Saturday, June 28, 2008

Middle East - Chapter 6

The Middle East see-saw is fluctuating with its characteristic unpredictability as moves towards peace and ceasefires are matched by new tensions and violence. There is a sense that a new chapter in the region is opening. Partly due to several political facts that will occur in the next six months, but partly due to a long overdue re-evaluation of the problems in the region and the best way to resolve them. This new chapter could possibly see South West Asia move onto a more equal standing to the rest of the industrialised world, but it also has the potential to become far worse - even to the point of total destruction. So finish reading chapter five, make yourself a cup of tea, then turn the page to start this gripping new chapter....

What we do know and can predict with some certainty are the following. That a new American president will be elected by the end of the year and with this will follow a re-consideration of US policy in the region. The new President will either stay in Iraq until an unspecified date or will initiate a
troop withdrawal to be completed within a 16 month time frame. Those are pretty stark differences in policy. The second way in which the new President will impact on the region is diplomatic. One will maintain the current diplomatic freeze on Iran, tighten sanctions and take military action if it comes to it. The other will meet the Tehran leadership without preconditions. Again with such differences in policy the future of the region could go either way. Tehran will also hold elections in 2009 and the end of Ahmadinejad's radical rule could change the course of this crisis. Regarding Israel and the Palestinians, both candidates have expressed strong support for Israel recently and have not put forward any radical alternatives to the status quo, so that conflict will continue as it is.

Linked to America's destiny in the region is the strong possibility of some sort of enhanced sovereignty for Iraq. As Iraqi forces gain the upper hand against the insurgency, greater political control will follow. Ten out of Iraq's 18 provinces have been handed back to Iraqi government control - Diwaniyah is
the latest. The tide may well have turned since the start of the surge in 2007, but Sunni provinces are still beyond the Baghdad government's control. Iraq also remains heavily influenced by Iran, the provinces under Iraqi government control are Shiite and Prime Minister Maliki shows no sign of cooling Iranian ties under American pressure. But the battle against the militias appears to being won and maybe, just maybe, 2009 could be a year of serious reconciliation for Iraq. Iraq is pushing for further sovereignty with the setting of a US timetable for withdrawal and possible prosecution of American troops but these are flimsy aspirations.

Finally for the United States, as Iraq achieves some vague concept of stability, a new front is re-opened in Afghanistan. The recent revival of the Taliban shows that western concepts of victory are very flimsy. A "victory" in late 2001 seems a long way off now. The Taliban may have been in power from 1996 for five years, but once ousted, they simply reverted back to their previous guise as the insurgency that defeated the Soviets in the 1980s. Having regrouped in Pakistan, they pose an even greater threat to regional stability. Bin Laden is not heard of, but he seems irrelevant, as the international jihadist movement has established its own momentum. Expect America's involvement in the Afghan war to take a dangerous twist in the next chapter.

Another near certainty for the region is a change in political leadership in Israel. A Likud win in Israel's elections
raises the possibility of renewed war with Hezbollah and military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran will achieve nuclear capability in the next two years, according to Israeli intelligence, so war may be inevitable regardless of who leads Israel. The long delayed full scale invasion of Gaza will probably happen as well, regardless of who leads Israel. Linked to America's destiny closely, the relationship between new leaders in both countries, will be critical. Presidents have regularly been well received in Israel, mostly because the said President has gone out of his way to appear pro Israeli. But Israeli public opinion is unsure about Obama and what approach he will adopt. A new US-Israel relationship could emerge, but many have argued it will slip back into the traditional mould.

Some slightly less certain but equally important possibilities for the region revolve around economic factors. The region's wealth has clearly developed at a rapid rate, but now with this growth, influence might follow. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are the powerhouses using oil wealth to not only expand international economic influence - the rise of sovereign wealth funds being the main vehicle - but through significant investment in education and technology - the region is developing its own soft power. Dubai is a centre for experimental architecture, science and medicine research - providing an intellectual export to go with the energy one. Talent may also be drawn into the region, lured by advanced educational institutions flushed with investment and superior facilities.

So that's what could be reasonably expected for the next few years, there are certainly more probabilities and there will also be the odd surprise. Could Syria finally come in from the cold? Could a democratic forces gain momentum in say Lebanon or Pakistan? Another rollercoaster chapter for the region. But in this next stage, events will also lead to new thinking.

The mistakes and misadventures of the last seven years have now spurred a new wave of intellectual output. How the West should interact with the Middle East (and the rest of the world for that matter) is analysed in some new groundbreaking works. Robert Kagan, neoconservative writer and adviser to John McCain, in his new book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, sees the Middle East being absorbed into a larger geopolitical game with the democratic West facing the autocratic East - Russia and China. The extremist forces in the region dedicated to tradition that reject modernity, argues Kagan, such as Al-Qaeda and Iranian Mullahs, simply cannot win. Neither the outside world with such a vested interest in the region, nor the peoples themselves, will allow this backward path to happen.

On an even broader scale, Philip Bobbitt's Terror and Consent sets out the landscape for the 21st century, as states divide between those of terror or consent. With this new paradigm must also follow a re-evaluation of the war on terror to date, which has been misconceived and mismanaged. Islam is not the issue but rather shifts in how states and warfare are linked. Like Kagan, the Middle East is a focus for the 21st century conflict, but certainly will not be the sole arena. But critically America's role in the region and the world may be diminishing - the view of Fareed Zakaria in his book The Post American World. The threats that have emerged from the Middle East, argues Zakaria, are essentially exaggerated. Once American policymakers realise this, they will see the folly of involvement in the region.

Thursday, June 5, 2008

Lebanon - the enemy within

The recent talks between Lebanon's leaders in Doha has merely ushered in a lull, and whether a civil war or long uneasy ceasefire follows is an unanswerable and complex question. The urgent gathering that followed Hezbollah's mock coup last month has presented an uneasy calm - requiring conflict management not conflict resolution. This was the consensus at the Frontline club's panel discussion on Lebanon's future last week. Not only is Lebanon's complex internal fabric highly flammable, but an explosion of violence could equally be provoked by its neighbours Syria and Israel and the more distant meddlers Iran and the United States. A country that is only slightly smaller than Jamaica and Kosovo, is a battleground for all the major players in the region. Like Kosovo Lebanon is on the fault line. Christian post colonial remnants battles the emerging so-called Shia crescent. Cutting across this split are Lebanon's Sunni population still influenced by Syria and an anxious Israel seeking to protect its northern border at all costs. The root of this current imbroglio could be the inconclusive Taif agreement in 1989, Israel's invasion in 1982, the initial eruption of violence in 1975 or the anachronistic overtly confessional constitution drawn up in 1943. But the history - although critical - will come later.

All sides made concessions at Doha, including Hezbollah. But the Shia movement ultimately received what it wanted, negotiating from a position of strength, gaining greater cabinet representation. The fighting that erupted in May and the following deal proved several facts. That the Lebanese army is no match for Hezbollah; the neighbouring powers, especially Syria, do not wish for civil war; that the United States is a peripheral player in this crisis; and the Arab states for once invested political capital in a Middle East peace agreement. So crisis averted and some stability might be on the horizon. But the possibility of violence is there on all fronts.

Hezbollah, designated a terrorist organization by the US, Israel obviously, and many other western states, has real political representation. Unacceptable to the US and funded by Iran, Hezbollah presents Lebanon's gravest problem. That is a fact, regardless of whether you are pro or anti Hezbollah. The movement has rearmed to its levels pre 2006 war, its support has galvanised and returned. The spark for the recent trouble was an incursion against Hezbollah's communications network and the sacking of an airport security chief with alleged links to the group. This network - revealed in its full extent last month - shows the grip Hezbollah has on Lebanon and its position as a state within a state. Dominance in the Bekaa valley and the coastline puts them in a strong strategic position. It also raises the vision among western intelligence agencies of Iranian presence on the eastern Mediterranean.

Israel's fear of Iranian influence on its northern border only grows as Hezbollah strengthens. Historians may debate whether Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon created Hezbollah or whether a Shia political force would inevitably have developed, given the Shias lowly position in Lebanese society. But Iranian influence put resistance to Israel in south Lebanon or in all of historic Palestine at the heart of Hezbollah's ideology. This opposition led to a painful guerrilla war in the 1990s until Israel's withdrawal in 2000. The 2006 war was merely a messy draw and the long awaited replay will most likely be even more inconclusive and bloody. Especially as both Iran and the United States have reiterated their material support on both sides.

The outcome in Lebanon will depend on whether US-Iranian relations improve. With a new presidency next year, things could improve. Then again, Lebanon like Iraq could be the spark for the much feared wider showdown between America, Iran and Israel. But for Lebanon, local issues are always more important than the geopolitical games it seems to be dragged into. The concept of Lebanon needs re-examination, its constitution is long overdue reforming and political flexibility must be paramount for leaders on all sides. Bottom up solutions as always. The Lebanese are tired of the Middle East's political roundabout. Hezbollah's presence is problematic, but despite Israel and America's opposition, they have shown that they are impossible to ignore.