battle with the climate or will it be another episode in Britain's wacky weather history. Only certain parts of the UK have been effected and summer 2008 could be its usual mild and only slightly unpredictable self. But it might not be floods next time. An urgent public inquiry into prevention and preparedness against all natural disasters is now a priority.
http://www.theecologist.org/blog_full.asp?blog_detail_id=166
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood/
President Bush was left floundering with no one to blame in the wake of hurricane Katrina, but managed to make Michael D. Brown the fall guy. Environmental secretary Hillary Benn puts this down to unprecedented rain levels rather than poor flood defences, in an old new labour spin. Prime minister Brown has avoided the denial and thankfully acknowledged that global environmental changes are a cause, but must admit that the country has been hit hard. However stating that we must adapt and cope is not a satisfactory approach for the future.
The political debate focuses on whether the government was prepared, but no political party anticipated this and their reactions have been damp. David Cameron has been criticised for an overseas trip to Africa, whilst his county is three feet under. Since no political party had factored in these events in their environmental policy, they are all treading water.
Environmental disasters always offer an opportunity for the Green party to state their case, and Principal Speaker Dr. Derek Wall has condemned the government's hypocritical environmental policy: "Government failure to prepare for the flooding is matched by government failure to tackle the causes of climate change. On the one hand the government is encouraging the building of new houses on flood plains, on the other it is expanding Heathrow and our motorway network." How much of a role climate change played in this deluge is unclear though. Dr Malcolm Haylock, an expert on climate extremes: "You can't attribute any specific event to climate change."
As the floods subside though, will this be an opening salvo in our future battle with the climate or will it be another episode in Britain's wacky weather history. Only certain parts of the UK have been effected and summer 2008 could be its usual mild and only slightly unpredictable self. But it might not be floods next time. An urgent public inquiry into prevention and preparedness against all natural disasters is now a priority.
http://www.theecologist.org/blog_full.asp?blog_detail_id=166
http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood/
Wednesday, July 4, 2007
A Strip of Light
Small successes are rare but always welcome in the Middle East and BBC journalist Alan Johnston's release today is certainly a minor one creating a chink of light within the dark cloud over the region. After 114 days, successful negotiations between his captors (the previously unheard of Army of Islam) and Hamas have not only set free Johnston, but have presented an opportunity for the international community to engage with the Islamist group.
First lets bring in a little bit of perspective. Despite the obvious peril and threats made to Johnston, this was not in the same desperate league as the kidnappings in Iraq. Journalists know the risks and attractions to kidnappers of western journalists, a handful had been kidnapped in Gaza over the last two years. Also, hundreds of Palestinians are detained without trial in Israel and IDF soldier Gilad Schalit remains a hostage as do two soldiers in Lebanon. Clearly those detained illegitimately lack the potential publicity a BBC journalist can drum up. In humanitarian terms, this is a more pressing issue. The release of Johnston always lay in the fractious power struggles within Gaza, rather than Islamists continuous conflict with the West. The demands to release Abu Qatada and others always seemed a red herring (or is that green).
Johnston will lie low for a while with a less risky assignment, the focus has shifted now to Hamas. Since their seizure of power two weeks ago, the group have tightened the pressure on the Dagmush clan. Releasing Johnston was Hamas' first priority and their first true test. Hamas has had slim positive PR since coming to prominence in the 2nd intifada. Their pretensions to being a moderate resistance organisation with legitimate authority and effective governance over Gaza and eventual the whole of Palestine have not been harmed. Israel's politicians have immediately contrasted this act with the year plus custody of Schalit. Whereas Hamas clearly did not hold Johnston, so were able to gain good publicity. They (or more specifically the military wing) are widely assumed to hold Schalit, and any peace negotiation with Israel will start there. Hamas would have more to gain from any deal than Israel in a prisoner swap, which makes any negotiation a long way off.
New Foreign Secretary David Milliband hinted at deepening contacts and trust. Britain might have strengthened its relations (or influence) as a result of this episode, but it is still way short of negotiating with the United States and Israel. The irreconciable differences between Hamas and Israel will be the last possible stage of any peace process. The first step is the settling of bitter differences with Fatah and a national unity government across the whole occupied territories. But Israeli strategists will not deviate from dire predictions of Hamas' long term objectives - the destruction of Israel. Whilst Hamas might reform itself and gain international recognition, Israel will base its see the Islamist group as an existential threat first and foremost.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages//877955.html
First lets bring in a little bit of perspective. Despite the obvious peril and threats made to Johnston, this was not in the same desperate league as the kidnappings in Iraq. Journalists know the risks and attractions to kidnappers of western journalists, a handful had been kidnapped in Gaza over the last two years. Also, hundreds of Palestinians are detained without trial in Israel and IDF soldier Gilad Schalit remains a hostage as do two soldiers in Lebanon. Clearly those detained illegitimately lack the potential publicity a BBC journalist can drum up. In humanitarian terms, this is a more pressing issue. The release of Johnston always lay in the fractious power struggles within Gaza, rather than Islamists continuous conflict with the West. The demands to release Abu Qatada and others always seemed a red herring (or is that green).
Johnston will lie low for a while with a less risky assignment, the focus has shifted now to Hamas. Since their seizure of power two weeks ago, the group have tightened the pressure on the Dagmush clan. Releasing Johnston was Hamas' first priority and their first true test. Hamas has had slim positive PR since coming to prominence in the 2nd intifada. Their pretensions to being a moderate resistance organisation with legitimate authority and effective governance over Gaza and eventual the whole of Palestine have not been harmed. Israel's politicians have immediately contrasted this act with the year plus custody of Schalit. Whereas Hamas clearly did not hold Johnston, so were able to gain good publicity. They (or more specifically the military wing) are widely assumed to hold Schalit, and any peace negotiation with Israel will start there. Hamas would have more to gain from any deal than Israel in a prisoner swap, which makes any negotiation a long way off.
New Foreign Secretary David Milliband hinted at deepening contacts and trust. Britain might have strengthened its relations (or influence) as a result of this episode, but it is still way short of negotiating with the United States and Israel. The irreconciable differences between Hamas and Israel will be the last possible stage of any peace process. The first step is the settling of bitter differences with Fatah and a national unity government across the whole occupied territories. But Israeli strategists will not deviate from dire predictions of Hamas' long term objectives - the destruction of Israel. Whilst Hamas might reform itself and gain international recognition, Israel will base its see the Islamist group as an existential threat first and foremost.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages//877955.html
Monday, July 2, 2007
Crisis Management Lessons Part 1 and 2
Gordon Brown has been in politics long enough to never slip into complacency and having waited ten years to become prime minister, he is probably glad it hasn't been a dull start. Nearly one week in and two crises are upon his newly formed government. Dominating the headlines is the dual terror plot in London and Glasgow. The second crisis, still floating in and out of the headlines, are the floods which hit large parts of northern England last week and remain in many unfortunate homes across Yorkshire. Terror and the environment are on their way to being the two defining issues of Brown's premiership.
Just as airports, national landmarks and sports events are surrounded by armed police and security personnel, the military and emergency services are piling up the sandbags in preparation for the next deluge. Both crises are a real test for the economy and government responsiveness. The floods will eventual subside and the sun might come out in late July, likewise arrests will be made (8 so far) and the British flippancy will return. But what lessons will the Brown government take? Terror and climate change share unpredictable traits, so there are no clear solutions.
Brown's phlegmatic manner and his sturdy - head dinner lady - Home Secretary Jacqui Smith have provided a calm response to the terror attacks. The tactics are clearly inspired by the Iraqi insurgency, one of the suspects qualified as a doctor in Baghdad. The British have created enemies amongst Sunnis and Shia alike, plus there is the unknown Iranian factor. Whereas 7/7 was the product of domestic alienation, this plot has a "blowback" feel, as terrorists trained in bombing tactics in a distant warzone bring their operations back with a vengeance.
Despite the visceral effect of the terrorist attacks, the floods have claimed more lives and will present the longer term threat. The layman assumption was that global warming would, as its name suggests, create droughts and unbearable heat waves, but all round extreme weather is the most likely outcome. Unprecendented rain fall, violent hail storms and widespread flooding poses a new and no less worrying concern. Rather than another annual occurence of heavy rain, this has rightly been classified as a disaster. A budget of £800m has been agreed by the Department of Environment under new secretary Hillary Benn. So far, last week's floods had caused damage to 27,000 homes and 5,000 businesses, with an estimated clean-up cost of £1 billion. Now Britain is certainly not on the frontline of climate change or in a high-risk zone, but if seven people can die in a week's deluge in Britain, then imagine the impact in parts of the world that lack Western standards of infrastructure or emergency response services. Disaster planners and politician are going to need to consider all the possible effects of climate change.
Just as airports, national landmarks and sports events are surrounded by armed police and security personnel, the military and emergency services are piling up the sandbags in preparation for the next deluge. Both crises are a real test for the economy and government responsiveness. The floods will eventual subside and the sun might come out in late July, likewise arrests will be made (8 so far) and the British flippancy will return. But what lessons will the Brown government take? Terror and climate change share unpredictable traits, so there are no clear solutions.
Brown's phlegmatic manner and his sturdy - head dinner lady - Home Secretary Jacqui Smith have provided a calm response to the terror attacks. The tactics are clearly inspired by the Iraqi insurgency, one of the suspects qualified as a doctor in Baghdad. The British have created enemies amongst Sunnis and Shia alike, plus there is the unknown Iranian factor. Whereas 7/7 was the product of domestic alienation, this plot has a "blowback" feel, as terrorists trained in bombing tactics in a distant warzone bring their operations back with a vengeance.
Despite the visceral effect of the terrorist attacks, the floods have claimed more lives and will present the longer term threat. The layman assumption was that global warming would, as its name suggests, create droughts and unbearable heat waves, but all round extreme weather is the most likely outcome. Unprecendented rain fall, violent hail storms and widespread flooding poses a new and no less worrying concern. Rather than another annual occurence of heavy rain, this has rightly been classified as a disaster. A budget of £800m has been agreed by the Department of Environment under new secretary Hillary Benn. So far, last week's floods had caused damage to 27,000 homes and 5,000 businesses, with an estimated clean-up cost of £1 billion. Now Britain is certainly not on the frontline of climate change or in a high-risk zone, but if seven people can die in a week's deluge in Britain, then imagine the impact in parts of the world that lack Western standards of infrastructure or emergency response services. Disaster planners and politician are going to need to consider all the possible effects of climate change.
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